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ABSTRACT
ATOMISM AND INFINITE DIVISIBILITY
FEBRUARY 1994
RALPH E. KENYON JR., B.A., B.S., MIAMI UNIVERSITY,
M.A.
,
PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY, M.S., OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
M . A , UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph . D
. ,
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Bruce Aune
This work analyzes two perspectives, Atomism and Infi-
nite Divisibility, in the light of modern mathematical know-
ledge and recent developments in computer graphics. A de-
velopmental perspective is taken which relates ideas leading
to atomism and infinite divisibility. A detailed analysis
of and a new resolution for Zeno's paradoxes are presented.
Aristotle's arguments are analyzed. The arguments of some
other philosophers are also presented and discussed. All
arguments purporting to prove one position over the other
are shown to be faulty, mostly by question begging. Includ-
ed is a sketch of the consistency of infinite divisibility
and a development of the atomic perspective modeled on com-
puter graphics screen displays. The Pythagorean theorem is
shown to depend upon the assumption of infinite divisibili-
ty. The work concludes that Atomism and infinite divisibil-
ity are independently consistent, though mutually incompati-
ble, not unlike the wave/particle distinction in physics.
v
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PREFACE
The belief that there are indivisible units of exten-
sion is termed 'atomism'. The opposing view is that exten-
sion is infinitely divisible. For the purpose of this work,
I shall occasionally refer to this position as 'divisionism'
and the adherents to this view as 'divisionists'
.
Preliminary studies showed that some of the traditional
arguments supporting infinite divisibility make use of pre-
misses which effectively beg the question. The same appears
true of Atomism. In this work I show that the traditional
mathematical arguments for infinite divisibility are flawed
and that most philosophers in the past did not discover the
flaw. My view is that the two positions, atomism and divi-
sionism, are each internally consistent and, though mutually
incompatible, are independent in a way not unlike Euclidean
and non-Euclidean geometries or the waves and particles of
quantum physics.
xi
CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARY NOTIONS
Introducti on
People have been dividing things and sharing them for
millennia. When it comes to dividing something among two or
three persons, the "right amount" can often be cut or broken
off at once. But when one is dividing something among four
persons, it is often easier to divide it in half and then
divide each half in half again. Division into smaller por-
tions is most often achieved by a process of repeated or
successive division. At some time long past it must have
occurred to someone to wonder how long such a process could
be continued.
Practical experience sometimes suggests that there is a
limit to the process. In dividing something, and dividing
the results again, sooner or later one reaches a limit where
the remaining parts cannot practically be divided again.
For some things this limit is much more obvious than others.
Dividing a bag of marbles among children provides an example
of an obvious limit. But practical experience also suggests
that sometimes there are non-obvious cases. Dividing a
pitcher of liquid refreshment among imbibers provides an
example of this. One might resort to counting drops, but
1
2drops come in different sizes, and there is the matter of
the residual film of liquid. We can easily conjecture that
the liquid could continue to be divided beyond our ability
to distinquish the divisions.
We can use a magnifyinq glass and a razor blade to
divide a droplet of water that we could not perceive as
large enough to divide when we looked at it with only the
naked eye. We can also use a microscope and appropriately
sized tools to divide the droplet that seemed too small to
divide when we used only the magnifying glass. The use of
higher and higher powers of magnification shows that at each
stage an apparently indivisible droplet proved to be divisi-
ble when it was looked at with greater magnification. While
very high powered devices have been able to distinguish the
individual atoms of heavy metals, no such results have been
obtained with water. It is our atomic theory of matter that
allows us to conclude that there is also an indivisible
minimum size for water.
Apart from that modern atomic theory, we can easily
generalize that the process of successive division need have
no end — that the process can continue indefinitely. But
we are quite aware that our perception is limited. There
are smallest amounts — less than which we cannot perceive.
3Humans, being the divisive people we are, take sides and
argue about such guestions. We may reasonably infer that
ancient peoples were divided in their opinions even before
recorded history.
Atomism is the view that successive division must ter-
minate in some indivisible minimum. The opposing view is
the belief that successive division can be continued infi-
nitely. Since division is a process that is applied to
something, an immediate dichotomy concerning the guestion is
possible. The question may be asked with emphasis on the
object of the process, or it may be asked with emphasis on
the process itself. It is from the former that the name
'infinite divisibility' derives and is given to the view
opposing atomism. I shall sometimes refer to that view as
'divisionism' . Divisionism is most often expressed as the
view or belief that matter or extension is infinitely divis-
ible. What may be the proper object of the process has
varied with the major philosophical positions.
I have already hinted that recognition or perception
might influence knowledge of divisibility. I will touch on
the epistemological concerns relating to the arguments, but
I will primarily be focusing on the metaphysical aspect of
the question. The Epicureans argued from the perceptible to
4the imperceptible by analogy. More recently the question
was applied to the conceivable.
One way to organize the perspectives taken by concerns
for metaphysical questions, epistemological questions, and
questions regarding conceivability is along a subjective-
objective dimension. Philosophical perspectives fall along
that dimension with realism toward the objective end, ideal-
ism toward the subjective end, and phenomenalism somewhere
between these two.
In the context of realism, one asks whether matter, ex-
tension (space), and duration (time) are infinitely divisi-
ble. In the context of phenomenalism, one asks whether per-
ceptions are infinitely divisible. In the context of ideal-
ism, one asks whether concepts are infinitely divisible. If
one is to focus on the process itself, questions concerning
the meaning of 'infinite' arise.
All these questions can be asked with a decidedly meta-
physical flavor as well as with a decidedly epistemological
flavor, but realism lends itself much more easily to meta-
physical questions while phenomenalism lends itself much
more easily to epistemological questions. And idealism
lends itself more easily to questions regarding conceivabil-
5ity. The ana-
logical rela-
tionships I see
suggest the
visual represen-
tation illus-
trated in figure
1 .
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Figure 1. Subjective-Objective dimension.
In this exposition I shall be concerned mostly with the
validity of various arguments for and against each position.
I am particularly concerned with mathematical arguments that
have been presented and the light they shed on premisses
which have been used to support one or another position. To
"cut to the chase", my research suggests that there is no
valid argument with true premisses which establishes one
position over the other. It seems that there are consistent
models for both positions. And these models differ by one
"axiom" — the presumption of atomism on the one hand or of
infinite divisibility on the other hand.
I also presume a "developmental" perspective consistent
with genetic epistemology. 1 I assume that, for the most
part, earlier writers assimilated or understood by means of
fewer distinctions, and that some problems with earlier
6views may be resolved by more recent distinctions. However,
there are instances when the mere addition of a distinction
is insufficient to resolve the issues. The mappings of con-
cepts may have to be significantly reorganized in order to
accommodate a newer development
.
2 This developmental per-
spective is also suggested by Furley when he traces the
evolution of Atomism as presented by Epicurus:
[This] essay will show how Epicurus' doctrine
evolved; it is a modification, adopted for the
purpose of meeting Aristotle's criticisms, of a
doctrine which the earlier atomists put together
to meet and thwart the Eleatic attack on plural-
ism. 3
Some of the earliest writings on this subject are at-
tributed to Zeno of Elea. By Zeno's time the controversy
was fairly well developed; the positions were characterized
as beliefs in "atomism" and "infinite divisibility". These
contrasting beliefs are closely related to the earlier ques-
tion, whether "things are one" or "things are many". If
things are infinitely divisible, any division into parts
yields parts which are themselves divisible into parts —
"All things are many" (all the way down). If things are not
so divisible then there are things that are not many —
"things are one" (and indivisible).
Even earlier than Zeno, Heraclitus had things to say
about the controversy. Interestingly enough, Heraclitus
7seems to have had the most mature views on the topic, al-
though records of his thoughts are the most scanty. (See
page 17
.
)
Mathematical Induction
Mathematical induction figures prominently in my anal-
ysis of infinite divisibility, and I would be remiss not to
briefly present it here. Mathematical induction is applied
to a statement which is expressed in terms of some arbitrary
natural number, usually represented by 'N' . Induction, as
one might expect, is a way of reasoning to conclusions about
more particulars than may reasonably be examined. Mathemat-
ical induction has two premisses and one conclusion. One
premiss that must be satisfied is that the statement in
question be true for some small value of N. This need not
be the smallest, but it usually is and most often is the
number 1. The second premiss that must be satisfied is a
material conditional going from an arbitrary number N (equal
to or larger than the value used in the first premiss) to
the next larger number N+l. If these two premisses are
satisfied, then one may draw the conclusion that the state-
ment is true for all values of N (greater than or equal to
the small value of N). Suppose we refer to the statement as
S(X). Premiss 1 would be expressed:
S ( A is true.
8Premiss 2 would be expressed:
IF S ( N ) is true THEN S(N+1) is true (whenever N>A) .
The conclusion that may be drawn is:
For ALL X (>A)
,
S(X) is true.
This conclusion is justified by the following reason-
ing. Suppose A is 1. S ( 2
)
may be inferred from S(l) and
premiss 2 by modus ponens. S(3) may be inferred from S(2)
and premiss 2 by modus ponens. This process may be contin-
ued until X is as large as you like. Mathematical induction
is the shortcut method for deducing the truth of S(X) for
all X. Simply by showing that premisses 1 and 2 are satis-
fied for some statement, S(X), we may use mathematical in-
duction to directly demonstrate the truth of S(K) without
going through K-l applications of modus ponens. Because
mathematical induction is only a shorthand for deductive ap-
plications of modus ponens, it is strictly truth preserving,
as are all valid deductive arguments.
Infinity
In the literature three primary senses are given for
the term "infinite" and its derivatives. These are arbi-
trarily large, unending, and aleph null (K 0 ) • Distinguishing
carefully among these senses takes one a long way toward
9resolving Zeno's paradoxes. in many instances substituting
the appropriate phraseology in a premiss statement using the
term "infinite" renders the truth value of the premiss much
more apparent.
The first sense, arbitrarily large, is illustrated by
James Thomson in "Tasks and Super-Tasks".
[T]o say that a lump is infinitely divisible isjust to say that it can be cut into any number of
parts
.
4
Infinity is paired with any number with the implicit under-
standing that this number may be as large as you like.
The second sense, unending, is illustrated by Russell.
Etymologically, 'infinite' should mean 'having no
end'
.
5
The third sense, aleph null, is most precisely captured
by the axiom of infinity in the Zermelo-Frankel set theoret-
ic representation for numbers6 . That axiom is an existence
axiom in that it postulates the existence of a number with
certain properties. The axiom of infinity can be para-
phrased in terms of ordinary natural numbers as follows:
There is a number X (infinity) such that 1<X and whenever
N<X then N+1<X, where N is any natural number generated from
1 by repeated applications of the successor axiom (+1).
10
This axiomatic definition for infinity (K„) explicitly uti-
lizes the structure of mathematical induction.
Motion
The notion of "motion" or "velocity" figures into atom-
ism versus divisionism arguments in a number of ways. it is
implicit in two of Zeno's arguments and explicit in a third.
It is appropriate to present a brief view of the current
space-time perspective on motion to provide an explicit
background for understanding the arguments presented as they
reflect on it.
In mathematical physics velocity ("motion") is defined
as the rate of change of position with respect to time.
When time is taken as a fourth dimension, and one looks at
events as having both spatial and temporal coordinates, no
"motion" can be seen. When one adopts such a "four-dimen-
sional space-time perspective", one attends to a three-di-
mensional "object in motion" as a four-dimensional space-
time "worm" with its "starting position" at one place-time
and its "ending position" at another place-time. The start-
ing position is identified by its having a "lower" time-
coordinate. From the four-dimensional space-time perspec-
tive a "velocity" is seen as just the slope of a line drawn
with both space and time coordinates. It is no different
11
from the rate of change of one spatial dimension with re-
spect to another, such as the slope of a road. For example,
on a road with a 7% grade, the road rises 7 feet for every
100 feet of length. Saying the road "rises" is only valid
in respect to one's position along the road (and whether one
is going up the road or down the road). In order to develop
the analogy with motion, references to time must be removed
from the notion of physical slope. As one stands in differ-
ent positions along the road, one's elevation varies depend-
ing on one's position.
The physical slope of the road corresponds directly to
the ratio of position with respect to time. When an object
in three-space is moving in time its spatial coordinates are
changing, but only as the time coordinates are changing.
Its position coordinate varies with its time coordinate just
as one's elevation coordinate varies with one's position
coordinate along the road.
When one looks at an object from the four-dimensional
space-time perspective one sees all the space-time coordi-
nates of the object. Both the starting point and the ending
point coordinates are immediately available. The view is
one that could be called "omniscient" in that all space-time
positions can be seen "at once". 7 The analogous perspec-
12
tive for viewing the road is from the side. By standing to
one side of the road with a 7% grade, far enough back, one
can see both the bottom and the top of the hill "at once".
In a like manner, "standing to one side of time" allows one
to adopt the four-dimensional space-time perspective and see
both the beginning and end of the motion of an object "at
once"
.
From the four-dimensional space-time perspective no
"motion" is seen at all — thus exonerating the ancient
argument that motion is impossible. However I will discuss
the questions mostly from the more conventional, three-di-
mensional perspective. Keeping in mind the way motion is
defined in mathematical physics will provide a consistent
view of the problems of infinite divisibility and atomism.
Developments Leading Toward Atomism
The concept of the atom did not emerge on the scene
full-blown. It evolved from a number of earlier views
through a gradual process involving a number of stages.
Atoms, as we know them, and as most clearly presented by
Lucretius, are conceived of as hard, indivisible bits of
solid matter that come in various shapes and kinds. They
whiz around in empty space colliding with each other, some-
times bouncing off and sometimes sticking to each other.
13
All the "stuff" of the universe is made up of them. Atoms
could not exist as even a concept were it not for the co-
existence of empty space into which to put them. The uni-
verse can be seen as distinguished into bits of matter and
space. But without the notion of empty space, the notion of
atoms cannot exist.
A "solid" concept of atomism also requires some stabil-
ity concerning the guestions what the stuff of existence may
be made of and in how many kinds it can come. I will touch
only briefly on this question as it is peripheral to my main
interest. But developments in this argument do affect the
development of atomism proper, so I present a brief summary.
Atoms (of matter) also represent a synthesis of the
notions of dividing and not dividing. The stuff of the
universe is divided into bits (atoms), but the atoms them-
selves can not be divided. Required also is some notion of
"size" for matter. Arriving at a birth for the concept of
atomism requires that all these questions have undergone
some development and some resolution. And all these devel-
opments depend upon some notion of existence.
I will not be touching deeply on these early develop-
ments. But I will outline them briefly to establish a con-
14
text for the main discussions. My main focus is on the
mathematical arguments that arise as a result of these early
arguments
.
"Being" or Existence
The question of "being" permeated the early pre-Socrat-
ic philosophy. The convoluted arguments centered around
what appeared then to be worse than an oxymoron — the ap-
parently contradictory act of asserting the existence of
something in order to deny it. The act of speaking or even
thinking something was viewed at the time to have had exis-
tential import.
when the goddess points out to her listener that
he could neither know nor point out what-is-not
(2.7-8), she is precluding reference in thought or
speech to the non-existent. 8
This made talk of "nothing" or non-existence very problemat-
ic. It was the denial of this "void" that lead to monism.
In the denial of nothing the early Ionians concluded that
everything was one and that motion was impossible. Atomism
has its roots in this concept of "the one" or unity — which
later became associated with the idea of indivisibility.
Thales and Anaximander
Thales of Miletos is credited with having explained
that everything is made of water; that air, ether, and even
15
earth are just different forms of the one substance. As a
result, Milesian thought was dominated by corporeal mon-
ism
,
that all things reduce to the one (body) which ap-
pears in different forms. 10
All the Ionians had taken for granted that the
primary substance could assume different forms,
such as earth, water, and fire, a view suggested
by the observed phenomena of freezing, evapora-
tion, and the like. Anaximenes had further ex-
plained these transformations as due to rarefac-
tion and condensation (§ 9). 11
Thales is credited with opening the guestion that leads
to the atomic theory. 12 It might be reasonable to attrib-
ute the contrasting view to Anaximander, of the next genera-
tion of Milesians, who was a follower of Thales.
Thales, Anaximander seems to have argued, made the
wet too important at the expense of the dry. 13
Burnet credits Anaximander with giving some equal standing
to the different "elements".
[It] is more natural to speak of the opposites as
being 'separated out' from a mass which is as yet
undifferentiated . . . . 14
But he also begs the question by suggesting that this some-
how entails it being made of "particles".
That, of course, really implies that the structure
of the primary substance is corpuscular, and that
there are interstices of some kind between its
16
particles. It is improbable that Anaximenes real-ised this consequence of his doctrine. 15
No such conclusion is warranted without some presumption of
the incompressibility of matter, a later atomic development.
The mixing (and separation) of colors shows a non-particu-
late counter-example. Burnet seems to have "projected" a
more modern view into his analysis.
Already the Ionians have a general question regarding
whether there is some primary stuff of existence that is
divisible into other substances, or there is one of these
that cannot be so divided. Anaximander affirmed divisibili-
ty while his predecessor Thales affirmed the one.
Pythagoras
The Pythagoreans taught that all things were number.
And number is an expression of unity or oneness — the Mi-
lesian monism in a less corporeal form. Pythagoras, who was
in Kroton from about 532 B.C. to the end of the sixth centu-
ry, was probably a disciple of Anaximander. 16 He is cred-
ited with discovering the problem of doubling the square. 1
"
"Pythagoras discovered that the square of the hypote-
nuse was equal to the squares on the other two sides;
but we know that he did not prove this in the same way
as Euclid did later (1.47). It is probable that his
proof was arithmetical rather than geometrical; and, as
he was acquainted with the 3:4:5 triangle, which is
always a right-angled triangle, he may have started
17
from the fact that 3 2 + 4 2 = 5 2 . He must, however, havediscovered also that this proof broke down in the caseof the most perfect triangle of all, the isosceles
right-angled triangle, seeing that the relation betweenits hypotenuse and its sides cannot be expressed by anv
numerical ratio. The side of the sguare is incommensu-
rable with the diagonal." 18
In the atmosphere of Milesian monism, it must have been
quite disconcerting to be unable to find whole numbers giv-
ing a ratio for doubling the square. With monism firmly
established in the culture, the faith that such a number
existed and would be found probably prevented the discovery
of what is now known to be \f~2 . Had it been discovered
then, atomism might have been dealt a disabling blow. If
the square root of two is to be a number, then number can no
longer be strictly a unity.
Heraclitus and Parmenides
Heraclitus of Ephesus (fifth century) was known for his
theory of flux and his doctrine of the unity of opposites.
Most of Heraclitus's works are lost, but a few fragments
have been gleaned from various sources; he was quoted by
ancient philosophers from Plato on. Enough substance is
contained in those fragments to provide a reasonable assess-
ment of his view concerning the present question. The an-
cient question concerned whether all things were "one" or
"many". We may understand "many" to mean "composed of
parts" where the term 'parts' is used circularly or recur-
18
sively. Zeno's paradox of plurality (page 41) explicates
this issue more fully. By "one" we may understand "an indi-
visible whole". While this pairing may not be exact, I
think it naturally evolved into the atomism versus infinite
divisibility distinction. Atomism may be an early attempt
to resolve the paradox of plurality. If so, it would pro-
vide for a true recursive definition for the term 'part'. A
part is either an atom or it is something composed of smal-
ler parts. [See the discussion of the Paradox of Plurality
on page 41 below.
]
For Heraclitus, the question whether all things are one
or many is answered by fragment 112:
From out of all the many particulars comes one-
ness, and out of oneness comes all the many par-
ticulars. 19
While this hints at Hegel's synthesis of thesis and antithe-
sis, it also suggests that anything that is one is also
divisible. One could interpret this as an affirmation of
infinite divisibility. But his doctrine of the unity of
opposites actually mandates that he affirm both views. His
theory of flux, in which things are continually changing
into their opposites, is moderated by his principle of bal-
ance. That principle is best stated in fragment 33 and can
be understood as a conservation law.
19
[The] resultant amount is the same as there hadbeen before. 20
On this account, it would seem, Heraclitus would not have
subscribed to the naive view that if something were infi-
nitely divisible then it would be divisible into nothing at
all. Such a premiss would violate his principle of balance.
Yet that premiss is exactly the one which has gone unchal-
lenged for millennia. I shall return to this premiss when
it is more explicitly stated. [See the discussion under the
paradox of plurality on page 73 below.]
Parmenides taught, in opposition to Heraclitus, that
being was "a solid, homogeneous, extended body", 21 and that
it was spherical and unchanging. In many ways this reaf-
firms the earlier Milesian view of the one, but the similar-
ity to the later conception of an atom is readily apparent.
Empedocles and Anaxagoras
Empedocles seems to have attempted to synthesize the
views of his predecessors. Thales made everything out of
water; Heraclitus made everything out of fire; Anaximenes
made everything out of air22 ; Anaximander gave none of
these primacy. Empedocles made everything out of all of
these, including earth, and, as such, provided the first
theoretical forerunner of modern atomic chemistry.
20
Empedocles called his elements 'roots', and Anax-
agoras called his 'seeds', but they both meant
something eternal and irreducible to anything
else, and they both held the things we perceive
with the senses to be temporary combinations of
these . 23
But Anaxagoras apparently thought Empedocles's system
flawed. He did not think that four elements could produce
all the substances we see. According to Burnet, Anaxagoras
was misunderstood by both Aristotle and the Epicureans.
Burnet explains that Anaxagoras's "seeds" were infinitely
divisible but differed in their proportions.
He therefore substituted for the primary 'air' a state
of the world in which 'all things ( x Pfi
M
arQ: ) were to-
gether, infinite both in quantity and in smallness'
( Fr . I). This is explained to mean that the original
mass was infinitely divisible, but that, however far
division was carried, every part of it would contain
all 'things' ( X pfi Mckt or ) , and would in that respect be
just like the whole . 24
The "flavor" of the disputes of the time were perhaps
eloquently expressed by Zeno in his paradoxes, to which we
now turn.
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CHAPTER II
ZENO'S PARADOXES
Arguments about atomism and infinite divisibility were
first developed in detail by Zeno of Elea (born c. 490 be)
in the form of his now famous paradoxes. Since these para-
doxes have had a very important influence on subsequent
disputes regarding atomism and divisionism, it is important
to identify them here. I shall give the basic thrust of
each paradox by a short statement, and then, in order to
show the logical form of the underlying argument, I shall
offer an expanded version of it. I shall defer my critical
comments on the paradoxes and the relevance to my subject to
the next chapter.
The Achilles
I can succinctly state the Achilles paradox as follows:
Achilles and the tortoise race; the tortoise is given a head
start. By the time Achilles reaches the spot where the
tortoise was, the tortoise will have moved on. So Achilles
can never catch the tortoise . 1
To appreciate the logical structure of the paradox, the
relevant premisses and conclusions must be identified and
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set forth in explicit terms. Some of the premisses are
merely implicit in the brief statement of the paradox.
A basic assumption of the argument is this:
APO To catch the tortoise, Achilles must eventu-
ally occupy the same spot as the tortoise.
This premiss is present in the argument in a contrapositive
form:
APO' If it is always the case that Achilles does not
occupy the same spot as the tortoise, then Achil-
les never catches the tortoise.
The information given in the argument ostensibly does not
permit the conclusion that Achilles does catch the tortoise.
What the premisses do ostensibly warrant is indicated as
follows
:
The initial premiss is:
API The tortoise is given a head start.
* Premiss, inference, and conclusion statements will be
labeled according to the following scheme: The first letter
or letter and digit will identify the argument; the second
letter will identify the statement type; and the third digit
will be a sequence number. A sub-sequence number may also
be used in some cases.
First letter or letter and digit
The Achilles A
The Dichotomy form 1 D1
The Dichotomy form 2 D2
The Arrow R
The Stadium S
Paradox of Plurality P
Second letter
Premiss P
Inference I
Conclusion C
Definition D
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All API ==> AC1
AC1 The tortoise is ahead of Achilles.
AP2 If the tortoise is ahead of Achilles then Achilles
runs toward the tortoise.
AI2 AC1 & AP2 ==> AC
2
AC2 Achilles runs toward the tortoise.
AP3 If Achilles runs toward the tortoise, then the
tortoise runs on ahead to another spot.
AI3 AC 2 & AP3 ==> AC
3
AC 3 The tortoise runs on ahead to another spot.
AP4 If the tortoise runs on ahead to another spot
then, when Achilles reaches the spot previously
occupied by the tortoise, the tortoise will occupy
a spot different from the one Achilles occupies.
AI4 AC 3 & AP4 ==> AC
4
AC 4 The tortoise occupies a spot different from the
one Achilles occupies.
AP5 If the tortoise occupies a spot different from the
one Achilles occupies, then the tortoise is ahead
of Achilles.
AI5 AC 4 & AP5 ==> AC
5
AC 5 The tortoise is ahead of Achilles.
But AC 5 is just ACT; the argument leads to the original
premiss. No valid reasoning with these premisses leads to
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any other conclusion. No matter how many times the argument
is followed through, the conclusion is always the same —
the tortoise is ahead of Achilles. No premiss or conclusion
in the argument leads to Achilles being in the same spot as
the tortoise.
We could argue that what is true of each instant is
true of the whole race, but that would involve the fallacy
of composition. A stronger wav to conclude that Achilles
can never catch the tortoise is to use mathematical induc-
tion on each iteration of the argument. AC1 is true after
the first iteration. Assume AC1 is true after N iterations.
Then, by applying the premisses in order, AC1 is also true
after N + 1 iterations. These two conditions satisfy the
requirements for mathematical induction and allow us to
conclude that it is always the case (after every iteration)
that Achilles does not occupy the same spot as the tortoise.
(If always AC4
,
then Achilles can never catch the tortoise.)
However, since mathematical induction was not available to
Zeno, we may appeal to additional premisses.
AP6 There is no end to an infinite sequence (of steps
or acts )
.
AP7 Achilles's repeated attempts to catch the tortoise
constitute an infinite sequence.
AI6 AP6 & AP7 ==> AC6
.
27
AC6 There is no end to Achilles repeated attempts to
catch the tortoise. in other words, Achilles can
never come to the end of his sequence of attempts
to catch the tortoise — that is, Achilles can't
catch the tortoise.
It is interesting to note that this argument is valid
without reference to the speeds of either Achilles or the
tortoise. it is clear that if Achilles runs slower than the
tortoise or at the same speed as the tortoise then we have
no difficulty with the conclusion. But if Achilles runs
faster than the tortoise the conclusion is absurd. Since
Achilles is "the fleetest of all Greek warriors" 2
,
we may
assume
:
AP8 Achilles runs faster than the tortoise.
AP9 If Achilles runs faster than the Tortoise, and he
runs toward the tortoise, then Achilles will be
closer to the Tortoise when he reaches the spot
the tortoise left.
With these two additional premisses, it is possible to con-
clude, validly, that Achilles is always getting closer to
the tortoise.
AI7 AC 2 & AP8 & AP9 => AC
7
AC 7 Achilles is closer to the tortoise.
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But nothing in these premisses allows us to conclude
that Achilles actually catches the tortoise. The paradox is
that an apparently valid argument with acceptable premisses
yields such an unacceptable outcome.
The Dichotomy
The dichotomy has two forms.
1. For Achilles to reach any point he must get half
way. Then he has to get half the rest of the way. since
there will always be a fraction to go, he can never reach
any point.
This argument must also be unpacked and stated in the
form of premisses and conclusions. Here are the relevant
premisses
:
D1P1 For Achilles to reach another point (his destina-
tion) he must first get half way to it.
D1P2 If Achilles is at a point not his destination,
then he moves toward his destination point.
D1P3 If Achilles moves toward his destination point
then he first reaches a point half way towards it.
D1P4 If Achilles is at a point half way towards his
destination, then he is at a point which is not
his destination.
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D1P5 Achilles is at a point which is not his destina-
tion .
And here is the form of the argument:
Dill D1P2 & D1P5 => D1C1
D1C1 Achilles moves toward his destination.
Dll 2 D1C1 & D1P3 => D1C2
D1C2 Achilles reaches a point half way toward his des-
tination
.
D1I3 D1C2 & D1P4 => D1C3
D1C3 Achilles is at a point which is not his destina-
tion .
But D1C3 is just DIPS . As in the Achilles, the argu-
ment leads to the original premiss. No valid reasoning
leads to any other conclusion. No matter how many times the
argument is followed through, the conclusion is always the
same. Nothing in the argument leads to Achilles being at
the other point. As in the Achilles, this form of the Di-
chotomy rests on the premisses (1), that an infinite series
has no end and (2), that Achilles is traversing an infinite
series of points. Since an infinite series has no final
term it is concluded that Achilles cannot reach the end of
the series. But this is just what he must do in order to
reach the other point.
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2. The second form of the paradox can be explained this
way
:
For Achilles to reach any point he must get half way.
To get half way, he must get to half that, etc. To get any-
where, he must have already covered an infinite number of
points
.
3
In this form of the Dichotomy, the infinite series of
points that Achilles is to traverse is "reversed" from that
of the first form. As the points are enumerated, the second
is one quarter of the way to the destination in the second
form while it is three quarters of the way to the destina-
tion in the first form. Between Achilles and any other
point there is an infinite series of points. For Achilles
to get to any one of these points, he must have already
traversed, in reverse order, the infinite series of points
which, according to the premiss in the first form, he can
not come to the end of. This form of the Dichotomy entails
a premiss which is less clearly acceptable.
D2P1 Achilles cannot traverse an infinite number of
points
.
D2P2 Between Achilles and any point is an infinite
number of points.
D2P3 To traverse the distance to any point, Achilles
must traverse all intervening points.
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D2I1 D2P2 & D2P3 => D2C1
D2C1 To traverse the distance to any point, Achilles
must traverse an infinite number of points.
D2I2 D2C1 & D2P1 => D2C2 (Modus Tolens)
D2C2 Achilles cannot traverse the distance to any
point
.
This argument is more straight forward, but it is also
clear that premiss D2P1 is not obviously true. However,
this argument and the preceding first form of the Dichotomy
exhibit symmetry. Support for premiss D2P1 can be achieved
with a additional premisses — namely:
D2P4 Achilles can traverse an infinite seguence of
points if and only if he can come to the end of a
infinite series.
D2P5 Achilles can not come to the end to an infinite
series
.
D2I3 D2P4 & D2P5 => D2P1 (Modus tolens)
D2P1 falls out as a conclusion from these two less
questionable premisses. Since it is clear that Achilles can
not come to the end of an infinite sequence, it must also be
the case that he can not traverse an infinite sequence of
points
.
32
The first form of the Dichotomy concludes that Achilles
can't reach any point, and the second form concludes that he
can't even get started. Although the arguments appear to be
valid, both conclusions are clearly absurd.
The Arrow
The arrow cannot move. To do so requires that it be in
one place equal to itself during one part of an instant and
another during another. Also, it would occupy a space larg-
er than itself in order for it to have room to move. 4 ' 5
RP1 Everything at a place equal to itself is at rest.
RP2 A flying arrow is always at a place equal to it-
self at every instant in its flight.
RI1 RP1 & RP2 => RC1
RC1 A flying arrow is at rest at every instant in its
flight
.
RP3 That which is at rest at every instant does not
move
.
RI2 RC1 & RP3 => RC2
RC2 A flying arrow does not move.
While the above rendition of the argument suffers from
the fallacy of composition, it is possible to render the ar-
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gument in a form not subject to this fallacy. This can be
done as follows:
Def: RD1 An instant is an indivisible minimal element of
time
.
Def: RD2 Something is at rest (instantaneously) iff it is
in its place (one place equal to itself) in one
instant and it is in the same place (equal to
itself) in different instants (remains at rest).
Def: RD3 Something moves iff it is not at rest.
RI3 RD2 & RD3 => RC2
RC2 Something moves iff either (A) it is not in one
place (equal to itself) in one instant or (B) it
is in different places (equal to itself) in dif-
ferent instants.
I will present the two disjuncts as separate cases.
Case 1
:
(A) That which moves is not in one place (equal to
itself) in one instant.
It would appear that this case could be disposed of im-
mediately by noting that it seems to contradict RP2 direct-
ly. — RP2 could be interpreted that everything is always in
a place equal to itself. — However, it is instructive to
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analyze more deeply. We can consider the 'not' as applying
to "one place" or alternatively to "one instant". Let us
first consider the 'not' applied to "one place". "Not one
place" becomes "different places".
RI42 RC2 => RC2
2
RC22 Something moves iff it is at different places in
the same instant. (An instant has more than one
place
.
)
Although this interpretation is practically inconceiva-
ble to us, it is the interpretation intended by the argu-
ment. But we can think of it as like the blurred photograph
of something in motion. The object is apparently at (many)
different places (equal to itself) at the "instant" the
photograph was taken.
RP4 If something is at different places during the
same instant then it is not at one place equal to
itself
.
RI5 RP4 => RC3
RC3 If something is at one place equal to itself then
it is not at two different places during the same
instant
.
RI6 RP2 & RC3 => RC4
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RC4 An arrow in flight is not at different places dur-
ing the same instant.
RI7 RC2 2 & RC4 => RC5
RC5 An arrow in flight does not move.
The "also" clause has more the form of an "otherwise"
clause
.
RP5 Something cannot occupy a space smaller than it-
self .
RP6 If something is not at a place equal to itself
then it occupies a space either smaller than or
larger than itself.
RI8 RP5 & RP6 => RC7
RC7 If something is not at a place equal to itself
then it occupies a space larger than itself.
RI9 RP4 & RC6 => RC7
RC7 If something is at different places during the
same instant then it occupies a space larger than
itself
.
RI10 RC22 & RC7 => RC8
RC8 If something moves then it occupies a space larger
than itself. (An arrow must occupy a space larger
than itself if it is to move.)
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RC22, however is also in direct conflict with a widely held
premiss
.
RP7 Nothing can be in two different places (equal to
itself) during the same (one) instant.
This case concludes that the arrow cannot move during an
instant. We are left with case 2.
Case 2
:
(B) That which moves is at different places (equal to
itself) in different instants.
RI41 RC2 => RC2
1
RC21 Something moves if it is at different places
(equal to itself) in different instants. (This is
our usual understanding of motion.)
We are considering whether an arrow can be in motion in
an instant. By the above case, something could move only if
it were in different places in different instants. There-
fore, for it to move in the one instant under consideration,
that instant would have to have two parts which were also
instants. It would be these "sub-instants" in which the
arrow were at different places. But, by RD1
,
an instant is
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indivisible; so, it has no such parts which are instants.
Consequently, at each instant it is not possible for the
arrow to be at different places in different instants.
In either case the arrow cannot move. Consequently the
logical disjunction of the two cases also yields an unmoving
arrow.
The Stadium
Oppositely marching rows of soldiers pass each other
and a standing row of soldiers in the same time. Since op-
positely moving rows pass twice as many bodies as each pass-
es stationary bodies, "Zeno concluded that 'double the time
is equal to half'". 6 Vlastos states that "Aristotle and
all our other ancient informants understood this as a (sup-
posed) paradox of relative motion" and attributes the inter-
pretation which follows to Paul Tannery. 7
If extension and duration are atomic, that is, there
are minimum amounts of each, then an analogy can be made
between atoms of extension moving in jumps of atomic time
and rows of soldiers drilling in a stadium. Consider three
rows of soldiers, one standing (A B C)
,
one marching to the
right (1 2 3), and one marching to the left (456). As the
row of soldiers marching to the right passes the row of
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standing soldiers, it takes one (minimum) unit of time for
the soldiers to move one unit of distance — from a position
opposite certain standing soldiers to a position opposite
the next ones.
1 2 3 => After one =>123ABC time unit ABC
On the other hand, the other row of soldiers, marching left,
al so move one unit of distance in one unit of time.
ABC After one ABC
4 5 6 <= time unit 4 5 6 <=
The problem is that the relative change between the soldiers
marching left to those marching right is twice the distance
in the same amount of time.
1 2 3 => After one =>123
4 5 6 <= time unit 4 5 6 <=
Soldier 6 ends up opposite soldier 1 after 1 unit of time.
In order to get there he had to pass soldier 2. This must
have taken one unit of time, and passing from there on to
soldier 1 must have taken another unit of time. Hence the
expression "double the time". It is reasonable to presume
that "half the time" refers to the immediately preceding
antecedent (the doubled time) rather than to the fixed unit
of time which got doubled. Otherwise, we would be looking
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for a relationship of 4 to 1 instead of 2 to 1. Vlastos
confirms this interpretation in his quotation:
So it follows, he
double [that t/2 =
thinks, that half the time equals
t] (Aristotle, Physics 239b35). 8
its
It is difficult to get the sense of the conflict be-
cause we are accustomed to thinking of time as continuous.
The perplexing nature of the situation may be illustrated by
noting that there must be some time when soldier 6 is oppo-
site soldier 2, while the argument says that there is not.
Unpacking the argument into premisses and conclusions yields
the following:
SP1 Soldier 6 passes from soldier C to soldier B in a
minimum unit of time.
SP2 The instant at which soldier 6 is opposite soldier
C is the instant that soldier 6 is opposite sol-
dier 3, and the instant at which soldier 6 is
opposite soldier B is the instant that soldier 6
is opposite soldier 1.
SI1 SP1 & SP2 => SCI
SCI The minimum unit of time that soldier 6 takes to
pass from soldier C to soldier B is the minimum
unit of time that soldier 6 takes to pass from
soldier 3 to soldier 1.
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SP3 If two instants are separated by the minimum unit
of time there is no instant between them. (Time
is atomic
.
)
512 SCI & SP2 => SC2
SC2 At one instant soldier 6 is opposite soldier 3 and
at the next instant soldier 6 is opposite soldier
1, and there is no instant between these two in-
stants .
SP4 Any soldier passing from soldier 1 to soldier 3
must pass all those in between.
51 3 SC2 & SP4 => SC3
SC3 Because soldier 2 is between soldiers 1 and 3,
soldier 6 must pass soldier 2.
SP5 If soldier 6 passes soldier 2 there must be an
instant at which this happens.
514 SC3 & SP5 => SC4
SC4 There is an instant at which soldier 6 passes
soldier 2.
SP6 If there is such an instant, it must be between
the instant that soldier 6 is opposite soldier 3
and the instant that soldier 6 is opposite soldier
1 .
515 SC4 & SP6 => SC5
SC5 The instant at which soldier 6 passes soldier 2 is
between the instant that soldier 6 is opposite
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soldier 3 and the instant that soldier 6 is oppo-
site soldier 1.
SC6 SC5 contradicts SC2
The paradox of plurality
This paradox can be tersely stated as follows: Ultimate
parts must have no magnitude or they would not be ultimate
parts. But an extended object cannot be made up of parts
with no magnitude. Parts of zero size add up to zero size.
So an extended object must be "so small as to have no magni-
tude". The parts must have magnitude. But an infinity of
extended parts must have infinite extension. So an extended
object must be "so large as to be infinite". 9
Expanding this statement to show more fully the pre-
misses, inferences, and conclusions yields:
PP1 The size of an extended object is not zero.
PP2 Extended objects are made up of parts.
PP3 Ultimate parts have no magnitude (zero size).
PP4 The number of the parts an extended object is
infinite
.
PP5 If something is made up of parts then its size is
the sum of the size of its parts.
Parts of zero size add up to zero size.PP6
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PP7 An infinity of parts of non-zero size adds up to
infinite size.
If an extended object has parts, there are two cases to
consider
:
the parts are ultimate or the parts are extended.
PI1 PP2 > PCI OR PC2
PCI An extended object is made up of ultimate parts.
PC2 An extended object is made up of extended parts.
Case 1
:
The parts are ultimate (PCI holds).
PCI An extended object is made up of ultimate parts.
PI2 PCI & PP3 => PC
3
PC3 An extended object is made up of parts of zero
size
.
PI 3 PC3 & PP5 => PC4
PC4 The size of an extended object is the sum of parts
of zero size.
PI4 PC4 & PP6 => PC5
PC5 The size of an extended object is zero size. ("It
is so small as to have no magnitude").
Case 1 concludes that an extended object has no size — a
clearly unacceptable result. Case 2 fairs no better.
Case 2
:
The parts are extended ( PC2 holds).
PC 2 An extended object is made up of extended parts.
PI5 PC2 & PP1 => PC6
PC6 An extended object is made up of parts of non-zero
size
.
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PI6 PC6 & PP5 => PC7
PC? The Slze of an extended object is the sum of parts
of non-zero size.
PI7 PC7 & PP4 => PC8
PCS The size of an extended object is the sum of an
infinite number of parts with non-zero size.
PI8 PC8 & PP7 => PC9
PC9 The size of an extended object is infinite size.
(It must be "so large as to be infinite".)
Case 2 concludes that an extended object must be infinite in
size — an equally unacceptable result.
The paradox lies in the following: it cannot be denied
that things are made up of parts; but if things are made up
of parts then there are two possibilities, and both possi-
bilities lead to absurd conclusions.
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CHAPTER III
DISCUSSION OF ZENO'S PARADOXES
Salmon suggests that Zeno is not just putting paradoxes
forth
.
It has been suggested, and Owen elaborates this
theme, that Zeno's arguments fit into an overall
pattern. "Achilles and the tortoise" and "Thedichotomy" are designed to refute the doctrine
that space and time are continuous, while "The
arrow" and "The stadium" are intended to refute
the view that space and time have an atomic struc-
ture . 1
The pattern suggested by Owen suggests a Zen koan — a para-
ble with illustrative value that is often logically incon-
sistent. Such parables are used to stimulate a disciple
toward certain realizations, and a perennial theme of Zen
koans is that obvious choices should be rejected. In this
case the choice is between atomism and infinite divisibili-
ty. Heraclitus rejected such a choice in his doctrine of
the unity of opposites. Zeno's arguments, purporting to
refute both choices, seem compatible with Heraclitus. But,
as with Zen, many disciples never master the teachings; some
write long dissertations arguing pro or con regarding some
illustrative parable. Regarding oneness or manyness —
atomism or infinite divisibility — many such dissertations
have been written.
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Zeno confuses discrete and dense sets, and he assumes
that zero times infinity is zero. These errors figure prom-
inently in his arguments. In a sense, 'discrete' means
atomic and 'dense' means divisible. (See page 100.) Today
we are accustomed to distinguishing between these two kinds
of sets. Certain properties or attributes are associated
with each kind of set. For example, the notion expressed by
'next' or 'successor' is one from counting and is associated
with discrete (atomic) sets. Whenever one asks about the
next one of any sequence, one is introducing the atomic per-
spective into the discussion. We have mathematical models
of both kinds of sets. The integers are discrete; the ra-
tional (and real) numbers are dense. Both numbering systems
are applied to extension, as Aristotle notes. (See page
91.) Metric space theory allows discrete as well as contin-
uous measures of extension. But continuous metrics are far
more well known than discrete metrics.
On The Achilles
In "Achilles and the Tortoise", Max Black suggests that
the paradox derives from an imprecise use of language.
[The] fallacy in Zeno's argument is due to the use
of the words 'never' and 'always'." 2
But Black does not expand and make explicit his assertion.
Instead, he suggests that an infinite series of acts is
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self-contradictory. Black is guilty of exactly the charge
he levies, only with a different word. It is not the infi-
nite series of acts that is problematical; it the notion of
completing an infinite series of acts on a one-at-a-time ba-
sis. Black's statement, "the machine comes to a halt",
suggests this sense . 3 The sense of completion involving a
one-at-a-time process presumes that there is an end to the
process, whereas Peano's successor axiom presumes that there
is no end to the process (of counting natural numbers). if
complete is understood in this sense, then "completing" an
infinite series of tasks means "coming to the end of a se-
quence with no end", which is indeed self-contradictory.
For it is the very essence of [an infinite] pro-
gression not to have a last term and not to be
completable in that ordinal sense! To maintain
the self-contradictory proposition that in such an
actually infinite aggregate of order type w, there
is a "last" set of divisions which ensure the
completability of the process of "infinite divi-
sion" by "reaching" a "final" product of division
is indeed to commit the Bernoullian fallacy . 4
But there is another sense of complete which must be
used while scrupulously avoiding the sense which connotes
coming to an end . 5 That sense is expressed by "all there".
For finite sets, and in ordinary usage, both senses apply at
the same time. In fact, one discovers whether the silver-
ware is "all there" by counting it and coming to the (right)
end. When we distinguish between these two senses of com-
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plete
,
we see that we cannot apply both senses to an infi-
nite set. An infinite series of acts, or an infinite set of
numbers, is complete in the sense that all acts, or numbers,
are included, while it simultaneously fails to be complete
in the sense of coming to an end. Finite sets may be dis-
tinguished from infinite sets by examining whether the sense
of "complete'' expressed by 'coming to an end' applies.
Black fails to make this distinction.
If we follow-up on Black's imprecise lead we can see
that 'always' is used in a particular way in Zeno's argu-
ment. It can be properly represented as meaning "for all
N" . In the form of the argument expressed by Black, Achil-
les runs at the speed of 10 yards per second, while the
tortoise runs at 1 yard per second and is given a 100 yard
head start. (Achilles has a 100 yard handicap.) If Achil-
les runs at 10 yards per second and the tortoise has a 100
yard head start, then Achilles will take 10 seconds to ar-
rive at the spot vacated by the tortoise. (100 Yd /10 Yps =
10 sec.) In that 10 seconds, the tortoise, who runs at 1
yard per second, will have run 10 yards. So, according to
this form of the paradox, while Achilles runs the 100 yard
handicap, the tortoise has run another 10 yards. This puts
the tortoise 10 yards ahead of Achilles. We can think of
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the race as starting again with a 10 yard handicap, while
Zeno runs the 10 yards the tortoise runs one yard.
Let us assign N=1 to the first race and N=2 to the
second race. Naturally, there is a third race, and a
fourth, etc., etc. In the first race Achilles runs 100
yards; in the second race he runs 10 yards; and in the third
race he runs 1 yard. This sequence can be expressed in
exponential form as 10 2
,
10 1
,
10°, •••. The relationship
between the distance and the race number can be more clearly
seen if we express the sequence as 10 (3_1)
,
10 <3 '2)
,
10 (3 " 3)
,
. . . . We can compute the distance run in each race by
Achilles if we use the expression 10 <3_N)
,
where N is the race
number. The tortoise, on the other hand, travels at 1/10
the speed of Achilles. In the 10 second first race he trav-
els 10 yards; in the 1 second second race he travels 1 yard;
in the .1 second third race he travels .1 yard. The corre-
sponding sequence for the tortoise is 10 (2_1)
,
10 (2_2)
,
10 (2_3>
,
. . . . We can compute the distance run in each race by the
tortoise if we use the expression 10 <2 ~N> .
By the same reasoning we can discover an expression for
the distance between Achilles and the tortoise after each
race. After the first race the tortoise is ahead by 10
yards; after the second race by 1 yard, and so forth. Each
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terra in the sequence, 10\ 10“
,
10" can be computed
using the expression 10‘ 2->. This is the same as the amount
the tortoise runs, and this makes sense because it is the
amount the tortoise runs that puts him ahead of Achilles.
Now, it is quite clear that this number is a positive quan-
tity for every N. Since there is never an end to numbers,
it is usually concluded that Achilles can never come to the
end of the races, that is, Achilles can never catch the
tortoise. That there is never an end to numbers is perhaps
better stated by Peano's successor axiom: every number has a
successor
. In the present context we should not conclude
that Achilles can never catch the tortoise; rather, we
should conclude that for every N, the tortoise has a 10 (3_N)
yard lead on Achilles." While this can be paraphrased as:
"the tortoise is 'always' ahead of Achilles" and subsequent-
ly re-paraphrased as "Achilles can 'never' catch the tor-
toise", it is usually forqotten that the 'always' and 'nev-
er' are limited by the oriqinal context to the integers
which index the successive races. The more qeneral sense of
'always' — "for all time" ('never' — "at no time") domi-
nates our understandinq of the final paraphrase. The argu-
ment, in effect, equivocates between two meaninqs of 'al-
ways' or 'never'.
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Were we to 'extend' the integers by adding the axiom of
infinity, without explaining how Achilles might "complete"
the finite races, trans-finite races would place Achilles
at, and beyond, the location of the tortoise. But the axiom
of infinity essentially assumes that the number infinity
exists. in the context of the Achilles, that is tantamount
to assuming that Achilles catches the tortoise.
There is a subtle fallacy at work in the argument. it
can be illustrated by an analogy. Godel's incompleteness
theorem showed that arithmetic is essentially incomplete.
That is, true statements can be constructed in arithmetic
which are formally undecidable on the basis of the given
axioms. While an undecidable statement may be added as an
axiom, the extended system so created is also incomplete. 6
As noted above, "nothing in these premisses allows us to
conclude that Achilles actually catches the tortoise." The
statement "Achilles catches the tortoise", is not decidable
on the basis of the premisses and inferences given for The
Achilles. It is, of course, true that Achilles catches the
tortoise. Like Godel's constructed undecidable statement,
"Achilles catches the tortoise" may be assumed true and
added as a premiss.
AP10 Achilles catches the tortoise.
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And, by the earlier mathematical analysis, this corresponds
to assuming the axiom of infinity. The truth of the premiss
is demonstrable by means other than the system of premisses
and inferences, so we cannot argue that the premiss could be
assumed to be false. We are without a means to demonstrate
its truth, and that is an epistemological issue. The falla-
cy is in confusing epistemological and metaphysical issues.
We may not infer that, because we can see no way to infer
the truth of a statement from certain premisses, the state-
ment is therefore false. But this seems to be what is hap-
pening in the Achilles. Of course, this fallacy is being
facilitated by equivocation between different senses of
'always' ('never'). This effectively disposes of "the
Achilles" as a paradox.
On The Dichotomy
The first form of the Dichotomy suffers from the same
fallacy as the Achilles. The computation may be made some-
what simple by presuming that the total distance to be 1
unit. When Achilles has reached the half way point, his
distance traveled is 1/2 the total, and the remaining dis-
tance is 1/2 the total. Then, when he has reached half the
rest of the way, his distance traveled is the original 1/2
plus 1/2 the remaining 1/2, or 1/2 + 1/2 *1/2, and the re-
maining distance is 1/2 the previously remaining 1/2, or
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1/2
-1/2. We can safely assume that Achilles, being "the
fleetest of all Greek warriors" 7
,
races toward the unreach-
able point, and construct a table showing his progress after
each "race".
Race # Distance traveled
1 1/2
2 1/2 + 1 / 2 - 1/2
3 1/2 + 1 /2 * 1/2 + 1 / 2 * 1 / 2 * 1/2
4 1/2 + 1 / 2 . 1/2 + 1 / 2 - 1 /2 - 1/2 +
Remaining dist.anrp
1/2
1 /2 - 1/2
1 /2 - 1 /2 - 1/2
/2 - 1 /2 - 1 /2 - 1/2 1 /2 - 1 / 2 - 1 / 2 - 1/2
The distance traveled for each race after N races can be
expressed as the series: ( 1/2
)
1
, (1/2) 2 , ( 1/2
)
3
, ( 1/2
)
4
,
• •
• / (1/2) N , and the remaining distance can be expressed
as: (1/2) N . The fraction Achilles has already covered after
N races is just the sum of the first N terms of the above
N
series and may be expressed as S ( 1/2
)
1
. This sums to 1-
1= 1
( 1/2
)
N
. The proper conclusion is "For all natural numbers
N, Achilles has a (1/2) N fraction of a unit remaining to
run". As in The Achilles, that Achilles has a positive
fraction remaining to run for all N does not mean that he
has a positive fraction to run for all time.
A New Resolution of the Paradoxes
There is yet another resolution of the paradoxes. The
proposed resolution is one that I have found no mention of
in any of the writings. The new resolution can be approach-
ed with an example from model-theoretic semantics. A model
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consists of a language, a set of objects, and an interpreta-
tion function from the language to the objects, sets of ob-
jects, and relations among the objects. It is not necessary
to go into the technical structure of models in more detail
to present the formal structure of the proposed resolution.
Suppose there are two such models related in a particu-
lar way. The two languages are different, and the set of
objects from one model is a proper subset of the objects
from the other model. For the purposes of this discussion I
shall refer to the model whose objects are the proper subset
as the limited model; I shall refer to the other one as the
general model. I shall also use these terms to refer to the
respective parts of the models.
In such a structure it is possible to use a set or
sequence of terms from the limited language to pick out an
associated set or sequence of limited objects. Since these
objects are also members of the objects in the general mod-
el, a corresponding sequences of terms in the general lan-
guage can also be constructed. Because the languages are
different, there is nothing to suppose that there cannot be
additional objects, in the general model and not in the
limited model, which may be selected by the terms of the
general sequence . 8 By way of an analogy we may correlate
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colloquial language with formal language, and reference to
the interpretation function. Under this analogy, when a
formal language term picks out some object or set of ob-
jects, the colloquial language refers to or describes the
analogous object.
In the first form of the dichotomy, Achilles' inexora-
ble dash achieves and passes the limit, not by following the
sequence as N gets bigger (limited language), but by remain-
ing in motion for a sufficient time (general language). The
distance covered is the product of the velocity and the time
elapsed. Under my new resolution the first form of the
dichotomy and the elapsed time argument are both descrip-
tions of the physical race. It is possible to describe
Achilles' position using the infinite series method only up
to the limit of that series. The language of the series
cannot describe what happens at or beyond its limit. The
description of the race using linear velocity, time, and
distance can describe what happens at and beyond the limit
of the series. Since the infinite series or limited system
of representation cannot describe events past its limit, its
use should be suspect.
The general fallacy implicit in the arguments seems to
be the belief that the totality of all languages can de-
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scribe everything - that nothing can exist that language
cannot describe — a point not universally accepted. Collo-
quial languages can describe things which do not exist, and
we are accustomed to describing only those things the lan-
guage can describe. Like the blind-spot, the contents of
which we do not see, and the existence of which we are nor-
mally unaware, languages have limits; they do not describe
some things, and we are normally unaware that indescribable
things may exist. It is quite clear that limited subsets of
language cannot describe everything the whole of language
can. That a particular subset of language, which we might
call a system of description, cannot describe certain ob-
jects does not entail that those objects cannot exist. Yet
that is just what both the Achilles and the Dichotomy would
have us accept.
The second form of the dichotomy suffers from equivoca-
tion on the sense of 'complete' as well. The idea that
Achilles can't even get started comes from the view that his
first step must be onto the "last" member of an infinite se-
quence of bisections. If the sequence is "complete" in the
sense of coming to an end, then Achilles can step onto that
end for his first step. But no such end exists, so Achilles
has no place to make his first step. This view requires
that the members of the series and the starting point stand
57
in the successor relation to each other. But the limit of a
sequence does not stand in the successor relation to any of
its members. K 0 has no predecessor. 9 [See the discussion
at the bottom of page 60.] The limit of the sequence stands
in a relation to its members not unlike that of the rela-
tionship of a pedestal to the floor around it. Whenever
Achilles steps off the pedestal down onto the series, he has
already stepped past an infinite number of elements — how-
ever small his step. Similarly, he cannot get back on the
pedestal by following the successive steps; he must jump up
through an infinite number of steps onto the pedestal (the
first form of The Dichotomy).
With the pedestal analogy in mind, the second form of
the Dichotomy seems not to pose a problem as long as exten-
sion can continually be divided in half. If it can, then
the conclusion seems acceptable. Nothing would be wrong
with "covering" an infinite number of points. But the con-
clusion depends upon the presumption that extension is, in
fact, infinitely divisible by bisection. If, at any stage
in the process, half way becomes an indivisible minimum, as
would be the case were extension not infinitely divisible,
then getting half that way becomes an impossible act. In
other words, this argument begs the question by presuming
that extension is infinitely divisible. It is supposed to
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prove atomism by concluding that an infinite number of
points must be covered — on the premiss that covering an
infinite number of points is an impossible act. But there
are an infinite number of points to cover only if
is—
I
nfinitely divisible ; the argument contains a premiss
which presumes the purported result. One cannot cover half
the minimum distance. The premiss "for Achilles to rpar
h
any point he must get half way" is not true when the point
he must reach is only the minimum distance away. He must
get there in one fell swoop since there is no intermediate
"half-way" point. That he can cover an infinite number of
points entails the presumption of divisibility.
J. 0. Wisdom noticed the difficulty in "Achilles on a
Physical Racecourse", but he interpreted it as supporting
his contention that the argument is intended to apply to
theoretical divisibility.
This, I think, is the easiest way of seeing that
Zeno's premiss cannot characterize a physical
race: the 'and so on' is inapplicable because
somewhere two neighboring physical points will
touch each other and it will be impossible to
subdivide the distance between them without alter-
ing the assigned size of the points, [sic] 10
On both the Achilles and the Dichotomy
James Thomson attempts to resolve the problems of infi-
nite divisibility by appealing to the definition of "infi-
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mte" ln the sense of arbitrarily large. Any such number
chosen is still finite. He distinguished this sense from
the sense in which "infinite" is taken to mean an unending
process and from the sense in which infinite means the first
number which every finite number is less than (K 0 ) .
" [ T ]
o
say that a lump is infinitely divisible isjust to say that it can be cut into any number of
parts. Since there are an infinite number of
numbers, we could say: there is an infinite number
of numbers of parts into which the lump can be
divided. And this is not to say that it can be
divided into an infinite number of parts. If
something is infinitely divisible, and you are to
say into how many parts it shall be divided, you
have K 0 alternatives from which to choose. This
is not to say that K 0 is one of them ." 11
Thomson proposes that it is the infinite number of ways that
an object may be divided that unpacks what "infinitely di-
visible" means. In any such way of dividing it, the object
would actually be divided into only a finite number of ex-
tended parts. This alternative avoids the obviously con-
tradictory notion of completing an unending process of re-
peated division. This is not, however, the argument Zeno
advanced, and Thomson defines the notion of "super-task" for
the purpose of resolving Zeno's argument.
Thomson defines a super-task as a task that is complet-
ed if and only if an infinite number of tasks are completed.
To suggest that an infinitely divisible object is actually
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divided in this way would be to presume that an unending
sequence of divisions had been completed. The presence of
both "unending" and "completed" in the reformulation of this
premiss makes it rather obviously self-contradictory (if
'complete' is taken to mean 'came to the end').
It is just this apparently self-contradictory nature
which determines the actual formulation for the axiom of
infinity. In terms of ordinary numbers, the axiom can be
stated: there is a number X (infinity) such that 1<X and
whenever N<X then N+1<X. 12 By formulating the axiom in
this manner, one makes no attempt to "complete" the process
of "+1" in any way whatsoever; one merely conforms to the
requirements of mathematical induction. We may use induc-
tion to infer that for all N, N<X.
Notice that X is not the successor of any number N
because N+1<X. There is no number N whose successor is X;
consequently, X does not have a predecessor13 . Thomson al-
ludes to this point, but is not explicit at all.
But it is obviously unreasonable to ask where the
runner was when he was at the point immediately
preceding his destination. [Italics mine] 14
One reason it is unreasonable is that there is no such
point; that is, K 0 has no predecessor.
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If the infinite sequence of remaining halves has been
traversed and one is at the point 1, this is equivalent to
havinq ascended to the number K 0 . But X 0 has no predecessor
so there is no immediately precedinq point to have been at.
Most people are more familiar with decimal mathematics, so
the equivalence may be better illustrated by taking the
fraction traversed (in the Dichotomy) to be 9/10 ths rather
than one half. The first step covers 9/10 ths (.9) of the
way; l/10 th remains. The second step covers 9/10ths of the
remaining l/10 th (9/10.1/10) or .09, and the total distance
traversed after two steps is .9 + .09 = .99. The next step
covers .009 for a total of .999. "Completing" the "super-
task" mentioned above requires traversing .999999..., and it
can be shown that that is just being at 1.
The following demonstration shows that the number ex-
pressed by .999999... is the same number as is expressed by
1. If these are the same number, then to have traversed all
the remaining 9/10ths is just to have reached 1.
Proof of .99999... = 1.
(1) Let X = .99999. .
.
(2) Then 10X = 9.99999...
and ( 2 ) - ( 1 ) is 10X - X = 9.00000...
Therefore: 9X = 9
and, by division, X = 1.
Completing the sequence of repeatedly getting 9/10 ths of the
rest of the way just is being at 1 . In other words, if one
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has completed the sequence then one is at 1. So, by modus
tollens, if one is not at 1, one cannot have completed the
sequence. Consequently, one cannot have completed the se-
quence without being at 1 . To presume that one has complet-
ed all the points in the sequence but is not at 1 is to
presume a hypothesis that is false — which leads, of
course, to anything at all.
Owen seems aware of this, but violates it in the same
breath that he denies doing so.
Notice that Zeno is not first setting up a divi-
sion which cannot have a last move and then ask-
ing, improperly, what the last move would be. He
is asking, legitimately, what the total outcome of
the division would be; and for there to be such an
outcome there must be a smallest part or parts. 15
The size of the parts is bounded below. In fact, there is a
greatest lower bound, and it is zero. However, this great-
est lower bound is not in the set of sizes. Consequently,
contrary to the above claim, there is no smallest part or
parts. Because there is no smallest part we cannot conclude
that the size of any such parts resulting from the division
process is zero. Mathematical induction shows that it is
not. The size of the parts is bounded below by zero, but no
part is of size zero, and there is no smallest part. The
real numbers under the usual order relation are not "well-
ordered" . If they were well-ordered, then the greatest low-
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er bound would be in the set, and there would be a smallest
(last) member whose size would indeed be zero.
On The Arrow
The physics of the relation between position and veloc-
ity has some interesting structural consequences. The Heis-
enberg Uncertainty Principle states that the position and
the momentum (velocity) of an object cannot be simultaneous-
ly measured to any degree of accuracy; accuracy in the mea-
surement of one is lost at the expense of accuracy in the
measurement of the other16
. A homely macroscopic analogy
illustrates this principle.
Take a photograph of an object in motion. The length
of time the shutter is open (the reciprocal of the shutter
speed) can be used in conjunction with the amount of blur in
the image to estimate the speed of the object. The longer
the shutter is open the longer the blur and the more accu-
rately the speed can be measured. But the longer the blur
is, the less accurately one is able to determine the posi-
tion of the object. Conversely, the sharper the picture is,
the more accurate knowledge of the position of the object
will be, but the more uncertain knowledge of its velocity
will be.
64
In Zeno thought experiment a very sharp view, namely,
the arrow being
-in its place-, is taken; this leaves no
blur at all to use in determining the velocity. The mental
shutter speed would have to be infinite to obtain an indi-
visible instant — we are left with an instant with zero
duration. Since motion is measured by determining the ratio
of distance traveled to the time duration, Zeno's thought
experiment leaves zero (length blur) divided by zero (length
duration) for the computation of velocity. And zero divided
by zero is undefined. One has perfect information about the
position but no information about the velocity. While it is
true that a stopped object leaves no blur, it seems falla-
cious to assume that velocity is zero when one sees no blur.
And any blur at all does have the immediate consequence that
the object is indeed occupying a space larger than itself.
It has been argued that an object always takes up the
space it occupies. It can also be argued that an object in
motion always takes up less space than it occupies. Rela-
tivity theory holds that an object in motion is contracted
in the direction of motion. The shortened length, X', can
be calculated in terms of the at-rest length, X, and the
velocity, V, using the Lorentz contraction equation. That
equation is X'=X* ( 1-V2/C2 ) 1/2 , where 'C' is the speed of
light. 17 The faster an object is moving, that is, the
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larger V is, the smaller X' is. if an instant is indivis-
ible and is the same "size" regardless of whether the object
is at rest or in motion, then the moving, and hence con-
tracted, object takes up less space; it has room to rattle
around in the same sized instant which immobilizes the ob-
ject at rest. But according to relativity theory objects in
motion experience a time dilation effect. That can be in-
terpreted to mean that the size of an instant is increased
or "stretched ". 18 This gives the moving object even more
room. Also according to relativity theory faster moving ob-
jects are contracted more. The greater the contraction, the
relatively greater the room to move — and hence the greater
the speed possible.
Consider the possibility that an instant is indivisible
in the sense that it has no duration. An instant without
duration is not consistent with our usual definition of
velocity. Velocity is the ratio of distance traversed to
the duration in which the traversal occurs. An instant with
no duration would be just the temporal coordinate of an ob-
ject. Taken together with its position coordinate, the
result forms the event coordinates of a particular space-
time point. It is not possible to determine the velocity of
an object on the basis of a single event. At least two
events are required. Even our notion of velocity at a point
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depends upon more than one event. We define the velocity at
a point as the instantaneous rate of change of position with
respect to time. An instantaneous rate of change, from the
differential calculus, involves taking the limit of the
ratio of the change in position (distance) to the change in
time (duration) between two points
. That limit may be some
definite quantity, but all computations not at the limit
require an extended duration, and no computation is possible
at the limit (the denominator would be zero, and division by
zero is forbidden). if an instant has no duration, then no
velocity within the instant is possible. Velocity at an
instant is not determinate without reference to the context
of the instant, that is, events external to the instant.
The renditions of the argument as I have presented them
significantly reflect our modern view of motion. The Arrow
as originally presented speaks only to motion within an
instant. The definition of motion I proposed, a modern one,
in conjunction with the attending argument concludes, valid-
ly, that motion is a phenomenon that is "trans-instantane-
ous". If instants are infinitely divisible, as the divi-
sionists presume, then any moving object exists in different
places (equal to itself) at different instants, as close as
you like. On the other hand. If instants are atomic, as the
atomists presume, then any moving object exists in different
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places (equal to itself) at different instants, and the
motion is as described more fully in the discussion of "uni-
form" velocity on page 72 below. But in both cases the
concept of moving, as we understand it, cannot apply "with-
in" an instant. Our concept of motion, which is based upon
infinite divisibility, requires that we think of objects as
moving continuously. If „e think of instants as intervals
(durations), that means we think of the object as crossing
each interval continuously until it enters the next instant,
crossing that into its successor, etc. But this view is not
consistent with atomism, as the Arrow shows.
On The Stadium
The alternative to an instant with no duration is an
instant which is indivisible in the sense that it is atomic,
that is, that it has a minimum but indivisible duration. It
is exactly this premiss that is used in the argument known
as The Stadium.
The stadium purports to prove that objects may pass
each other without ever being opposite one another. That
conclusion is presumed to be absurd and stands as the basis
for seeing The Stadium as a paradox. But we seem to have
actually observed just such behavior in the context of quan-
tum mechanics, and that observed physical behavior may be
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offered as an empirically based counter-example to The Sta-
dium. Protons appear to "by-pass" a point where they cannot
physically exist in the physical process known as tunnel-
ing . 19 A proton in a radioactive nucleus having enough en-
ergy to exist outside the nucleus is confined to the nucleus
by a potential field with an annular region reguiring a
greater potential than the energy of that proton. Because
the proton has less energy than is reguired to be in this
area, the area is called a potential barrier. This barrier
confines the proton to the region of the nucleus of the
atom. There is also a region outside the potential barrier
in which the potential is less than the proton requires to
be there. For a proton to traverse from the inner region to
the outer region, it must pass through a region requiring
more energy of its occupants than the proton has. The prob-
ability of the proton being located there is therefore zero,
but the observation is that some protons do get out . 20
They do so without being in the restricted region . 21 They
are described as having "tunneled " 22 through the potential
barrier . 23 In doing so they, in effect, "march" past oth-
ers without ever having been opposite them.
Relativity theory offers us another model that is in-
compatible with our "common sense" experience. Relative
velocities do not add according to ordinary arithmetic. The
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relative velocity of the row of soldiers marching left to
the row of soldiers marching right (V3) is not just the sum
of the relative velocity of the row of soldiers marching
left to the row of soldiers standing (VI) plus the relative
velocity of the row of soldiers standing to the row of sol-
diers marching right (V2). In the case of very high veloci-
ties the sum can be nearly the same as the original veloci-
ties. The formula for the resulting velocity — the law of
addition of velocity — in terms of ordinary addition, is:
TT Vi + V 2
Vs ~ 1 + V x .V '
where aH velocities are expressed as a
fraction of the velocity of light (C). 24
Suppose our soldiers are marching very fast. If the
relative velocity of the moving soldiers to the standing
ones is nine-tenths the speed of light (.9C) then the rela-
tive velocity between the two oppositely marching rows of
soldiers is not twice this (.9C + . 9C = 1.8C); it is only
. 9C + . 9C
1 + . 9C .. 9C . 9945C
.
In addition, objects moving at relativistic speeds
experience a contraction or foreshortening in the direction
of travel. This contraction means that the minimum length
becomes smaller as the velocity increases. The amount of
this foreshortening is computed using the Lorentz contrac-
tion formula — X' = X(1 - 6 2 ) 1/2 , where B = V/C. 25 In the
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case of the soldiers inarching at .9C relative to the stand-
ing ones, the contraction computes to ( l -
. 9 2 )
1/2
= 4359
This means that two of the moving soldiers take up less
space than one standing one — with room to spare! This
would mean that the moving atomic units would take up enough
less space that both could be opposite the one stationary
atomic unit at the same instant. As the fast moving sol-
diers pass the standing ones, the minimum distance in the
direction of travel has shrunk by over a factor of two to
one. This, paradoxically, would allow two moving soldiers
to be opposite one standing one! Since this is true of both
rows, a standing soldier would see two moving ones on each
side, and they would appear to be passing one another.
In the case of the soldiers marching at .9945C relative
to the row of oppositely marching soldiers, the contraction
computes to ( 1 - . 9945 2 ) 172 = . 1050. If one takes a "stand"
with one row of moving soldiers, the relative contraction of
the other moving soldiers is nearly a factor of 10 to 1 .
This would allow nearly 10 soldiers to be opposite one! But
relativity has its own paradoxes. To the other moving sol-
diers, it would also seem that ten were opposite one.
There is other evidence that calls into question the
argument of the stadium — evidence that does not need to
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evoke relativistic speeds. This particular evidence comes
from the studies of human perception. As such it represents
an epistemological approach. We believe that we can per-
ceive smoothly continuous motion and that that smooth per-
ception would contradict the atomistic assumptions about
time and space. However, psychological experiments show
that velocity perceived as smooth may in reality not be
smooth. In the experiment an observer sees two distinct
lights. One is turned off and the other is turned on in
sequence. Within a narrow range of the parameters of sepa-
ration and the duration in which both lights are extin-
guished, the two lights appear to observers as one light
which moves smoothly instead of as two lights which blink
off and on respectively. The underlying neurological pro-
cesses involve the length of time an image of a stimulus is
retained in the neural circuits and our experience with
moving objects. Under certain conditions we cannot percep-
tually distinguish between a continuously moving object and
one which ceases to exist at one point and then begins to
exist at another point (as would be the case under the hy-
pothesis of atomism) . An argument from the perception of
smooth motion that atomism is false fails because perceptual
experiments show that smooth perception arises in response
to atomistic jumps in motion.
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About both the arrow and the stadinm
It seems clear that the various writers recognize that
movement involves a change of position over different parts
of a span of time. But the two arguments, the arrow and the
stadium, seem to presume that motion is somehow continuous.
Continuous motion would require continuous space and time.
The arguments suggest that a contradiction results from
assuming that space and time have an atomic structure. The
contradiction actually results from the implicit assumption
that movement does not also have an atomic structure. Were
movement to also occur in discrete units, no contradiction
would arise. A discrete movement would occur when an arrow
was in one position at one instant of time and in another
position in another instant of time (like electrons changing
energy levels in "atoms"). Clearly, the slowest non-zero
"uniform" velocity occurs when the arrow occupies the adja-
cent position during the successive instant. A slower mo-
tion would require the object to remain "at rest" in the
same position during more than one successive instant. Such
motion would be full of starts and stops. However, a faster
motion would require "skipping" positions. Moving twice as
fast would skip every other position. But it is the assump-
tion that motion is continuous that is required to show that
an object must also pass, or be in, any intermediate posi-
tion. The mean value theorem in calculus proves that, in
73
the case of a continuous, monotonic increasing function, the
midpoint must be passed by the function at some intermediate
point. A key prerequisite for this theorem is that the
function concerned be continuous
.
26 it is similarly so
with the paradoxes of the arrow and the stadium. For the
arrow which moves twice as fast to occupy the intermediate
position, it must also occupy an intermediate instant. But
by assumption there is no intermediate instant — because
time is assumed to be atomic and not continuous. Motion
cannot be continuous when time and space are not. Assuming
that motion is continuous assumes a contradictory premiss
and anything follows.
On The Paradox of Plurality
If something is composed of parts then the parts must
also be composed of parts, ad infinitum. This leaves open
the question "what is a part?" To give a definition of
"part" in the context of the plurality hypothesis, one must
necessarily produce a circular definition. "A part is that
which is composed of parts . " In modern times we could sal-
vage this circularity by making the definition recursive . 27
"A part is either an ultimate part, or it is composed of
parts." Of course, for the definition to be satisfactorily
recursive, it must provide some reassurance that parts are
composed of ultimate parts after a non-infinite number of
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reentries. it is, after all, the finite number of reentries
that distinguishes recursion from circularity and infinite
regress. The plurality hypothesis, as it is represented,
entails a circular definition of part just because there is
no base case definition of a part nor any way to terminate
the regression back to such a base case after a finite num-
ber of tries. A part is a part is a part is a part ... can
continue infinitely.
Many of the premisses no longer command the loyalty
they once did. There are many counter-examples that cast
doubt on the truth of the premisses. I shall examine each
statement which forms a part of the argument (as presented
on page 41) and present one or more examples where the pre-
miss entailed by the statement no longer holds.
Consider the first statement, "Ultimate parts must have
no magnitude or they would not be parts." This statement
just defines what an ultimate part is. An ultimate part is
just a part with no magnitude. The second statement, "But
an extended object cannot be made up of parts with no magni-
tude", is questionable in the light of modern physical theo-
ry. According to the standard model in modern physics, the
extended proton is composed of a finite number (3) of unex-
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tended quarks. The proton consists of two up and one down
quarks
.
28
The proton and neutron are both about 10 A -13 cm or
about 1/100,000 of the size of an atom. ... By indi-
rect means the sizes of quarks and electrons are knownto be less than 10 A -16 cm, less than 1/1000 of the size
of neutron or proton. Indeed, there is no evidencethat these particles have any size at all, they may bethouqht of as points of matter occupyinq no space. 29
This clearly shows that the third statement, "A finite num-
ber of unextended parts cannot comprise an extended whole",
is not true for particle physics. While, for practical
purposes, the premiss is almost always true, it is a fallacy
to apply it by analoqy to sub-atomic particles.
Modern mathematics also permits questioninq this pre-
miss, as Grunbaum notes.
In the context of modern mathematics, Zeno is thus
defyinq us to obtain a result differing from zero upon
adding all the lengths of the super-denumerable infini-
ty of points that compose a unit segment. This means
that we are being asked to add as many zeros. To Zeno's
mind, it was axiomatic (1) that such an addition is
necessarily feasible and permissible and (2) that the
result of any addition of zeros would be zero, regard-
less of the cardinality of the set of zeros to be add-
ed. But he could not anticipate that the addition of a
super-denumerable infinity of numbers, be they zero or
positive, presents a problem altogether different from
adding either a finite sequence of numbers such as 3,
4, 7 or a denumerable infinity of numbers such as 1,
1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 1/16, 1/32, . . . . 30
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There are two models from mathematics. The easier model is
from integral calculus and is the definite integral, which
involves denumerable infinity. The definite integral of a
function computes the area under the curve between two limit
points. Such a function is integrated by dividing the area
under the curve into a finite number of pieces, summing the
area of the parts, and then by taking the limit of the sum
as the number of parts gets larger and the parts themselves
get smaller. The limit of the number of the parts is infi-
nite. The limit of the size of each part is zero.
The sum over these parts can be non-zero and non-infi-
nite. For a simple example, I will show the steps involved
in integrating the function X 2 over the interval from 0 to 1
'l
X 2dx. While there are many different methods for ap-
Jo L
proximating the area under the curve, the simplest involves
treating each segment as a small rectangle. First, the
interval is divided into N pieces. The width of each part
is 1/N
,
but the height depends upon which rectangle (the
I
th
) is considered. Since the function X 2 always increases,
the right-most point of each rectangle is the highest point
in the interval. If we call it the I th rectangle (out of N
of them), that height is (I/N) 2 . The area of the I th rectan-
gle is its width times its height: ( 1/N ) • ( I/N) 2 . The area
under the curve is approximated by adding the area of all
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these small segments. That value is just the sum from 1=1
to N of ( 1/N )
•
( I/N
)
2
— S ( 1/N)
•
( I/N) 2
.
Computing the exact value of the area just involves
taking the limit as N approaches infinity. since the size
of each piece is ( 1/N)
.
(
I/N )\ this limit is zero; and the
limit of N is infinity. We have an infinity of parts of
size zero, yet the resulting area is neither zero nor infi-
nite. To show that the sum is a definite number we can
algebraically manipulate the sum before we take the limit.
The expression for the sum can be simplified by factoring
out (1/N). This reduces to ( 1/N) 3 . (2 I 2 ) . But S
I
2
=
1=1 i=i
N * ( N+l )
•
( 2 * N+l ) /6 31 , so the sum is the product of this and
(1/N) ( 1/N) 3 * [N* (N+l )
•
( 2 «N+1 )/6 ) ] . This multiplies out
to [(2 «N 3+3 -N 2+N)/6 ]/N 3 . Simplifying, we get 1/3 + 1/(2*N) +
1/ ( 6 •
N
2
) , which, as N approaches infinity reduces further to
Limit1/3. So, X 2dx =
N-«x) [1/3 + 1/(2- N) + 1/ ( 6N 2 )] = 1/3
which is clearly neither zero nor infinite.
The second mathematical model involves taking transfin-
ite sums of infinitesimals. These can also be non-zero and
non-infinite. Illustrating the model is not necessary,
however, as the principle is similar to that of integration.
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The statements, "Parts of zero size add up to zero
size. So an extended object must be so small as to have no
magnitude"
,
commit another fallacy when it comes to the
context of an infinitude of parts. Adding the same quantity
many times is the same as multiplying that guantity by the
number of times it is an addend. For example, 10 added to
itself 4 times (10 + 10 + 10 + 10) is 10 multiplied by 4 .
In the immediate context adding an infinitude of zero sizes,
that is, adding zero an infinite number of times, is the
same as multiplying 0 times infinity. But multiplying zero
times infinity is one of the undefined operations, or at
best produces an indeterminate result. That zero times any-
thing is zero is a fallacy; zero times infinity is not de-
fined.
The next statement in the argument is: [Therefore,]
"the parts must have magnitude." Ordinarily, the argument
to this point would constitute a reductio that there can be
ultimate parts or that an extended object can be made up of
ultimate parts, but the argument proceeds (rhetorically) for
effect
.
From "the parts must have magnitude" it does not follow
that that magnitude must have a non-zero lower limit. Look,
for a moment, at the process of bisecting an extended
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length. For simplicity take the length of the extended
object to be 1 unit. When the first bisection is completed
the length of each part is 1/2 (half the length of the orig-
inal). Now consider a part which results when the unit has
been bisected N times. Its length is (1/2) N
. (1/2) N is
still extended. When we bisect that length the result is
also still extended and is of length (1/2) N+1 . i have just
shown that bisecting (dividing) an extended length yields an
extended length for N=1 bisections. I have also shown that
whenever the length after N bisections is extended, then so
is the length after N+l bisections. These two premisses
satisfy the requirements for mathematical induction and we
may conclude that "for all N, after N bisections the length
is extended". So, the process of bisection yields an infin-
ity of parts, all of which are extended. But notice that
after one bisection there are two parts of size 1/2; after
two bisections there are 4 parts of size 1/4; and after N
bisections there are 2 N parts whose length is (1/2) N . In
each case the total length of the parts adds up to the orig-
inal length.
To assert that an object is composed of unextended
parts because this limit of the size of the parts is zero is
just not valid reasoning. The flaw is very subtle and has
been the basis of controversy in mathematics for millennia.
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It confuses the limit of a sequence with the members of that
sequence, a point which Thomson notices:
Hence Whitehead emphasized that the sequence
1, 1/2, 1/4, . . .
was convergent and had a finite sum. He alsothereby pointed out a play on the word 'never 7 ;the sequence never reaches 0, the sequence ofpartial sums never reaches 2. (The sequence does
not contain its limit: but it is converqent, thelimit exists.) 32
The arqument, "But an infinity of extended parts must
have infinite extension", is based upon the unwarranted
assumption that because the parts are all extended there
must be a smallest non-zero size to the parts. Were there
such a limit, then infinite extension would follow. But
there beinq no such limit, infinite extension does not nec-
essarily follow. Some infinite series converge ; some di-
verge .
This argument goes past the point of establishing a
contradiction, and hence a reductio; I would think that it
does so for the poetic license of being able to say that an
object composed of a plurality of parts must be both small
and large without limit. The argument above purports to
establish the existence of an extended object with no magni-
tude. It actually establishes that an object made up of
parts cannot be made up of ultimate parts. A missing pre-
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miss is that any object composed of parts is composed of
ultimate parts.
The question that arises is: are ultimate parts com-
posed of parts? The first tendency would be to say no, that
that would prevent their having been ultimate. But a second
reading is possible. That ultimate parts have no magnitude
does not mean that they have no parts. A line has no width
but it has both a left and a right side. Moreover, these
parts combine to form the whole which has no magnitude
(width). An alternate definition of 'ultimate part' could
be. A part is an ultimate part if it has no parts." But
this alternate definition clashes with the notion that a
part is composed of parts ad infinitum. There can be no
ultimate parts under the plurality hypothesis if ultimate
parts are parts which have no parts.
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CHAPTER IV
ARISTOTLE (384 322 BC) AND INFINITE DIVISIBILITY
Before we can reasonably examine Aristotle's views on
the subject, we need to briefly outline the events and con-
ditions that transpired between Zeno and Aristotle. it was
during this period that true Atomism was born.
The—Birth of Atomism Proper
The birth of atomism in its modern form can be traced
to a reinterpretation of Melissos's arguments to support
Eleatic monism. Melissos re-presented Parmenides' arguments
in Ionic prose, but he deviated from Parmenides' teachings.
Parmenides claimed the real was a sphere, which suggests
that the real was finite. Melissos claimed that the real
was infinite.
The real, he said, could only be limited by empty
space, and there is no empty space . 1
Melissos also presented a reductio argument against plural-
ism.
If there were many things, they would have to be
of the same description as I say the One is . 2
While Parmenides had earlier advocated the spherical
nature of the one, it was Melissos's assertion that there
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was no empty space that suggests the next development, com-
bining Parmenides sphere with the denial of both Melissos's
assertions, that the real is infinite and that there is no
empty space, yields a spherical non-infinite "real" in ex-
isting empty space. The denial of monism multiplies these
non-infinite reals and produces atoms. That task fell to
Leukippos
.
Leukippos (450-420 be)
It is certain that Aristotle and Theophrastos bothregarded [Leukippos] as the real author of the
atomic theory. 3
Leukippos modified Melissos's statement into the prop-
osition that there are many things and that they are all
spherical as Parmenides had said the one is, but not infi-
nite. He also denied the non-existence of empty space.
Creating empty space provides a "place" to put these many
little "reals". This development can be seen as distin-
guishing between substance and existence. Prior to this
distinction, substance was that which existed and non-sub-
stance or void was that which did not exist. When the two
notions are distinguished, then it is possible to have non-
substance that exists (void).
Prior to Leukippos the strong association of being with
anything that could be thought of or said constituted a
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denial of a void in nature.' Whatever is thought of is,
and the world is full of substance. Nothing could not exist
and could not be thought. Arguments fairly raged about
whether that substance was one or many, and if so, how many.
But it was Leukippos who distinguished between non-existence
and empty space.
Leukippos supposed himself to have discovered aheory which would avoid this consequence [theimpossibility of motion and multiplicity]. Leu-kippos was the first philosopher to affirm, with afull consciousness of what he was doing, the exis-tence of empty space. The Pythagorean void hadbeen more or less identified with 'air', but the
void of Leukippos was really a vacuum . 5
Taking this new distinction literally poses problems for
Aristotle later when he struggles with point and place.
(See page 120. below.)
Democritus (460-370 be)
This distinction is also more clearly made when Democ-
ritus clarifies and expands Leukippos's theory.
Leucippus had been content to speak of it, as did
the Eleatics who denied that it existed at all, as
the 'not-real' or 'non-existent' ( yuf| ov): accord-
ing to Aristotle, Democritus, taking advantage of
the distinction between the two Greek negatives,
called it the 'unreal' (ok ov) or the 'nothing'
(oi>6ev). He was in this way able to distinguish
the void whose existence he affirmed as stoutly as
Leucippus from absolute non-existence (to /if) ov),
and to dispose of his opponents' objections by
phraseology as well as argument. . . . 'space' was
not 'the real'(ov), not body, neither was it the
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'noli-r^ai' (/if) ov), that which does not exist atall, but only 'unreal' (ook 6v). The distinction
meant?«
°ng reinforce>"e"t of „hat Leucippus
No one, even in modern times, has given a more
fllt
S±C ex
^
ession ^ atomism ... the only dif-erences allowed to the elements are strictlv
IltPr^hpf ' P
lus the motion in space necessary toa ter t eir positions. For Democritus therefore
^no
rinCiPle
?
explain everything: atoms and emptyspace.
. in the first place, each atom isindivisible. The word atom itself means indivisi-ble, it was for that reason that Democritus in-
vented the term atom and applied it to his ele-
ments
.
A number of things come together here. Matter and
space are distinguished from existence and non-existence.
It is denied that matter has both infinite extent and infi-
nite divisibility. But plurality is preserved by limiting
its scope. This actually foreshadows the development of
recursion in the twentieth century. it also disposes of the
problem of infinite regress implicit in the notion of infi-
nite divisibility. We also have each of the types of matter
previously conceived preserved as individual types of atoms.
This polished atomic theory holds together quite nicely,
although its incompatibility with geometry will readily
become apparent. We now turn to Aristotle's struggles with
this and his rejection of the atomic theory.
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Aristotl o
Infinite divisibility had already long been a topic of
philosophical discussion before The Philosopher came on the
scene. Aristotle, in his characteristic way, summarized
selected arguments about it in his On Generation and corrnp-
tion 8 and, to a lesser extent, in The Physics . 9 He accom-
panied these summaries with critical analyses which include
his reasons for rejecting the views of the atomists. Aris-
totle is not putting forward a positive model of infinite
divisibility; he is presenting the horns of the atomists'
dilemma and rejecting both horns.
The atomists say that there must be atoms, because
things being infinitely divisible leads to the absurd con-
clusion that there is nothing left to reassemble. Aristotle
argues that although things are infinitely divisible, they
are not divisible everywhere. He thus rejects a premiss of
the atomists' necessary to conclude that nothing is left to
reassemble. He does not go further and present a positive
account of infinite divisibility.
Here is the abstract form of the atomists' and Aristot-
le's arguments.
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The AtomistK
;
Either A OR B.
IF NOT B THEN A.
IF B THEN C.
NOT C.
Conclude NOT B.
Conclude A.
Aristotle;
Either A OR ( B ' AND NOT B)
.
IF (B' AND NOT B) THEN NOT A.IF X THEN (B' AND NOT B)
X. 1
*
Conclude (B' AND NOT B)
.
Conclude NOT A.
A - Reality is made up of atoms.
B
'
~ Reality is everywhere divisible.
B “ Reality is anywhere divisible.
C - There is nothing left to reassemble.
Point is not contiguous to another point.
There are flaws in both arguments. in what follows, I
shall examine Aristotle's critical analyses and supporting
definitions from various perspectives. I shall contrast his
writings with our current understanding of mathematical
infinity, the real-number line, and model-theoretic seman-
tics. My aim is to show that the use of these perspectives
allows us to identify problems with his analyses that are
otherwise difficult to uncover and to provide some account
for one of his more opaque passages. I shall begin by exam-
ining his supplementary definitions.
Quantity
Only divisible quantities may be considered as candi-
dates for infinite divisibility, and Aristotle defines what
a quantity is in The Categories . 10 In 4b20 he divides quan-
tity into discrete and continuous. According to Aristotle,
number and language are discrete, and lines, surfaces, bod-
ies, time, and place are all continuous (4b22). Aristotle
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distinguishes between discrete and continuous in the way
their parts interact. The parts of discrete quantities do
not have co,»o„ boundaries; the parts of continuous quanti-
ties do. Aristotle is also explicit in stating that nothing
else is a quantity:
strLtlv^all Uhe
e
ol'h
nti0
a
ed
-
are CaUed ^"titlesrric iy, al t t ers derivatively; for it is
ties t5a38)°°
k “hen WS 0311 thS °therS quanti-
Aristotle, in The Metaphysics 18
,
strongly suggests that
quantities, and only quantities, are divisible.
Quantum' means that which is divisible into twoor more constituent parts of which each is by
nature a 'one' and a 'this'. A quantum is a plu-rality if it is numerable, a magnitude if it is
measurable. 'Plurality' means that which is di-
visible potentially into non-continuous parts
magnitude' that which is divisible into continu-
ous parts; (1020a7) ... for these also are
called quanta of a sort and continuous because thethings of which these are attributes are divisi-ble. (1020a30)
The foregoing illustrates how Aristotle has identified
what are quantities and hence what are divisible. A quanti-
ty is something that is divisible; on the other hand, any-
thing that is divisible is a quantity. As a result, the
phrase 'divisible quantity' is redundant; however, it will
often be useful to keep this redundancy in mind. Aristotle
has, in effect, established that infinite divisibility can
be analyzed only as "infinitely divisible quantity".
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The Infinite
The nature of infinite divisibility depends upon the
nature of the infinite. To examine the role the infinite
plays in infinite divisibility, we must turn to Aristotle's
discussion of the nature of the infinite in The Physirg
. j n
2 0 2b3 0 - 203bl4
,
he surveys the opinions of his predecessors
concerning the nature of the infinite and includes in the
survey opinions of those who affirm infinite divisibility as
well as opinions of atomists who deny it.
Some of Aristotle's predecessors held the view that in-
finity was some real thing itself, a view which Aristotle
objects to. In spite of the reification of infinity sug-
gested by his own use of the definite article in his discus-
sions of "the infinite", Aristotle essentially settles on a
definition of 'infinite' which rejects its being a proper
subject. "Infinite", in his view, is predicated of other
things — magnitude and number in particular as well as time
and motion. Aristotle said:
Some of these do not treat infinity as an attrib-
ute of something else but make the infinite itself
a substance; but of these the Pythagoreans treat
it as present in sensible things, and also de-
scribe what is outside the heavens as infinite,
while Plato recognizes nothing outside the heav-
ens, but makes the infinite a constituent both of
sensible things and of ideas. (203a4)
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Aristotle rejects these views in favor of a more pro-
cess-oriented view, one which spans the distinction between
atomism and its opposition. He cites supporters of this
view from both the atomist camp and their opposition, those
who favor infinite divisibility:
Those who make them infinite in
oras and Democritus do, describe
continuous by contact. (203a20)
number
,
as Anaxag-
the infinite as
Aristotle supports the rejection of a reified infinity by
arguing that the infinite is a principle.
[The infinite ' s ] being ungenerated and imperish-
able points to its being a principle; for there is
a limit to all generation and destruction. Thisis why the infinite has no beginning but is itselfthought to be the beginning of all other things
• . •
. ( 203b7 )
^
This argument can be interpreted as follows: If the infinite
were a thing then it would be something that could come to
be and cease to be. The infinite cannot come to be nor
cease to be. Since it cannot come to be nor cease to be, it
must not be a thing.
In 203bl5-24, Aristotle offers the following as sup-
porting the existence of the infinite.
Belief in the infinite is derived from five sourc-
es: (1) from the infinity of time, (2) from the
divisibility of magnitudes, (3) from the fact that
the perpetuity of generation and destruction can
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be maintained only if there is an infinite sourceto draw upon, (4) from the fact that the limitedis always Umited by something else; but aboie
^
he ^finity of number, of magnitudes, and of
t£e fact°tw
d
rn
the heaVens
.
is inferred frim (5)
. .
hat there is no limit to our power ofthinking of them; (203bl5) P
Aristotle
' s statements of these beliefs seem somewhat
question-begging or circular, but they all hint at something
which can be continued again and again (presumably without
end). He clearly favors the perspective on infinity which
treats infinite as an attribute of a process which cannot be
gone through. He would certainly agree that the infinite is
not a thing which can come to be and cease to be; infinite
is that attribute which identifies a process as having no
end. Aristotle explicitly gives four senses of 'infinite 7
,
three of which include the notion of a process which cannot
be completed.
We must first distinguish the senses of 'infin-
ite'; (1) That whose nature forbids its being
traversed, (2) that which admits of incomplete or
(3) difficult traversal, or (4) which, though of
such a nature as to be traversable, yet does not
admit of it. Again what is infinite is so in re-
spect of addition, of division, or of both.
( 204a2
)
Even though Aristotle's language treats "infinite" as
an object, these three senses clearly emphasize the intermi-
nable nature of processes that are said to be infinite.
That such a process is said to be infinite makes it a
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"thing" which 'the infinite' is predicated of. m his con-
tinuing discussion, Aristotle becomes more explicit in this
regard by stating:
F°r infinity is an attribute of number andtude, and an attribute of an attribute isless capable of independent existence than
attribute. (204al5)
magni-
even
an
Of course, attributes are predicated of other things. (in-
finite is an attribute predicated of divisibility and divis-
ibility is an attribute predicated of magnitude.) Once the
infinite is predicated of processes, and limited to the
process of addition and division at that, the subjects of
the processes come under examination.
Aristotle claims that a thing is infinite only by addi-
tion or by division. This is more precisely stated by say-
ing that a thing is infinite only by the process of addition
or division. Extracting the essence of this in regard to
the infinite yields "the process is infinite". "Infinite"
is then predicated of a subject. The only subjects he deems
appropriate are magnitude, number, time, and motion. In
regard to addition, Aristotle concludes, "Clearly then there
is no actually existent infinite body" (206a7), a conclusion
with which modern science agrees,
divisibility to extension.
He goes on to apply
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Spatial extension is not infinite in actualitybut is so (a) by division (the belief in indivisi-ble lines is easily refuted); (206al7)
So, the infinite is not actually predicated of magnitude per
se. it is the divisibility of magnitude — the process of
dividing — that infinite is actually predicated of.
Atomism
Aristotle's discussion of infinite divisibility in The
£frysics is intended mostly to elucidate "the infinite" rath-
er than to address the topic of infinite divisibility it-
self. The parenthetical insert at 206al7 is not justified.
It appears to be question-begging. Suppose the atomists
were right. First consider the simple case of dividing a
line by the process of bisection. If each line were always
divisible exactly in half, it would have had to have had an
even number of points. Not only would the number of points
have to be even, it would have to be an exact power of two
— 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, • •••. The consequence would be for
lines of four and eight points to exist but not for lines of
six points. Bisecting a line of length six yields two lines
of length three — a length not capable of being bisected.
This is clearly absurd (except, perhaps, to the Pythagorean-
s). 14 The alternative would be for a line to have had an
unending supply of points. But having an unending supply of
points is just having an unending supply of places where it
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IS divisible. Therefore, to presume that a line is divis-
ible exactly in half is to presume that it is infinitely
divisible. Rather than refuting atomism, this begs the
question by assuming infinite divisibility.
Let s examine a bit further the consequences of the
atomists' position. Under their presumption, lines will be
composed of a finite number of (indivisible and extended)
points. To presume that a line may be divisible into two
(not necessarily equal) parts is to presume that the line is
at least as long as the magnitude of two (adjacent) points.
Since a line must consist of at least two points by defini-
tion, a line is always divisible into two parts. But the
two parts may be single (extended and indivisible) points
and hence not proper lines. We can call such a part a de-
generate or improper "line". These improper lines are not
themselves divisible; hence there is a limit to divisibility
(under the presumed atomic structure). Consequently, that
there are no indivisible lines, per se, does not necessitate
that lines are infinitely divisible. The atomists' position
is not as fragile as Aristotle would have us believe; he
believes lines are continuous, and his belief has infected
his reasoning. His parenthetical remark at 206al7 is gratu-
itous. It reminds one of the remark Fermat scribbled in the
margin of a book — the remark about the existence of an al-
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leged "elegant and simple" proof of his famous last theorem
(which was proven in 1993, but the proof was not trivial).
Infinite Divisibi 1 i ty and Matter
In The Physics
,
Book III, Chapter 7, Aristotle asserts
a reciprocal relationship between number and magnitude.
Number is potentially infinite by addition just as magnitude
is potentially infinite by division. Number has a minimum
unit while magnitude has an (unspecified) maximum. He con-
cludes :
(1) Magnitude is infinitely divisible.
(2) Number is infinitely addable.
Peano's successor axiom makes (2) explicit with regard to
number. "Every number has a successor" captures the notion
that number has the nature of being, as Aristotle would say,
"infinite by addition"; addition is a never-ending process.
Consequently, I cannot argue with (2).
But, it seems to me, (1) can be questioned. Hume and
Berkeley both argue against it.
Infinite Divisibility
I have approached Aristotle's treatment of "infinite
divisibility" by looking first at the logically prior treat-
ments of (divisible) "quantity" in The Categories and "the
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infinite" in The Physics
. Aristotle deals specifically with
"infinite divisibility" in On Generation and corrupt In
chapter two of that work he attempts to clarify what 'infin-
ite divisibility' means. He needs to clarify the meaning of
infinite divisibility', because, as he sees it, several
important notions (coming to be, alteration, growth, and
undergoing the contrary of these) all depend upon how infi-
nite divisibility is characterized.
Basic to all this is the question whether the
things there are come to be and alter and grow and
undergo the contrary of these things because the
primary existences are things which have size, and
are indivisible, or whether nothing which has size
is indivisible; this makes a great deal of differ-
ence. ( 315b24
)
On a first reading of this chapter, one might think
that Aristotle had two models which were not compatible and
that their incompatibility could be accounted for by Georg
Cantor's account of transfinite numbers. That is, Aristotle
could have devised a coherent characterization of "infinite
divisibility" had he known of the different orders of infin-
ity as characterized by Cantor. 15 Aristotle was getting
apparently contradictory views by tacitly assuming (falsely)
that there is only one kind of infinity.
As a result of Cantor's work, we differentiate among
infinities of different cardinality (size). The first such
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division is between the size of the natural numbers and the
real numbers, and lines are usually modeled by real numbers.
Some of Aristotle's descriptions conform to a cardinality
characteristic of the natural numbers and some to a cardi-
nality characteristic of the real-number line.
On a more careful analysis of Aristotle's passages on
infinite divisibility, and in consideration of the types of
language he uses in describing his analysis, a more subtle
reading is possible. The need for different infinities may
be too strong. A lesser difference may be sufficient to
account for the problem. The difference here is the dis-
tinction between so-called "discrete" sets and "dense" sets.
In this particular use of 'discrete', the members of
such a set can be placed "next" to each other and be count-
ed. Two elements can be said to be next to each other,
successive, or adjacent, if there are no other elements
between them. Aristotle's corresponding definitions can be
found in The Physics . He defines 'in succession' and 'be-
tween' in book 5, chapter 3, in the context of a discussion
of motion. For our purposes here, only certain aspects of
these definitions are necessary.
'Between' involves at least three terms; (226b26)
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That is 'in succession'
has nothing of the same
it is in succession to.
which, being
kind between
( 226b34
)
after
.
. .
it and what
The natural numbers, with the successor function, is the
primary exemplar of such a set and represents the discrete
model. in the case of any set of macroscopic objects which
are stacked or lined up and can be counted, the "successor"
or next" relation can be shown of any given one of such
objects (except the last one in a finite set).
Sets which are "dense" have the property that between
any two members of the set another can be found. The real
numbers provide the most common example. if you have two
real numbers x and y, then the number (x+y)/2 is between x
and y
.
One's first reaction to Aristotle's problem with infi-
nite divisibility might be to consider the difference be-
tween the natural numbers with their successor property and
the real numbers with their dense property as providing a
way of explaining Aristotle's difficulty. These two sets
represent different orders of infinity, so one might be
tempted to think the different orders of infinity are re-
quired to extricate Aristotle from his difficulties.
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In the problem of infinite divisibility, it is the
dense property of the real numbers which suggests a differ-
ence sufficient to distinguish between the two models. it
is not the greater cardinality of the real numbers which is
significant, merely their denseness. Another dense set is
the set of rational numbers. if you have rational numbers
a/b and c/d, then the number (a/b+c/d)/2, which is just the
rational number (ad+bc)/2bd, is between a/b and c/d. Just
as with the real numbers, between any two rational numbers
is a third. But rational numbers have the same cardinality
as the natural numbers. The distinction between the dense
and discrete property may be adequate to explain the diffi-
culty with infinite divisibility.
One potential source of difficulty is that Aristotle
views magnitude as a continuous quantity. "The 'continu-
ous'", says Aristotle, "is a species of the contiguous; two
things are continuous when the limits of each become identi-
cal and are held together." (227a7) He had previously pro-
posed a definition for 'contiguous' in 227a6: "That is 'con-
tiguous' which, being in succession, is also in contact."
The rational numbers do not form a continuous set. In
fact, the set of rational numbers is discontinuous "every-
where" because there are irrational numbers arbitrarily
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close to any rational number. There are infinitely many
irrational "holes" in the (rational) number line. Aristot-
le's definition of 'continuous' might seem to require a
greater infinity than the countable. ('Countably infinite'
means having the same cardinality as the natural numbers.)
Even the real-number line seems to fail to satisfy his defi-
nition of 'continuous'. Two things are continuous if they
are of the same kind, are contiguous, and touch. Certain
sets of real numbers — intervals — can touch and, when
touching, form a unity. But two (distinct) single real
numbers cannot touch any more than two rational numbers can.
If we ignore the irrational "holes" in the number line,
then sets of rational numbers behave just like real numbers
as above. In other words, relative to the set of rational
numbers, closed interval sets of rational numbers can form
contiguous, touching, consecutive sets of the same kind.
(They "touch" provided their terminus is a rational number
and not an irrational one. For example, the closed interval
ending with 2 touches the closed interval beginning with 2.
But the open interval terminated by n does not touch the
open interval beginning at it since n is irrational.) So,
some closed interval sets of rational numbers are continuous
qua the rationals. Half-open intervals would seem to quali-
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fy, but they do not touch, even though there is nothing be
tween them.
Potential and Antnai
The potential/actual distinction applied to divisibili-
ty seems to correlate with these two models. That which is
potentially divided forms contiguous parts with a common
boundary wherever it might be actually divided. The actual-
ly infinitely divided would give an exploded view with adja-
cent parts "next" to one another (but not touching — as in
discrete sets). These views are irreconcilable in that the
potentially divided retains its dense structure, while the
actually divided does not. Now, we can find a mapping from
the natural numbers to the rational numbers showing that
there is still the "same number" of points. But the order
required by "next" gets changed around.
In 316al6-25
,
as Aristotle summarizes the Atomists'
argument, he is clearly using a dense model when he argues
that no body or thing possessed of size is left, since, if
anything left had size, it would also be divisible. Such a
body has the same structure as denseness in that a point
exists between any two distinct points.
105
In 316326 33 he is discussing the characteristics of
sizeless" points. Since points have no size, when two of
them are placed together they become coincident; that is,
only one point remains. Moreover, an object composed of
only two points, when divided, still retains the same over-
all size (two points of no size still adds up to no size).
However, generalizing from combining any finite number of
points to combining infinitely many points is not valid.
But this is just what Aristotle does. He asserts that an
object assembled from ("infinitely") many sizeless points
cannot have size:
So even if all the points are put together they
will not produce size. (316a34)
One suspects that Aristotle doesn't have it all together in
view of his previous statement:
Similarly, if it is formed out of points it will
have guantity; for when the points were in
contact and there was just one thing possessed of
size and they were together, they did not make the
whole the slightest bit larger; (316a28)
Aristotle is a bit loose here. Points cannot be in
contact without being coincident. In his notes, Williams
seems aware of the errors — he adds quotes to 'in contact'
and 'together' — but he focuses on the issue of continuity
and questions Aristotle's mastery of the argument involving
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the "sawdust model". >• Joachim notes a grammatical shift
Of subject at the same point (or is it "place "?) 17
It seems clear to me that Aristotle's mental model in-
volves "exploding" a body of size into discretely separated
sizeless parts (points) and then sequentially putting to-
gether points two at a time. He is left with only one point
after each step. This process can continue for a countably
infinite number of steps and still yield the same result: an
object the size of one point — "a set of measure zero".
Something is intuitively wrong when the reassembled
parts do not make up the original whole. The flaw is in
presuming that "exploding" the original yields discrete
consecutive points, that is, gives the same result as a
completed infinite division. Mentally explode something
slowly ; it stretches rather than breaks. The dense nature
of a continuous object supplies "as many more points as
necessary" to fill in any gaps where it might be [is poten-
tially] divided. Mathematically, an interval of any size
can be transformed into one of any other size, including
between the finite and the infinite. I will return to this
subject later; for now, it is sufficient to comment on the
difference between the discrete "exploded view" and the
dense "assembled view".
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This difference corresponds to the distinction between
counting and measuring, about which Ackrill, in his comments
on The Categories
,, says:
Aristotle does not stop to examine
nature of counting and measuring
,
survey the different ways in which
guantities may be spoken of;
.
carefully the
nor does he
guantity or
18
If 'guantity' represents an abstraction subsuming both
counted guantities and measured guantities and these are
somewhat conflated, as Ackrill implicitly suggests, then
Aristotle's apparent shift between a discrete and a dense
model is understandable.
Infinity Times 7Prn
There is a problem with Aristotle's use of 'all' when
he refers to putting "all" the points together. 'All', in
this sense, stands for an undistinguished infinity. By
adding all the points together, we have the sum over infini-
ty of a zero-sized body. Summing the same thing many times
amounts to multiplying by the number of times; for example,
adding 4 a total of 10 times is the same as multiplying 4
times 10. The net result is that adding all the points has
the structure of multiplying zero times infinity; that prod-
uct is mathematically indeterminate.
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If we coordinate the division process with the summing
process, we can overcome this indeterminate resuit. Suppose
we divide a body into N pieces, each of size L/N where L
stands for the length or size of the object. (Remember,
Aristotle's conception of the infinite is of a process which
cannot be gone through. Dividing a magnitude in an attempt
to achieve infinite divisibility by such a process is divid-
ing it with an ever-increasing number of divisions and can-
not actually be completed.) Something is infinitely divisi-
ble if N is getting larger and larger. Conversely, L/N is
getting smaller and smaller, until finally (if there can be
a finally), N reaches infinity and L/N reaches zero size.
Of course, according to Aristotle, the infinite cannot be
gone through; the limit cannot be reached by any direct
method. Since the infinite cannot be gone through, any
attempt to put things back together must be done with the
incompletely divided fragments — which are of size L/N.
By coordinating the summing with the division, we per-
form the multiplication of size L/N times the number of
segments N and obtain a product of (L/N).N. Notice that
this simplifies to L, and it no longer matters how big N is.
So, if we take the limit as N approaches infinity of
(L/N)*N, we end up with L, the same size we started with.
Aristotle and the atomists neglect the fact that infinity
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cannot be gone through when they presume something to be
infinitely divided. Additionally, both the atomists and
Aristotle implicitly presume that infinity times zero is
zero. Of course there would be nothing reassembled if this
were true. But infinity times zero is not zero; it is inde-
terminate. The atomists' premiss, that there would be noth-
ing reassemblable, is not compelling. The reductio argument
fails
.
The Atomists 7 Argument Exparuipri
The atomists' argument is flawed in another way, as is
Aristotle's presentation. Here is a greatly expanded ver-
sion of the argument.
Every perceptible body is potentially divisible at
every point.
It is impossible that a body is actually divisible at
every point (simultaneously). (Premiss 2 is proven by
reductio in conjunction with premiss 3.)
3 . Nothing can come to be out of nothing or cease to be
into nothing. (319al6-21)
110
2.1. It is possible that a perceptible body is actually
divided at any point. (Assume the contrary of 2.)
2.2. If a body is actually divided at every point, then
there will be nothing left. (Premiss 2.2 is it-
self proven by reductio.)
2.2.1. if there were something left, it could be
further divided at some point, contradicting
its having actually been divided at every
point.
2.3. If nothing is left, then the body will have van-
ished into something incorporeal
.
2.4. If a body vanishes into something incorporeal,
then it ceases to be (something corporeal).
2.5. If something can cease to be something corporeal,
then it can also come to be something corporeal
(out of points or out of nothing at all).
Therefore, 2.1 leads to the contrary of 3 and absurdity; 2
is proven by reductio.
Ill
If a body is not actually (simultaneously) divisible at
every point, then consider whether it is potentially (non-
simultaneously) divisible at every point.
4.1. If a corporeal body is divided, it is divided into
corporeal bodies. (a trivial case is division
into a corporeal body and separate points. The
corporeal body is not diminished by this form of
division.
)
4.2. Division into parts cannot yield a process which
goes on to infinity because infinity cannot be
gone through. Non—simultaneous division is a
process of successive divisions which, by the
nature of the infinite, cannot be completed. Any
stopping point would yield, by 4.1, undivided
corporeal bodies.
So, a body cannot be divisible everywhere because either the
process could not be completed and something of size would
be left, or nothing at all would be left.
The Atomists are happy with the first horn but must
further reject the second horn. That rejection flows as
follows
:
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If the process were to be carried out to infinity (or
simultaneously
) , the parts would all be nothing at all
or vanishingly small points.
6. If coming to be and ceasing to be are to take place by
aggregation and segregation, then aggregation must be
capable of adding to the size of what comes to be; con-
versely, segregation must diminish the size of what
ceases to be.
7. Aggregation cannot proceed by the accumulation of noth-
ing at all or points (vanishingly small pieces). Con-
versely, segregation cannot proceed by diminution from
vanishingly small pieces or points.
8. Coming to be takes place by aggregation; ceasing to be
takes place by segregation.
9. Aggregation must proceed by the addition of pieces of
some determinate size. Conversely it is so with segre-
gation .
Here the atomists' argument actually makes a wild leap of
faith
.
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10. The process of aggregation itself proceeds by exactly
the size of the limit of divisibility, and that is the
minimum size (which just happens to be so small as to
be invisible).
That aggregation must proceed by the addition of pieces
of some determinate size begs the guestion if "determinate"
is taken to mean "minimum". The argument is that aggrega-
tion must occur by the addition of something of size. Noth-
ing is actually presented to rule out continuous accretion.
If there were some non-guestion-begging way to rule out
continuous accretion, we would have a nice, tight reductio.
But it leaks.
Aristotle has it that aggregation occurs by "leaps and
bounds", that is by the addition of large clumps of material
at each "step". These clumps are themselves infinitely
divisible but not divisible at every point. He rejects the
atomists' solution, retains infinite divisibility, but re-
jects the notion that objects of size are everywhere divisi-
ble. (The real-number line satisfies this by having a
countably infinite number of rational "division points" and
many irrational "non-division points" but does so by includ-
ing different orders of infinity.) Of course, Aristotle be-
lieves that time is infinitely divisible; there is no prob-
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lem with half as big an increase occurring in half the time,
continuous accretion is the natural consequence of this
model. However, aggregation by atoms goes along equally
well with a limit to divisibility of both magnitude and
duration. The nature of time (continuous or discrete) would
seem to fit in the appropriate model. Even if duration were
not infinitely divisible, aggregation could still occur by
the addition of divisible clumps at each interval.
Aristotle, however, does not proceed along this line;
he takes another tack.
"Contact 11
In 3 16b6 Aristotle introduces a statement from another
level of analysis. He states;
And any one contact always involves two things,
since there has to be something else besides the
contact or division point.
Aristotle asserts that any one contact requires two things,
in the sense of distinct things. This requirement seems to
be based upon a syntactic-level notion for the word 'con-
tact'. Contact requires two distinct objects touching or
"contacting" at a single point. Remaining distinct while
still sharing a point (of contact), in truth, requires a
minimum of 3. points. Since there is no reason to prefer one
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object over another, each must provide a point distinct from
the point of contact. Otherwise, one object would not be
distinct from the point of contact, which is part of the
other object as well. We would, in such a case, have one
object with a point of contact and no other object. Aris-
totle's argument is a little weak here, since he asserts
only the need for 2 points instead of 3.
His mistake is understandable in the light of the ten-
sion between incompatible models: discrete quantities do not
have a point of contact; continuous quantities "join" at a
point (of contact). Since two distinct discrete quantities
do not share a point of contact, no third "point of contact"
is required.
This kind of characterization of contact has as a prime
paradigm such things as stacks of coins or columns of
bricks. Macroscopic objects all have at least two distinct
points (and all points between) so can remain distinct apart
from a shared "point of contact". Further, the type of such
a set of objects is discrete. One can use the point of
contact along with the other two distinct points (one for
each of the two objects) to evoke the adjacent, or next,
relationship. Starting with the point not of contact in
object "A" (and we are guaranteed that at least one such
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point exists), move first to the point of contact and then
to the point not of contact in object "B» (and we are guar-
anteed that at least one of these points exists also). By
this method we move from one object to "the next" (a notion
Aristotle uses). In doing this, we have ignored any points
of objects "A" & "B" except for one point not of contact
from each object and the point of contact.
Anywhere is not Everywhere
For parts to form a continuous whole, there must be a
point of contact between one part and "the next". if some-
thing were divisible everywhere, the parts would be mere
points — which, according to Aristotle, cannot be recom-
bined into anything of size. Aristotle must find a way to
disallow divisibility everywhere while still permitting
infinite divisibility. Lear, in "Aristotelian Infinity",
notes
:
Aristotle offers a paradigmatically Aristo-
telian solution. He distinguishes two senses in
which a line may be said to be divisible 'through
and through' (317a3ff). A length is divisible
through and through in the sense that it could be
divided anywhere along its length. But it is not
divisible through and through in the sense that it
could (even potentially) be divided everywhere
along the length. One can thus actualize any
point but one cannot actualize every point; for
any process of division, there must be divisions
which could have been made which in fact were not
made
.
19
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Lear, who is more interested in infinity than infinite
divisibility, takes the potential/actual distinction at face
value and does not elaborate further.
In 317a3 Aristotle states:
inoe no point is contiguous to another pointthere is one sense in which divisibility at everypoint belongs to things of size and another in
which it does not.
The distinction between these senses will be clear when we
examine his argument in the next few lines. It follows from
an apparent distinction between his usages of "anywhere" and
"everywhere". He goes on to state:
When this is asserted, it is thought that there is
a point both anywhere and everywhere, so that the
magnitude has necessarily to be divided up into
nothing;
. .
.
(317a5)
Here Aristotle begins to hint at his argument by implying a
distinction between (divisibility) "anywhere" (hopeoun) and
"everywhere" (pante) and by using the conjunction "both
. . . and" (kai . . . kai) to join them. The rest of the
sentence
,
for because there is a point everywhere, it is
formed either out of contacts or out of points
( 317a6 )
,
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introduces his distinction between places where the line is
divisible (contacts) and places where it is not (points).
Aristotle continues with his analysis and refutation of
the atomists' argument. He is quite terse in his dealings
with it, and the brevity of his rebuttal leaves much to be
desired. Williams comments:
The above paraphrase of 317a2-12 is the near-
est I can come to making sense of this baffling
passage. A large part of it, 317a8-12, is so
resistant to my attempts to understand it that I
have contented myself with a literal translation
which I have placed between obeli to indicate that
no claim is made to have found a sure way of mak-
ing sense of the Greek. Other commentators and
translators seem to have fared no better, and I
can hope to surpass them only in frankness. 20
Better sense, I think, can be made of Aristotle's discussion
by fleshing out certain contextual presumptions.
When this is asserted, it is thought that there is
a point [where something with magnitude is] both
[divisible] anywhere and [divisible] everywhere,
. . .
.
(317a5)
Aristotle is leading to the conclusion that something
with magnitude is divisible anywhere but is not divisible
everywhere, and since it is not divisible everywhere the
atomists' argument is defeated. This distinction can be
interpreted as corresponding to the distinction between
being potentially divided and being actually divided. Aris-
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totle seems actually to agree with the atomists, though he
potentially does not. Although he agrees that there is a
sense in which something with magnitude is not everywhere
divisible, he denies that it follows from this that magni-
tude is not infinitely divisible.
Aristotle seems to connect 'anywhere' with "potentially
divisible" in the following passage:
In one sense there is a point everywhere, becausethere is one anywhere and all are like each
one;
. .
. (317a8)
Here, the distinction between 'anywhere' and 'everywhere' is
used in an entailment manner: "If there is a point 'any-
where' then there is a point 'everywhere'", with the reason
given that "all are like each one". By this Aristotle means
that there is no reason to suppose that one point is any
different from any other. Potentially, there is a point
anywhere
.
He goes on with his crucial "point" that "but there is
no more than one." By this he means that there is no more
than one point anywhere (at each position). His argument to
support this immediately follows: "since they are not con-
secutive,
. .
.". ( 317a9
)
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One might expect 'contiguous' in place of 'consecutive'
above. 'Contiguous' would seem to fit more easily in the
reading that follows. His use of 'consecutive' at this
point seems more in keeping with the undivided, or poten-
tially divided, state under consideration. The undivided
line is continuous, so any parts are contiguous to each
other; in this state, the parts are not discretely separated
by actual division. Consequently, there is no "next" part
adjacent to any chosen one. So, two points (parts) are not
consecutive
. (But they are not contiguous either — the
"parts" of something continuous are normally contiguous, but
points are an exception.) Aristotle concludes:
so it is not the case that there is a point every-
where. ( 317a9
)
Point and "Place"
Sense can be made of the argument at this point if we
interpret Aristotle to be thinking of both point and place
but ambiguously using the term 'point' for both. We need to
recall that, for Aristotle, a point must be actualized in
some way . He would say that the place of a potential point
does not hold an actual point. We can distinguish between a
place where there is an actualized point and a place where
there is no (actualized) point (there would be a potential
point in such a place). By the symmetry of arbitrariness,
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any place could have a point. Once such a place is chosen,
then the contiguous places have no points. To show how this
works, here is an expanded interpretation of the argument at
( 317a9
)
If there were points everywhere, then there wouldbe contiguous points at every point. Contiguouspoints must touch. Since points take up no spaceat all, touching points would be in the sameplace. This would necessitate there being two
contiguous points at every place. But there can'tbe two points at the same place. Conseguently
points cannot be contiguous. Since points cannotbe contiguous, the "place" of the potential con-tiguous point must be empty. So, there is a sensem which there is not a point everywhere.
This argument entails a presumption that "place" is
both contiguous and consecutive. Every place has both a
contiguous place and a consecutive place. So, since points
can t be contiguous, there must be places where points
aren't, namely the contiguous places.
This is the sense in which there isn't a point every-
where, while the sense in which there is a point anywhere is
its potentially having been chosen as the starting "point".
I think this establishes that Aristotle differs in his in-
terpretation of (divisible) 'anywhere' and 'everywhere'. He
has concluded that even though there is a point "anywhere"
there is not a point "everywhere". There is a loose associ-
ation between the term 'anywhere' and the potentially chosen
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starting point and the term 'everywhere' and the contiguous
Places which might hold points - loose, but not consistent.
There is a kind of logic in his argument which is il-
lustrated by the following example. Suppose we want to talk
about "the Universe" and intend by that term to include all
things, including all space and all time. Then, suppose
someone wants to use the term 'edge', or 'boundary', in
talking about the universe as we have defined it. By
'edge', or 'boundary', we usually mean a distinction or
division between two things, one of which belongs to one
side and the other of which belongs to the other side of the
distinction
.
"Edge of the universe" presupposes that there is some-
thing which is in the universe and, on the other side of the
edge, something which is not in the universe. But we de-
fined 'universe' as including all things, so we can conclude
that there is no edge to the universe. That is, we cannot
consistently use the term 'edge', or 'boundary', with its
usual meaning, if we hold the meaning of 'universe', as we
have defined it, to include all things. It requires careful
analysis to notice that simply using the term 'edge', or
'boundary', with 'universe' introduces a contradiction and
yields a (verbal) structure which is no longer consistent.
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Aristotle seems to be displaying a similar type of
argument, but one which is more subtle, in creating a dis-
tinction between the intended usages of the terms 'every-
where' and 'anywhere'. He allows for two senses of 'every-
where', in one of which there is a point (and hence divisi-
bility there) and in the other of which there is not a point
(and hence no divisibility there). The argument is confused
because he does not create a separate term for each usage
and, moreover, does not seem to be consistent in his usages
of 'everywhere' and 'anywhere' in regard to the distin-
guished senses.
In the sentence that follows, Aristotle is referring to
the "place" which is contiguous to any point:
For is divisible at the middle it will also
be divisible at a contiguous point. (317al0)
This appears to introduce a terse reductio supporting his
previous sentence.
1. Suppose we have two points (anywhere) at which magni-
tude is divisible. (He seems to be presuming that he
is considering two "consecutive" divisible points.)
2. Suppose it is divisible at the middle (between these
two points )
.
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2.1 Then it would also be divisible a +- . .at a contiguous point.
(Either could have been actualized.)
2.2 But it cannot be divisible at both the middle and a
contiguous point because there is no contiguous point.
"For position is not contiguous to position or
point to point." (3l7al2)
(Actualizing one precludes actualizing the other, but by
symmetry either both must be actualizable or neither can be
And we have shown that one cannot be, so neither can be
actualized.
)
3. Therefore, by reductio, it could not have been divisi-
ble at the middle.
The presumption that any place has both a contiguous
place and a consecutive place allows one to conclude that
there is a "point" contiguous to the middle point. But
points cannot be contiguous (without being coincident).
This presumption allows us to confuse the notions of
discrete sets and dense sets, notions which are otherwise
incompatible. With our visual model of the real line we
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think of a continuous set as something in which no amount of
"stretching" will create breaks or "holes". Of course, with
the rational numbers, which could be thought of as having a
"granular" quality, stretching does not separate the grains
any more than before stretching. There are always more
points between any two points, no matter how close they were
to start with.
The presumption that any place has both a consecutive
place and a contiguous place cannot be modeled, because it
is inconsistent in the context of Aristotle's definitions of
'contiguous' and 'consecutive'. As such, it represents a
syntactic-level" constraint or connection between the two
incompatible models.
Aristotle abandons his visual model in favor of this
syntactic-level argument when he nonchalantly states "since
they are not consecutive". (317a9) He thereby justifies his
statement that there is no more than one point anywhere.
What he seems to be doing is shifting levels of argument
from semantic considerations of the visual model of the real
line to more purely syntactic-level constraints. In the
semantic-level analysis, which is driven by the visual mod-
el, statements are judged by their agreement with the model
in this case the visual image of the real line. By ap-
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pealing to the assertion that the points are not contiguous
(presumably after division), he allows a shift to the dis-
crete model which provides the appearance of solving the
problem. By not consistently sticking to semantic-level
considerations, or conversely to syntactic-level con-
straints, he permits a kind of inconsistency to invade his
argument. This inconsistency results directly from the
notion that any place has both a contiguous place and a con-
secutive place.
Aristotle notes that, once an object is divided (into
points), no point has a contiguous neighbor; allowing that
leads to a contradiction of the hypothesis that the object
was divided at every point. He denies that points are con
tiguous but implicitly assumes that there is a next point,
distinct from the "one anywhere", and that the intervening
distance is not divisible. He concludes that there are no
points in this interval.
His argument here is based upon a view of the divided
object represented by an exploded set of separated points,
presumably in an array similar to what we see when we look
at a newsprint photo with a magnifying glass. This kind of
view represents a discrete set of points, while the set of
points in an undivided region of space (line segment, or
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disk in the plane) is a dense set. Aristotle has unwitting
ly converted from dense to discrete in the middle of his
argument
.
The remainder of his sentence, "and this is division or
composition .
" (317al2) simply states that he has dealt with
the problem of infinite divisibility and, its converse,
composition.
In 3 17al5-18
,
Aristotle confirms this interpretation
when he states:
nor in such a way that division can occur every-
where (for this is what would happen if point were
contiguous to point) ....
In 317al8, he states:
but into smaller and yet smaller parts, and aggre-
gation out of smaller cinto greater>.
Here, he recalls his purpose in examining infinite divisi-
bility, namely to shape the concepts of aggregation and
segregation, which will relate to alteration and growth.
Aristotle does not carry the smaller and smaller to its
logical limit because he has just argued that there is a
sense in which divisibility at every point is not applicable
to objects of size. The process of dividing something into
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smaller and smaller parts seems a simple concept to grasp
and, aside from practical considerations, easy enough to
carry out, but Aristotle has asserted that there are some
places at which the division cannot occur — those places
where there isn't a point. He does not relate the sense in
which "there is not a point everywhere"
( 317 a 9 ) to the pro-
cess of consecutive division.
I would like to have the consequence that there is not
a point everywhere directly related to the process, so I
could have some model or definition of how the process miss
es these points. The consequence itself doesn't seem like-
ly. It could be arqued that any process which yields any
potential division point, finite or otherwise, will always
select the point which is "anywhere"
,
makinq other points
the "not-everywhere" ones. In other words, it doesn't mat-
ter which points you choose; you can't choose any of the
ones at which the thinq is not divisible. Non-divisible
points are forever inaccessible. Aristotle would say that
that's because there aren't any "points" at these places.
Aristotle does not connect the two distinct adjacency
criteria in the notion of "place", as instantiated in the
two incompatible models (discrete and continuous), and con-
sequently fails to notice the resultinq contradiction.
129
Since his purpose was not to clarify infinite divisibility
itself but only to clarify it in relation to its use in
accounting for coming to be, alteration, growth, and under-
going the contrary of these, he stopped short of unearthing
the contradiction.
Many discussions have attempted to reconcile the appar-
ent contradiction by use of the potential/actual distinc-
tion. There is a point everywhere in the sense that a mag-
nitude is potentially divided at the point. On the other
hand, the uncompletable nature of (the process of) infinity
is such that any magnitude subject to successive division is
never fully divided. So, there are places at which there is
no point (where it is actually divided). This might seem to
be a promising way to remove the contradiction; yet David
Bostock has extended Zeno's arguments to show that the po-
tential/actual distinction does not, in fact, work. 21 Ar-
istotle uses the distinction to dispute Zeno's argument —
he argues that Achilles does not actualize an infinity of
points on his way to the tortoise. (263a23) Now, one way
for a point to be actualized is for something to stop at it
(262a21), and, in order for something to reverse direction,
it must stop at, and thus actualize, the point of reversal.
Bostock extends Zeno's argument to a bouncing ball in a way
that actualizes an infinity of points.
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But [Aristotle] was able to deny the factual ^“18t?nS
e of these points only by denyinq thatthey had been actualized, for Achillea „L 5supposed to have done anything at or to the .as he passed them. However"hifreply isnot available to the revised version of 7onn' c ^problem that I have just put forward, for theball s motion is certainly divided into infin-H-^i
mark the^c^of*
1® manY P°ints which
Y
be „
h bounce, and these must surelyadmitted to have been actualized in the course
7
of bouncmg I conclude, then, that Aristotle
Zeno ' s°problem
.
®
1
1
^ ^ right S°lution to
Aristotle himself asserts that points are not contigu-
ous. Any object made up of points cannot be divisible at
"non-points" "between" non-contiguous points. Unfortunate-
ly, between any two points there is another, to any desired
degree of precision, using our usual order relation. So,
between any non-contiguous points there are other points at
which the object is potentially divided. We now know that
the axiom of choice is equivalent to the axiom "Every set
can be well ordered." 23 (A set is well ordered if every
subset has a least element.) This axiom makes no statement
about the cardinality of a set or the order under which it
exhibits denseness. When it comes to the real number line,
we don't know what the well-order relation is, but when so
ordered, the points, separated by that order relation, would
be consecutive without intervening points; but this would
not be by the usual order relation, '<' (under which contin-
uous objects are dense).
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Summary of Aristotle's views
A tension pervades Aristotle's thoughts on the infinite
in general and infinite divisibility in particular, one
form of this tension is a conflict between the dense struc-
ture of the potentially divided or undivided model on the
one hand and the discrete structure of the actually divided
or exploded model on the other hand. The basic incompati-
bility of these two views is not discovered by Aristotle.
He appears to shift back and forth between the two models
using predominately syntactic-level arguments. This shift
may be facilitated by his holding a view of "place" which is
inconsistent with his view of "points". There are both
contiguous and consecutive places, while there can't be both
contiguous and consecutive points. Since there is no logi-
cal way to tell places from points aside from the definition
that points go into place, the view is inconsistent at
worst, ambivalent at best.
Aristotle, and his predecessors, also had an (under-
standably) immature understanding of infinity; he believed
that, essentially, zero times infinity is zero — whereas we
now know the product to be indeterminate. Further, neither
Aristotle nor his predecessors were aware that infinity
could be differentiated into different "sizes" — a distinc-
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tion which could go a long way toward resolving difficulties
with infinite divisibility.
In chapter VI I show that a careful analysis of the
positions of atomism (page 167) and infinite divisibility
(page 158) reveals that both points of view are internally
self-consistent. Both perspectives coexist in a manner com-
parable to the wave/particle duality of modern physics.
Many of Aristotle's insights are still current, but he nei-
ther proved that magnitude is infinitely divisible nor did
he refute the atomists.
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CHAPTER V
ATOMISM AND DIVISIONISM AFTER ARISTOTLE
Epicurus ('141-270 bn)
Epicurus's argument regarding atomism and divislonism
is similar to Aristotle's, except that Epicurus arrives at
the opposite conclusion. Furley distinguishes among three
kinds of indivisibility. They are physical (atom), theoret-
ical, and perceptual. It is Furley's contention that Epi-
ourus ' s Letter to Herodotus begs the question regarding the
atom.
I claim that the passage to be discussed offers no
argument at all for the existence of a physical
minimum, but assumes it. 1
But Furley then summarizes Epicurus's premisses and includes
a quotation of Epicurus's reasoning.
Nothing comes into being out of nothing or passes
away into nothing, and the universe is a closed
system — it has no relations with anything out-
side it. The irreducible contents of the universe
are bodies and space; everything else can be re-
duced to these. The bodies in question are "phys-
ically indivisible and unchangeable, if all things
are not to be destroyed into non-being but are to
remain durable in the dissolution of compounds —
solid by nature, unable to be dissolved anywhere
or anyhow. It follows that the first principles
must be physically indivisible bodies". 2
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According to Furley, the argument goes as follows:
Real things cannot be destroyed into 'non-bpin^.but mness there were a limit to physical Sii
must L a X lii?l-Wtat h°Uld happen; there thereforebe mit o physical divisibility. 3
The argument expands not uniike Aristotle's presentation,
but is much simpler because the distinction between place
and point is not involved.
1. No real thing can pass-away into non-being (by divi-
sion or otherwise).
2. If something is infinitely divisible then it can be
divided into non-being.
3. If something can not be divided into non-being then
it can not be infinitely divisible. (Contraposit-
ive of 2
. )
4. No real thing can be infinitely divisible, (by
1. & 3. using quantitative logic)
An examination of premiss 2 suggests a flaw. When
something extended is divided, the parts are extended. When
these extended parts are divided, their parts are extended.
There is no limit to this process. Since having no limit to
the process is what we mean by "infinitely divisible", we
always have extended parts. As the number of times an ex-
tension is bisected increases, the limit of the size of the
remaining extension is indeed zero. But at every stage in
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the process what is yet to be bisected has
sion. At no stage will dividing a non-zero
zero extension.
non-zero exten-
extension yield
There is a special case: removing the end-point of a
closed interval removes a
-piece" with zero extension, but
the remaining part still has the same extension as the orig-
inal. But this operation can only be performed twice —
once for each end of the line segment. Cantor examined con-
tinuing the process by removing individual points in a line.
This extended process can continue for countably many remov-
als and still not diminish the extension of the original
segment. (Such a set of points as was removed is known as a
set of measure zero.)
If it be argued that the removed single points somehow
pass away into non-being, the extension of the remaining
parts is not diminished at all. Hence even allowing points
to pass away into non-being does not cause the object under
consideration to pass away into non-being.
In the former case, dividing an extended object into
extended objects does not cause the object to pass away into
non-being even if the division process is continued to in-
finity. A trivial proof by mathematical induction on the
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N bisection shows that for all N, the parts are extended.
-
consequently, it is an error to conclude that that which is
infinitely divisible is divisible into non-being. We may
conclude that Premiss 2 is false.
Now let us consider the case of a minimum theoretical
quantity (idea or conception), as Furley translates Epicur-
US' "Letter to Herodotus".
(A) Moreover one must not suppose that in the lim-ited body there are infinitely numerous parts
even parts of any size you like. 5
(Bl) Therefore we must not only do away with divi-
sion into smaller and smaller parts to infinity,
so that we may not make everything weak and in our
conceptions of the totals be compelled to grind
away things that exist and let them go to wasteinto the non-existent, 6
( B2 ) but also we must not suppose that in finite
bodies you continue to infinity in passing on from
one part to another, even if the parts get smaller
and smaller. 7
Furley interprets Epicurus's argument as meaning that the
alternative to theoretical atomism is essentially infinite
regress of thought, which is unacceptable.
We must reject infinite divisibility, [Epicurus]
says, for otherwise we should make everything weak
— that is to say, when we tried to get a firm
mental grasp ... on the atoms, we should find
them crumbling away into nothingness. Every time
we thought we had arrived at the irreducible mini-
ma, we should have to admit that even these minima
are divisible. And so our search for the reality
of the atoms would be endlessly frustrated. 8
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The weakness is motivation for rejecting infinite di-
visibility. The impossibility of completing an infinite se
quence of contemplation of parts is grounds for rejecting
infinite divisibility. Here's how I see the argument ex-
panded.
a: We clearly comprehend a whole finite object.
b: To comprehend a whole object, we must compre-
hend its parts.
c *
-*- ts parts are infinite in number, then we
cannot complete a sequential process of com-
prehending each part.
d: Therefore, we cannot comprehend its parts.
e: Therefore, we cannot comprehend the whole ob-
ject .
According to Furley, both arguments are theoretical:
One deals with what would be left after an infinite number
of divisions; the other deals with how such a thing might be
comprehended. He suggests these correspond directly to two
of Zeno's arguments.
(Cl) For when someone once says that there are
infinite parts in something, however small they
may be, it is impossible to see how this can still
be finite in size; for obviously the infinite
parts must be of some size, and whatever size they
may happen to be, the size <of the body> would be
infinite . 9
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It is not obvious that the "some size" that the infi-
nite parts must have does not have zero as a limit. For the
argument to hold, "some size" must have a limit greater than
zero. The process of bisection reduces the size by half and
has a limit of zero. Although every bisection starts with
something of "some size" it yields parts which still have
"some size". And each bisection yields parts which have
"some size", there is no non-zero limiting size. This argu-
ment is infected by question begging in assuming that there
is a positive limit to "some size" (atomism).
Epicurus suggests that a theoretical or "cognitive"
minimum can be conceived of as "next" to something similar,
and that this sequential, one at a time, cognition trans-
verses the finite body.
(C2) And if the finite body has an extremity which
is distinguishable, even though it cannot be
thought of in isolation, it must be that one
thinks of the similar part next to this and that
thus as one proceeds onward step by step it is
possible, according to this opponent, to arrive at
infinity in thought. 10
But by using the term 'next' he introduces the atomic per-
spective. Furley notices a difficulty but fails explicitly
to note the question begging nature of the assumption im-
plicit in the notion of "next".
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We are considering someone's suqqestion thsi- ^
boly^tartt"^ [nUmber ° f]
7°f
Y
;
Sta ing from one edge of the body we imaa-a “lnVte
.
part of it/ 'the extremity'^ incon-ceivabie in isolation from the body. if we think
sarilv
t°“is extremit^ we »ust neces-niy think of another distinct part similar tothe extremity itself. But according to oir Laqi-nary opponent, there are in our finite body aninfinite number of such parts. So if we proceedin thought from one such part to another, ?it mustbe possible, when we traverse the whole object toreach mfmity in our thinking, which is ab-
surd. 11
It will be seen that this argument needs support.It is not yet clear why the extremity is a minutepart, nor why we can only think of the part nextto the extremity as being similar to it. This
support is provided in the next sentence, by an
analogy with the visual minimum. 12
According to Furley, Epicurean theory often depends
upon analogy with the perceptible for explaining the imper-
ceptible. 13 The existence of a perceptual minimum is taken
to support the existence of imperceptible minimum.
(Dl) We must observe that the minimum in sensa-
tion, too, is neither quite the same as that which
allows progression from one part to another, nor
wholly unlike it; it has a certain similarity to
things which allow progression, but it has no
distinction of parts. 14
( D2 ) When because of the closeness of the resem-
blance we think we can make distinctions in it —
one part to this side, one to that — what con-
fronts us must be equal. 15
(D3) And we study these parts in succession, be-
ginninq from the first, and not all within the
same area nor as touching each other part to part,
but, in their own proper nature, measuring out the
sizes, more of them for a larger one, fewer for a
smaller
.
16
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(E) This analogy, we must believe, is followed bv
J?,?10 a*om; for in its smallness?
V
clearly it differs from that which is percepti-ble, but it follows the same analogy. For we havealready stated that the atom has magnitude invirtue of its analogy with the things of this
scale
!
17
"*
USt projectin9 something small on a large
(F) Further, we must take these minimum partlesslimits as providing for larger and smaller thingsthe standard of measurement of their lengths be-ing themseives the primary units, for our use instudying by means of thought these invisible bod-
12?’ the similarity between them and change-
able things is sufficient to establish so much; 18
In the light of modern knowledge of vision systems,
there is an element of question begging in the use of the
perceptual analogy. The difficulty comes from the structure
of the visual receptors in our eyes. The retina of each eye
is comprised of an array of thousands of receptor cells,
each with a finite size. The fact that there are two kinds
of such cells is of no consequence. We know that these
cells respond by triggering the discharge of an optical
neuron. Aside from the fact that these cells are either
discharging or are quiescent is the matter of their physical
layout on the retina. Incoming light signals that activate
a single receptor cell produce a minimum perceptual experi-
ence. It does not matter whether we choose to view light as
corpuscular in nature or as a wave. It is simply not pos-
sible to have a visual or perceptual experience with less
than one whole cell of the retina activated. And since
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there are a finite number of discrete cells, this amounts to
built in atomism of the perceptuai apparatus.
The geometry of the eye requires that light from an
object stimulating a single receptor cell be within a mini-
mum angle. The most dense concentration of cells occurs
within the fovea. (Light from an object strikes the fovea
when we look directly at the object). But when only one
cell is activated, it is not possible to determine if the
object has a relative size smaller than the minimum angle
subtended by the cell. Figure 2 shows a diagram of the
angle that can subtend one retina cell. Notice that the
light from objects smaller than this angle can activate the
cell, but because the cell response is simply on or off,
there is no information in the perceptual system about how
big the image of the object may have been on the cell it-
self. The perceptual response is simply that it sees the
smallest possible activation. (Anything less would be no
cells activated at all.)
The visual system has an atomic structure. Its built
in bias is to respond in atomic terms. Consequently, using
an analogy to argue from the perceptual to the actual brings
the atomic structure of the visual system and imposes it via
the analogy onto the actual. This is a subtle form of ques-
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Figure 2. Visual apparatus involved in the minimum percep-tual experience.
tion begging. "There are atoms because I see atoms." But I
see atoms because my vision system has an atomic structure,
and it shapes it's incoming information into its own atomic
structure
.
Chrvsippus (280-207 bcl
Although Zeno of Citum (334-262 be) founded the Stoic
school, its view is largely known through Chrysippus. The
stoics, we are told, rejected atomism. The rejection ap-
pears to have centered around problems with infinity. Today
it is well known that both the natural numbers and the even
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numbers are infinite; the even numbers are a part of the
natural numbers. There is no difference [in number] between
them. it would be inappropriate to interpret 'no differ-
ence' in terms of subtraction — infinity minus infinity is
indeterminate. But it appears that Chrysippus may have been
onto one of the paradoxes of infinity.
Chrysippus, we are told, held "bodies" to be infinitelydivisible, not in the sense that a body could be divid-ed into an infinite number of parts, but in the sensethat there was no limit to division. It followed fromthis, as he observed, that there was no sense in sayingthat the whole of any extended magnitude contained moreparts than any one of its parts. "Man does not consist
of more parts than his finger, nor the cosmos of moreparts than a man; for division of bodies continues toinfinity, and of infinities none is greater or smaller
than others." This Stoic doctrine is a more precise anddeliberate formulation of a principle first announced
by Anaxagoras; "Of the small there is no smallest, but
always a smaller, since what exists cannot cease to ex-
ist; also there is always a larger than the large
. . .
.
" It is worth noting, too, that Chrysippus ap-
pears to have avoided saying that two infinities are
equal; he said that no infinity is greater or smaller
than another . 19
In the light of this view, questions would arise con-
cerning what the terms 'more', 'less', and 'same' mean in
the context of the infinite. Obviously, lack of recognition
that 'same' [size] in the context of infinity could mean
different things, allows equivocation to creep into argu-
ments about it. But Chrysippus 's care in this matter seems
not to have been followed by Lucretius.
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Lucretius (99/94-55/51 hr.)
Lucretius seems to be aware of what could both be de-
scribed as a characteristic of and as a problem with infini-
ty. One modern way to show that a set is infinite is to
show that it can be placed in one-to-one correspondence with
a proper subset of itself. For every integer there is a
corresponding even integer. Multiply the integer by 2 to
get the even integer; divide the even integer by 2 to get
the integer. It is this very thing that causes Lucretius to
reject infinite divisibility.
The argument for the existence of minimae
partes is worth a little attention, since it seems
to be something not found in the Letter to Hero-
dotus. The argument is simply this: if everything
is infinitely divisible, then the smallest bodies
as well as the largest will be composed of an
infinite number of parts, and there will be no
difference between them.
This has been said to be directed against the
Stoics. 20
There seems to be something disquieting about a set
with a proper subset "as big as" itself. It seems absurd
that the very largest of things is the same in number of
parts as the very smallest of things. Lucretius rejects
this absurdity in favor of atomism.
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Arnauld f 1 nivi^hii^..
By the time Arnauld published The Port-Pnv.i
»any arguments were taken for granted to
..prove" the infi-
nite divisibility of extension. Arnauld cites three from
geometry himself.
1. Geometry demonstrates that there are rPrtain pairs of lines which do not have a common
suraWes»
nd
-°r ^ reason "^ommen-
_
* An examPle is the diagonal and theside of a square. if the side of a square and th*square s diagonal were each composed of a certainnumber of indivisible parts, one of these partswould be the common measure of the two lines
that
e
the
S
r
e 1
?-
n° C°mmon measure
,
it is impossible
indivisible°parts?
" C°mP°Sed ° f "ny n" of
2. Geometry also demonstrates that althouahthere is no square of a number which is twice thesquare of another number, still it is quite possi-ble that the area of one square be twice the areaof another square. if these two squares werecomposed of a certain number of ultimate parts
oa?t. ^ ^
rger
??
UarS W°Uld contain twice as ianyp r s as the smaller one; and since both figuresare squares, there would exist a square numberdouble another square number — an impossibility.
3. Finally, nothing is clearer than thisprinciple; Two entities of zero extension takentogether still do not have any extension; that isto say, an extended whole has parts. Take any two
of these parts which we assume to be indivisible.
I ask whether the parts have extension. if they*do not have extension, they have zero extension
and the two taken together cannot have extension;
if the indivisible parts have extension, they haveparts and are hence divisible. 21
The first argument depends upon the Pythagorean theorem
(A + B — C ) . The length of the diagonal is computed as
the positive square root of the sum of the squares of the
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other two sides (C=Va 2+B 2 ) . Suppose the sides of the square
are each of length 1. Then the length of the hypotenuse is
the square root of 1 squared plus 1 squared, or the square
root of 2. It is a simple reductio proof to show that the
square root of two is not a rational number. 22 The first
argument is valid, but the premisses are not all true. The
argument assumes that the Pythagorean theorem applies in the
case of discrete metrics, a premiss that is not true. The
Pythagorean theorem formula is derived using the premiss
that extension is infinitely divisible. (See chapter VII for
a detailed demonstration of the dependence.) Consequently,
using the Pythagorean theorem in this context begs the ques-
tion by presuming what the argument purports to prove.
Moreover, a geometric device for
dividing a line of unknown length into
a fixed number of equal parts using
parallel lines and line segments of
known fixed length shows commensura-
bility and is illustrated in figure 3.
The ratio of the respective segments
is not 1:1. But the perspective ra-
tio 23 for different directions in a
discrete metric space is not 1:1 either.
Figure 3. Dividing
a line of unknown
length into equal
parts
.
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The second argument suffers from a similar fate. it
assumes that every line has a midpoint. Unfortunately, in
discrete metric spaces, not every line has a midpoint. A
line with an even number of points does not have a midpoint;
only a line with an odd number of points has a midpoint.
Moreover
,
the perspective ratio varies
as lines are rotated in the plane;
lines at "45 " have a 1.414:1 perspec-
tive ratio and may have fewer points
than a line of the same (continuous)
length. To illustrate the difficulty
consider a square inscribed inside
..
. .
Figure 4. Continu-
another square as shown in figure 4. ous Metric inscribed
squares
.
Consider the same diagram using a
discrete metric as illustrated in fig-
ure 5. I shall select a size which is
odd and has many points. The outer
square is 7 points long and has an
area of 49 points; the inner, rotated,
square has an area of 25 points, al-
though each side has only 4 points.
Figure 5. Atomic
metric inscribed
squares
One may conjecture that as the size of
the outer square gets large relative to the size of a point,
the ratio of the size of the outer square to the inner
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square approaches 2:1. A square with a side 3 points long
and an area of 9 points has an inscribed square with an area
of 5 and sides of length 2 points, but a square with only
two points on a side has no inscribed square at all.
The third argument
,
if not outright self-contradictory,
merely asserts that to have extension is to be divisible:
"if
. . . indivisible parts have extension,
. . . they
are
. . . divisible". 24
Arnauld goes on to add another alleged proof. His
demonstration imagines a flat
that is receding in the
distance. He constructs a
similar triangle argument
using the eye of the observ-
er, the light ray coming
from the waterline of the
ship, one coming from the
horizon, and an interceded
parallel transparent glass.
Figure 6 shows the geometry
involved. One is supposed
to be convinced by this
argument that there is a
(Euclidean) sea with a ship
Figure 6. Similar triangle
perceptual argument.
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point in the plane of the glass where the light ray coming
from the waterline of the ship passes. The illustration
shows that the passage of the "continuous" line goes through
actual points in the interceded parallel plane only when the
distances are fortuitously correct. Rays that do not inter-
sect points can be called "virtual" lines. Every line re-
guires at least two points, but the remainder of any line
may be virtual rather than actual. The ray that intersects
the transparent glass does so at a virtual point rather than
at an actual one. When extension is measured with a dis-
crete metric, the experiment proposed by Arnauld results in
a hypotenuse which gets "thinner" and "thinner". it does so
by passing through only as many points as are between the
water line and the horizon. The line is so nearly parallel
to the horizontal baseline that it extends for long distanc-
es without passing through actual points. The perspective
ratio is nearly infinity. One cannot "pick out" two points
in the transparent glass. Once one line intersects at a
point, the other is "too close" to hit an adjacent point and
is only a virtual intersection. The computer implementation
shows only a single row of dots close to the pane, as the
triangle in figure 7 shows. 25 ' 26
Figure 7. A long thin triangle only two atoms high on one
end
.
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Hume and Infi nite Divisibility
Hume argues against infinite divisibility; he inter-
prets space or extension in terms of the objects which might
occupy it. A consequence of the Humean view would be an
empirical answer to the question whether extension is infi-
nitely divisible or not.
Hume's argument involves treating space or extension as
not distinct from matter. According to Baxter, Hume's view
subsumes matter and extension into one structure.
Hume believes that our idea of a region of spaceis an abstract idea of the following sort: We
think of a region by thinking indifferently of
various objects that could occupy that region
•
_ • •
• [The] upshot of this theory is that re-
gions of space have the structure of extended ob-jects . 27
Under this view, space or extension would have the same
structure as matter. Consequently, the findings of modern
physics would be doubly relevant. What we learn about mat-
ter is immediately generalizable to extension (space). Bax-
ter essentially showed that Hume believes that the smallest
things have no extension and that extended things are creat-
ed by combining these unextended smallest things . 28
Modern physical theory corroborates this Humean view.
According to current theory, all matter is mostly empty
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space; extended objects are created by combining objects
which have (nearly) no extension of their own. The smallest
particles are called 'quarks' and are described by physi-
cists as "point-like" entities.
The first evidence for the existence of quarks
came about 15 years ago [1969] in experiments thatprobed nuclei with energetic electrons. They re-
vealed point-like objects (then called partons orquark—partons ) inside the neutrons and protons ofthe nuclei. 29
The influence of these point-like particles "extends" space
and matter and produces extended particles (including pro-
tons and neutrons). However, whether matter is infinitely
divisible or not is still not settled.
Underneath the standard [physical] model [of mat-
ter] is the realm of "compositeness". The stan-
dard model holds that everything is built out of
six kinds of quarks and six kinds of leptons, and
that these quarks and leptons are the most elemen-
tary forms of matter. Up to now, whenever physi-
cists have thought they had reached the most ele-
mentary constituents of matter, they have been
proven wrong. There is a fraction of theorists
who think they are still wrong. Believers in com-
positeness say the quarks and leptons are them-
selves composite, made of more elementary objects,
which may be called preons or technicolor quarks
or something else. 30
Hume's approach would allow the question of infinite
divisibility to be settled by empirical physics. But Hume's
tack represents a significant departure from Aristotle's
thinking. Even if modern physics did provide a definitive
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answer, Aristotle's difficulties would not be disposed of.
Aristotle clearly distinguishes between place and matter in
The Physics : "Place is no part of the thing." (211al). As a
result, Hume's approach could be conceived of as predating
Aristotle
.
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CHAPTER VI
THE VALIDITY OF BOTH VIEWS
In this chapter I present a consistent model for each
of the two positions. The traditional number line is devel
oped and examined for the purpose of contrast with the less
familiar view — atomism.
The Validity of Divisionism
Flour is finely grained stuff which has been being
divided for millennia. Have you ever tried to measure a cup
of flour? One cup, more or less, is likely to differ from
another by minute amounts. Water is another divisible guan-
tity. While the grains of flour can be made visible by a
sufficiently strong magnifying glass, the "grains" of water
cannot. True, we have obtained electron micrographs which
seem to show the individual atoms of some of the heavier
metals. But the same still cannot be said of water.
We are accustomed to dividing "stuff". To assist in
dividing stuff, we have devised units of measure. We have
invented arbitrary units of measure and conversions between
them. For example, to convert from liters to gallons we
multiply the number of liters by 0 . 2641720524
.
1 The pro-
cess of dividing materials, in conjunction with measuring
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how much (quantity), has developed into the use of numbers
for measuring and dividing.
Developing Numbers
The fifth or sixth century equivalent of a Certified
Public Accountant kept track of inventories. One may rea-
sonably presume that counting filled containers along with
adding tallies was sufficient for inventory purposes. But,
when the auditors came along, subtraction was necessary to
determine how much there "ought to have been". Tallying the
last inventory, adding the records of the amounts received,
and subtracting the records of the amounts drawn from stores
would yield how much a current inventory should find.
Negative Numbers
With the advent of subtraction it is only a matter of
time before negative numbers are needed. When the plans for
issues from stock, say in planning for a battle or a trip,
are compared with the inventory and found wanting, this
wanting can be quantified by negative numbers. "We need 100
sacks of flour more", the planner might say. The answer to
"How many will we have after the trip?" becomes "minus 100".
Inventing multiplication merely needed an extremely
rich person or a ruler with too many inventories to tally
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directly. Adding the same size tally many "times" yields
how many "times" we have that tally. it isn't easy to tell
the ruler with 45 granaries and a tally of 150 sacks of
flour in each granary how many sacks of flour he has. We
soon learned how to multiply 150 "times" 45 .
Fractions
Division follows quickly with the need to allocate
stocks evenly to a number of storage locations, or to the
legions of soldiers. How much do we have? How many battal-
ions of legionnaires must we divide this among? Finding out
how many supplies to take away and give to each battalion is
a long and cumbersome process when trial and error subtrac-
tion is used. The bigger the bureaucracy, the more the need
there is for division as a tool. With a notation for num-
bers in place, it's just a matter of time before someone
devises a better way; division is that way. But when the
answer doesn't come out even, the result is a fraction of a
whole. Since simple fractions (dividing in two, etc.) were
not unfamiliar, that division sometimes yields them makes it
less strange. 2
Pure Numbers
It falls to the philosophers to analyze these relations
and develop a theory of pure numbers — numbers which are
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viewed apart from that which they might be applied to in
measuring or counting. The '3' in '3 bags of flour' is seen
as something existing apart from the bags of flour.
There is a natural progression in this development.
First there are tally strokes. Tally strokes are measured
by numbers which count the tally strokes. Addition of num-
bers becomes a shorthand for tallying a lot of tallies.
This process generates the natural numbers. Whenever any
two natural numbers are added, the result is a natural num-
ber. The natural numbers are said to be closed under addi-
tion. If something is added to something else and a result
is obtained, then one ought to be able to subtract something
from the result and obtain something else. This process
works well enough for some pairs of natural numbers, but not
for other pairs. Three less one gives two, but one less
three does not give any known natural number. It gives the
number which, when added to two, gives zero. We extend the
natural numbers to include this zero as well as the other
strange numbers, which we call the negative integers.
When we include these negative integers, zero, and the
positive integers and thereby obtain simply the integers, we
find that the integers are closed under both addition and
subtraction
.
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Multiplicati nn
We found that adding a natural number to itself many
times is tedious and invented or discovered a shorthand —
multiplying that natural number by the number of times we
took it as an addend. We found that the natural numbers are
closed under multiplication. We also found that the inte-
gers are closed under multiplication. One strange effect
was noted — the product of two negative integers is a posi-
tive integer.
Division
Naturally, if one thing is multiplied by something else
and a product is obtained, one might well ask how the one
thing might be obtained from the product and something else.
Since a product is obtained by adding one thing many times,
the one thing could likewise be subtracted many times —
distributed among the many somethings or divided among them.
In such a case the one thing is called the divisor and the
other factor, which when multiplied by the divisor gives the
product, is called the quotient.
A similar problem to the one which arose in subtraction
arises. For some pairs of numbers, taking one as a product
and the other as a divisor, dividing the divisor into the
product yields a known integer. For example, six divided
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among (by) two gives three. But for some of these pairs of
numbers, taking the first as a divisor and the other as a
product, dividing the divisor into the product does not
yield a known integer. For example, two divided among six
does not yield any known integer, positive or negative.
Each of the six only gets a "fraction" of a whole. Initial-
ly, fractions, as such new numbers are called, are added to
our growing list of types of numbers. Combining fractions
with the integers gives what we call rational numbers. We
notice one more anomaly. Zero cannot be divided into other
numbers. It seems an ad-hoc solution, but we just forbid
division by zero. It doesn't work.
I've given a hypothetical account of how numbers might
logically have been developed. For the purpose of this
work, rational numbers are all we need. Let's look at the
properties we pretty much take for granted of the rational
numbers. Whenever any two rational numbers are added, mul-
tiplied, subtracted, or divided (excluding the forbidden
division by zero)
,
the result is another rational number.
The rational numbers are closed under the four arithmetic
operations — addition, subtraction, multiplication, and
division
.
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Order
The relation "less than" (or "greater than") has been
taken largely for granted. Higher counts are greater than
lower counts. Using this relation, it is found that any two
number must satisfy one of three relations (the trichotomy).
1. The first is less than the second.
2. The first is equal to the second.
3. The second is less than the first (the first is
greater than the second).
When a number is greater than a first number and less
than a third number it is said to be "between" the other
two. It is easy to show that given any two distinct ratio-
nal numbers, it is possible to find another between the
other two. For example, consider the rational numbers 1/3
and 1/2. 1/3 is the same as 4/12; 1/2 is the same as 6/12.
Clearly 5/12 is between 4/12 and 6/12. Since 4/12 is 1/3
and 6/12 is 1/2, 5/12 is between 1/3 and 1/2. As a general
procedure, one may add 1/2 the difference between the num-
bers to the smaller number. This will always yield a number
less than the higher number and larger than the lower num-
ber, or between the two given numbers.
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The property of having another element between any two
given members is called denseness. A set of numbers is
dense if and only if between any two numbers in the set
there is another number in the set.
The natural development of numbers for counting and
measuring originally had the numbers intimately associated
with the stuff being counted or measured. At these practi-
cal levels numbers were never separated from the things they
were a measure of . It was only with the invention of "pure"
numbers, numbers taken apart from the things they were tra-
ditionally used to count or measure, that the properties of
numbers could be separated from the properties of the things
they were used to measure. And the properties of numbers
drives the questions about the properties of the stuff they
are used to measure.
Extension Without Measure
When rational numbers are used in measuring the quan-
tity of stuff, it is presumed that the stuff is as divisible
as are the numbers. More in question is the so-called "ex-
tension" of stuff rather than its matter. The rational num-
ber system we use to measure "how much" (stuff) with has the
property of denseness. We can continue dividing between
numbers as long as we like. The question that arises natu-
166
rally is "can the stuff we associate the numbers intimately
with be similarly divided?" Even talk of (pure) extension
dissociates the "distance across" some stuff from its mat-
ter. When we remove the matter from consideration we talk
Of pure "extension".
We are accustomed to measuring extension relative to
directions. Two (non-parallel) directions are required to
measure area; three are required for volume. We can cer-
tainly conceptualize the (empty) space as something apart
from the system of numbers we use to measure it. But when
we ask "how much" in regard to such extension, we talk about
its "measure" the numbers we use to describe how much.
Talk of divisibility also asks after the "stuff", including
the empty space, we use the numbers to measure.
We are posed with a complex question. We have a con-
sistent model for measuring divisibility, one that exhibits
denseness, and can therefore support infinite divisibility.
We also have only conceptualization as a way of holding onto
the concept of the extension of empty space (or of matter).
But our conceptualization is amenable to using the model
provided by numbers. We conceptualize the difference be-
tween two distinct points in a visualized blow-up where we
can picture ourselves walking (part way) from one point to
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the other. So we naturally argue, by analogy, that "pure
extension" is similarly divisible. One point of the present
work is that, sufficiently informed, the analogy is not so
obvious
.
In the following section I present a much less familiar
model, one which presumes that the model provided by the
rational numbers does not apply, Once that model has been
presented it will no longer be such an "intuitively obvious"
conclusion that the "stuff" of empty space is best modeled
by the rational (or real) number system. The fifth postu-
late of Euclidean geometry was once thought so intuitively
obvious it was taken to be a "self evident" truth, yet we
now know of self-consistent geometries based on "less intu-
itive" statements of the postulate.
The Validity of Atomism
In this section I build and examine a consistent model
which is based upon the premiss of an indivisible minimum
extension. Computer graphics screen displays implement this
model
.
But although most geometricians from the time of Euclid
have in fact worked with the principle of infinite
divisibility, mathematicians do not refuse to consider
the possibility of a geometry of finite divisibility . 3
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A model of extension using atomic magnitudes, while not
consistent with infinite divisibility, is not inconsistent
by itself. An analogy with geometry will serve to illumi-
nate my view. For millennia people tried to prove the in-
sight that parallel lines never meet — the so-called Eu-
clidean or fifth postulate. More recently the fifth postu-
late was shown to be independent of the others. This inde-
pendence allows constructing a variety of non-Euclidean
geometries. They are each internally consistent but gen-
erally not compatible with each other. Each geometry de-
pends upon the form chosen for the fifth postulate. in a
similar manner people have argued for the intuition that
extension is infinitely divisible. As in the history of
geometry, in which various arguments were thought to prove
the Euclidean form of the fifth postulate, various arguments
have been advanced as refuting atomism. Two modern views
belie these historical alleged refutations of atomism.
One view is that provided by the invention of the mi-
croscope. Microscopically granular substances appear con-
tinuous at macroscopic levels. Modern particle physics has
found a hierarchy of successively smaller particles cumulat-
ing in quarks and leptons which are indivisible — so far.
Matter, strictly speaking, is not extension, but the exten-
sion of matter appears to be quantized (atomic), although at
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smaller levels than the namesake,
quantized with a discrete metric.
Extension per se can be
The other view derives from the advent of computer
graphics. Computer display screens exhibit de facto atomic
extension. The smallest portion of a display is called a
pixel (picture element). IBM PC Monochrome Graphics Adapter
(MGA) and Color Graphics Adapter ( CGA) displays have 640
horizontal by 200 vertical pixels. Enhanced Graphics Adapt-
er (EGA) displays have 640 by 350 pixels. Vector Graphics
Adapters (VGA) displays have 640 by 480 pixels. Drawing a
line on one of these graphics displays requires turning on
successive or contiguous pixels. A minimum length line con-
sists of two adjacent pixels (points). Except on very high
resolution displays, lines not aligned with the axes appear
as small step functions. Even on very high resolution dis-
plays, lines appear as step functions when viewed through a
magnifier
.
Now that computer displays have become commonplace,
they may be used as an example for illustrating discrete
metrics. By their very nature they implement discrete met-
rics, and they serve as a good example to illuminate a cer-
tain "weirdness" inherent in discrete metrics.
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Let a display be specified as composed of an NxM array
of pixels. Drawing a square on such a field requires using
the same number of pixels across as up and down. Drawing
the diagonal, however, uses only one pixel for each of the
vertical and horizontal positions. There are exactly the
same number of pixels in the diagonal as there are in both
the horizontal and the vertical
sides. Figure 8 is an example of a
7x7 square with one diagonal drawn
on such an array.
The usual metric with the Py-
thagorean criteria of preserving
distance with any rotation cannot
Figure 8. A 7x7
be presumed to hold. The distance square with one diago-
nal drawn on an atomic
between adjacent pixels is 1 mini- array,
mum unit, no matter what the direction. The shape of the
pixel affects the "size" of the distance according to some
external criterion. Within the system, there is no way to
discern that the diagonal distance differs from horizontal
or vertical distances. I shall discuss these differing
"sizes", but I shall have to deal with a few preliminaries
first.
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In addition to squares, triangles and hexagons also
form plane-filling patterns using pixels which exhibit some
kind of radial symmetry. Hexagons seem likely choices as
they approximate circles or "dots". There are "more" direc-
tions which have the same "distance" (o", 60", 120", etc.)
Hexagons allow 6 directions of symmetry, but unfortunately,
hexagons cannot "slide" past one another, while triangles
and squares can. Also, hexagons are made up of smaller tri-
angles. Triangles allow three directions of symmetry, while
squares allow two.
When it comes to three-space, cubes form space-filling
solids. Equilateral pyramids do also. Cubes allow three
directions of "sliding", while pyramids allow four.
But specifying a position in two-space requires only
two coordinates; similarly, specifying a position in three-
space requires only three coordinates. Consequently, the
simplex pattern (triangle, pyramid) has a redundancy in its
directions of movement resulting in a loss of 1 degree of
freedom. Parsimony is achieved by requiring orthogonality
in each additional dimension. Squares and cubes are there-
fore the logical choice for conceiving atomic pixels. How-
ever, using squares for illustrations prevents distinguish-
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ing individual pixels. To allow distinguishing individual
pixels, I shall use circles for illustrations.
We are not accustomed to thinking of extension in terms
of atomic distances. in fact, we are so accustomed to
thinking of extension as being continuous that we have dif-
ficulty even conceiving of it as being atomic. One branch
of mathematics which covers theories of distance is metric
space theory. A theory of distance which has integral units
of distance is called a discrete metric. The distance from
a point to itself is always zero in a metric space, discrete
metrics included. Under an atomic theory of extension,
there is no zero unit of extension, although there is a zero
unit of distance. The measure of distance between two
points is different from the extension or length of the line
that includes those two points. The distance from a point
to itself is always zero, even though the extension of the
point itself is not. The distance from a point to its near-
est neighbor is one unit of extension, but the length of the
line including the two points is two units of extension.
The length of a line composed of only two points is
actually a minimum of two units of extension. The continu-
ous length of such a line can be larger than two units of
extension. The ratio of the length of such a line to one
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with the minimum extension may not be 1
tualize these differences in "distance"
"aspect ratio".
1 • One can concep-
using the concept
Aspect Ratio
The ratio of the horizontal and vertical distances is
usually not one to one on computer displays. For example,
my EGA display on a 13" monitor has 640 pixels wide by 350
pixels high displayed in an area which is 10 inches wide by
7.5 inches high. The ratio of the horizontal height to the
vertical width of a picture or screen is called the 'aspect
ratio'. On my display, which is 10 inches wide by 7.5
inches high, the aspect ratio is 10/7.5, which is 1.33 or
4:3.
Drawing lines on such a display is also affected by the
shape of pixels themselves. In the case of my EGA display,
there are 640 pixels in 10 inches horizontally and 350 pix-
els in 7.5 inches vertically. The horizontal size of a
pixel is 10"/640
. The vertical size of a pixel is 7.5"/350.
The ratio of these is 0.729 — 0.729 = ( 10/640 )/( 7 . 5/350 ) or
35:48. The screen itself is wider than it is tall, but each
pixel is taller than it is wide. These facts must be taken
into consideration when drawing pictures on such displays.
If one presumes that the aspect ratio of a pixel is 1:1
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when one draws pictures on such a display, the resulting
pictures will appear distorted.
When a picture is stored or recorded using one aspect
ratio and reproduced using another aspect ratio the result-
ing view will also appear distorted. This effect can be
illustrated by a familiar technology in film. Wide screen,
or cinemascope 5
,
motion pictures do not use wider films to
store and project the wider picture. 6 Cinemascope pictures
use standard 35 millimeter films. How can the wider picture
be stored on the film? A special lens, called an anamorphic
lens, is used which distorts the image on the film by
shrinking it in the horizontal direction.
The aspect ratio of the cinemascope frame is
23.8:18.67 = 1.275 instead of the normal 1.38.
Since the anamorphic system operates with a ratio
of 1:2 the effective screen aspect ratio will be
(23.8/18.67) *2 = 2. 55. 7
The image of a square will appear on the film as a
rectangle which is narrower by half than it is tall, and the
image of certain double wide rectangles will appear on the
film as squares. The image is stored on the film with a
"perspective ratio" 8 which is not 1:1. Because the hori-
zontal compression is twice the vertical compression, the
perspective ratio on film is 1:2. When a cinemascope motion
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picture is projected a special anamorphic projection lens is
used to widen the image back to its original proportions. 9
A picture recorded using a cinemascope lens will be
stored with a perspective ratio which is 1:2. if that pic-
ture is projected using a standard lens it will be projected
presuming a perspective ratio of 1:1. A cinemascope picture
projected using a standard lens will appear sgueezed togeth-
er and too tall. I have seen Cinemascope pictures appear
this way on television while the credits are running. Con-
versely, a standard picture projected with a cinemascope
lens will appear stretched out and too short. A standard
film is stored with and projected with a 1:1 perspective
ratio. A cinemascope film is stored with and projected with
a perspective ratio which is 1:2. Each picture will appear
normal when it is projected using the same perspective ratio
with which it was stored. But when either picture is pro-
jected using a different perspective ratio from that with
which it was stored, it will appear distorted.
Anyone who has tried to draw a low resolution picture
on a computer screen using a character, say the asterisk,
can see the effect immediately. A square number of aster-
isks, say 6x6, hardly looks like a square. And when one
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finally gets something that looks reasonable on the display
screen, it looks different when it is printed.
The aspect ratio of most display screens for characters
is about .42 . 10 To make a square using six lines of text
one would need 6 divided by .42 or 14.4 characters on each
line. But what looks like a square on the screen prints out
as too wide. The aspect ratio for printed text in a 10
characters per inch by 6 lines per inch mode is .6. 11 The
printed square using six lines of text would require a width
of only 10 characters. In figure 9, the left array is nu
mencally
****** ************** **********
square. On the ****** ************** **********
****** ************** **********
screen the mid- ****** ************** **********
****** ************** **********
die one looks ****** ************** **********6x6 14x6 10 x 6
square, and on 1/1=1 1.8/. 75 = 2.4 1/ . 6 = 1.67
the printed page
6x1=6 6x2.4 = 14.4 6x1.67 = 10
the right one Figure 9. Square, Display, and Print
aspect ratios.
looks square.
Measuring distances using a metric based on the atomic
premiss requires that any "distance" be in terms of multi-
ples of the minimum distance, the distance between adjacent
points. The concept of perspective ratio can be adapted to
give us a quantitative measure of the difference, in non-a-
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toinic terms, between the scales used for different direc-
tions. Pixel aspect ratios show that one perspective can
illuminate (or obfuscate) the other, as when the square on
the display screen doesn't print square. But one perspec-
tive (atomic or continuous) cannot be used to evaluate the
other lest a contradiction be introduced in the overall
system. Like the wave particle duality of matter, transfor-
mation equations must be rigorously (and religiously) used
when switching perspectives.
Under the atomic presumption there are adjacent points,
and the minimum length of a line segment consisting of two
adjacent points is two minimum units. We can only visualize
these points as "dots" of a fixed size and indeterminate
shape. We would like to presume that these dots can be
thought of as small disks and will do so for illustrative
purposes, but in consideration of the foregoing discussion
of the aspect ratio of pixels, we must be ready to cast this
assumption aside. Some argue that this assumption might
entail a contrary presumption — that angle is infinitely
divisible, a question dealt with elsewhere.
178
Drawing lines in discrete metric spaces
A line between two points may
have two sides. Figure 10 is an
illustration on a 7x9 array of pix-
els. The line from point A to
point B passes directly through
point 0 but passes immediately to
the right of points represented by
a left semicircle and to the left
of points represented by a right
semicircle
.
Figure 10. The two
sides of a line.
A closed plane figure would have to include either the
left semicircle points or the right semicircle points de-
pending upon on which side of the line the figure was. Both
figures would include points A, 0, and B. Obviously, the
degree of overlap depends upon the orientation of the line
as well as its length. As a practical matter, computer im-
plementations of line drawing functions presume a "preferred
direction". Turning on the rightmost one of a horizontal
pair of pixels and the lower one of a vertical pair is only
one of 4 possible implementation strategies and is shown in
figure 11.
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Before we can intelligently dis-
cuss overlapping plane figures, we
must examine intersecting line seg-
ments. Two lines intersect at a
point, and in atomic or discrete
metrics a point has a finite size
or a minimum length. For the fol-
lowing discussion, lengths (and ar-
eas) are given in terms of the min-
imum unit of size. If the length
of two intersecting line segments
are A and B, then the length of the
combined segment is A + B -1. One point is shared by both
line segments, and its size must be subtracted. If A and B
were merely added, as we are accustomed to doing with con-
tinuous distances, the
overlapping point would
be counted twice; its
length must be subtract-
ed. Figure 12 is an il-
lustration .
Figure 11. Using the
rightmost and lower
points to fill out a
line
.
Segment A B length 2 * *
Segment B C length 2 * *
Segment A C length 3 * * *
Figure 12. Adding lengths of
line segments.
Of course, there are also line segments which cross
each other but which do not share an actual intersection
point. Figure 13 shows such a case. Line segment AB has a
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slope of -2; segment CD has a slope of
1* Tile positioning of these lines is
such that there is no point that both
line segments pass through. if the only
points the line actually passed through
were selected in an implementation, seg-
ment AB would appear as a sequence of
dots
.
cross but do not
share a point of
intersection.
To "thicken" the line and make it more visible, the
points immediately to the left of or to the right of the
line must be selected. Figure 14 identifies the points
which would be selected were the line
thickened "to the left". In both figure
13 and 14, line segment AB "crosses"
line segment CD but does not pass
through a point on segment CD. In such
cases the extension of the two line seg-
ments taken together does add up to the
sum of the individual extensions. The
geometric interpretation of this is satisfied for finite
geometries. In figure 15, the line is thickened to the
right. This option implements the strategy mentioned illus-
trated in figure 11 above. In this case one of the points
used to thicken line segment AB is one of the points on line
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segment CD. There is a shared point of
intersection in this case, but it is not
located where it would be located were
the lines continuous. in such cases the
extension of the two line segments adds
up to the sum of the individual exten-
sions less the extension of a single
point
.
When it comes to drawing plane figures, we must rely on
our experience with continuous metrics, but we must be pre-
for "weird" (unintuitive) differences.
Constructing triangles in the atomic plane
Let us examine some "minimum sized" triangles with
atomic magnitudes. Clearly the smallest has two sides each
of length 2 (points). Since the two side lines intersect at
a point, one point is shared by both lines.
Rotation aside, there are only two ways to
draw such a figure. Figure 16 is a degen-
erate triangle — a line segment consisting
of two intersecting collinear line seg-
ments. Figure 17, on the other hand, is a
recognizable triangle. Notice that the di- Figure 16. A
degenerate
agonal has a length of 2 points, hence is atomic trian-
gle .
Figure 15.
Points selected
for thickening a
line to the
right
.
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the same "size" as the other two sides.
However, the perspective ratio between the
diagonal and the horizontal (or vertical)
is not 1 : 1 . in fact, it is 1.414:1. Per-
spective ratio relates ratios of atomic
distances (number of pixels) to continuous
(infinitely divisible) distances along
f©rent directions or dimensions. We
Figure 17. The
minimum sized
atomic trian-
gle.
must beware that we do not evaluate atomic figures from the
perspective of presuming infinite divisibility. To do so
would be to beg the guestion or, worse yet, introduce a
contradiction, from which anything follows.
this seems a little strange when held up against
our conventional view, which is based upon continuous lines
However, lest we fall into the same trap the ancients did,
it behooves us to develop a little familiarity with the
atomic perspective.
Drawing a triangle in a discrete metric space so that
the length of its sides in continuous distances is compara-
ble to the number of pixels on the line reguires some inge-
nuity. There is a way which can make maximum use of our
familiarity with continuous metrics. Locate the vertex
points on the centers of pixels as shown in figure 18. Draw
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continuous (divisible) lines connect-
ing the vertexes. Examine the center
point of each pixel interior to the
continuous triangle or overlapping it.
the center point of the pixel falls
Figure 18. Locating
on or inside the triangle, then count vertex points of a
continuous triangle
this pixel as part of the area of the on atomic points,
triangle. The illustrations help guide our understanding,
but we must develop a formula for the area of a triangle
which can be compared to the familiar continuous formula.
Computing Area of an Atomic Triangle
The area of an atomic triangle is
not simply ^BH. We can compute the area
by devising a mapping from the continuous
plane to the atomic plane. Here's how.
Draw a right triangle with the vertices
centered on atomic points so that the
base B and height H cover the reguisite
number of atomic points as in figure 19.
Next fill in the points on the base line and the height line
as in figure 20. Then draw the diagonal line connecting the
two vertices, and fill in the points which are on or interi-
or to that line as in figure 21.
Figure 19. Lo-
cating the ver-
tices of a right
atomic triangle.
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We can compute accurately the number
of points to fill in without actually
drawing the line by noting the relation
between distance along the base and the
proportions of the triangle. We are, in
effect, computing the height of each sim-
ilar triangle which has an integer number
of points along the line of the base. In
figure 22, the smaller triangle and the
larger triangle are similar. This simi-
larity may be expressed in a precise pro-
portion. Side h is to side b as side H
is to side B — h:b::H:B. The corre-
sponding mathematical formula, h/b=H/B
allows us to compute side h; h=(H/B)-b.
Even though the extension of the
sides is the number of points and
is given by B and H, the length in
continuous distances is actually
B-l and H-l. (The starting point
is not counted in measuring dis-
tances, but must be counted in mea-
Figure 20. Fil-
ing in the base
and height of an
atomic right
Figure 21. Fil-
ing in the inte-
rior points of
an atomic right
triangle
.
Figure 22. Similar
continuous triangles
suring the atomic extension of the sides.) If we count out
to the I th point along the line of the base, we can compute
how many points are under the (continuous) diagonal by using
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the proportion in continuous distances. Because of the
relationship between length and extension, the actual length
of the base of the smaller continuous triangle is l less
than the number of points. The length of the base of the
triangle with I points is 1-1. The length, in continuous
distance, of the vertical line under the diagonal is comput-
ed using the appropriate proportion of the height, when the
appropriate values are inserted the atomic version of the
formula becomes ( (H-l ) / ( B-l ) ) • ( i-i
)
or ( 1-1 ) ( H-l ) /B-l ) . if
we take the integer part of this we will have the length in
atomic distance units of the height of the triangle with I
points along the base. But the extension of that line is one
point more than its continuous length. The expression for
the extension of this line is INT( ( 1-1 ) ( H-l ) / ( B-l ) ) +l —
which is just the total number of points in the vertical
column of points at the I th point along the base. Adding
those extensions for each point along the base gives us the
total area of the triangle in atomic points — the SUM from
I = 1 to B of INT ( ( 1-1 ) ( H-l ) /(B-l)+l)
.
The area of an atomic triangle with base B and height H
is S INT( (1-1)
• ( (H-1)/(B-1) )+l) ; it is not simply ^BH.
Figure 23 is a table of the areas of discrete triangles up
to 10x10. The values are computed using the above formula.
It can be shown that this formula reduces to the familiar
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~2 as the size of the
individual points ap-
proaches zero. 12
I have developed a
consistent mathematical
formula, but it is not
always clear exactly
what the drawings look Figure 23. Table of areas for
selected atomic triangles.
like when compared to corresponding continuous figures.
Figure 24 shows various small discrete (right) triangles.
Tabulated with each one is its size and the lengths of the
opposite and adjacent
sides (A and B)
.
Overlapping Atomic Fig-
ures
Armed with some
familiarity with inter-
secting (and non-inter-
secting) lines and
simple triangles, we
are now in a position
to examine overlapping
Figure 24. Various small atomic
triangles
.
Height Area of atomic triangles
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
11 16 22 26 31
10 15 19 25 28
9 13 17 21 25
8 12 16 19 22
7 10 13 16 21
6 9 11 15 16
5 7 10 11 13
4 6 7 9 10
3 4 5 6 7
37 41
33 37
29 36
28 29
22 25
19 21
16 17
12 13
8 9
46 55
45 46
37 41
33 37
28 31
25 26
19 22
15 16
10 11
Base 7 8 9 10
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plane figures. Consider the square with a diagonal in Fig
ure 25.
Drawing a diagonal across a
square usually divides the square
into two triangles. It is no dif-
ferent in atomic metrics. But, be-
cause there is a minimum extension
in atomic metrics, the line that
forms the diagonal is itself exten-
ded.
Figure 25. A square
with one diagonal.
This line is a part of both triangles; its extension is
therefore included in the extension of each of the two tri-
angles. Consequently, the area of the two triangles, which
includes the area of the line twice, is larger than the area
of the square. The area of triangle ABC is 28 units of
extension. The area of triangle BCD is also 28 units of
extension. But the sum of the areas of triangles ABC and
BCD — 28 + 28 = 56 — is larger than the area of the square
— 7 x 7 = 49. The area of their common line, BC, is 7.
The area of square ABDC is the sum of the areas of triangles
ABC and BCD less the area of the common line — 28+28-7
49 .
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This property must be taken into consideration very
carefully whenever traditional geometric demonstrations are
attempted. The areas of adjacent figures do not just add up
to the area of the figure they comprise. Any such demon-
strations must be reexamined in the light of the atomic
perspective, if a corresponding atomic demonstration is to
be made. The results of such demonstrations are often dif-
ferent from those in continuous geometries. One such demon-
stration involves the traditional (non-atomic) "proof" of
the Pythagorean theorem; this theorem has figured into al-
leged proofs of infinite divisibility.
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1- William H. Beyer, ed., CRC Standard Mathematical Ta-bles, 25 Ed., (Palm Beach, FL: CRC Press, 1973), p. 3 .
2. The "hypothesized" development presented above followsthe logical development of number systems rather than thehistorical development. The historical record suggests thatintegers were followed by fractions, that a symbol for zero
wasn t devised until positional notation was invented, and
negative numbers first showed up in Chinese matrix algebra
in the third century. Dirk J. Struik, A Concise History of
Mathematics
,
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3. David J. Furley, Two Studies in the Greek Atomists
r(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 5 .
4. Aspect Ratio: ratio of width to height of the picture
image projected on the screen or printed on the film, the
height being taken as unity. The long-established film
aspect ratio, still retained for narrow-gage film, is 4:3
(1.33:1). The Focal Encyclopedia of Film & Television Tech-
nique
.
(London: Focal press, 1969), p. 50.
5. Cinemascope: Trade name of the most widely used method
of anamorphic wide-screen presentation; camera lenses pro-
ducing images on 35mm film with a 2:1 lateral compression
are viewed with compensating horizontal expansion on projec-
tion. The Focal Encyclopedia of Film & Television Tech-
nique
.
(London: Focal press, 1969), p. 132.
6 . To do so would have required theaters to invest in
expensive additional projectors, and the expense would have
inhibited the spread and use of the technology.
7. Michael Z. Wysotsky, Wide Screen Cinema and Stereophon-
ic Sound , translated by Wing Commander A. E. C. York, (New
York: Hastings House, 1971).
8 . While there are no "pixels" on recorded film, we can
measure an effective pixel aspect ratio by comparing the
ratio of the sides of the image of a true square (as mea-
sured by continuous metrics) when it is recorded on film.
But since 'effective pixel aspect ratio' is a cumbersome
phrase, and the concept will need to be used frequently, I
shall coin 'perspective ratio' to use in its stead. I shall
also extend the concept to cover any ratio involving two
different scales of measurement. The need for this exten-
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sion will be apparent, and its use will bepropriate, for discussions involving lines
plane. While an aspect ratio is the ratioperspective ratio, as defined here, is the
scales for measuring distance.
immediately ap-
in the atomic
of two distances,
ratio of two
9.
These lenses cost only a tiny fraction of what an en
4-i
re
i.
pr°'ieCtor would cost, enabling the spread and use ofthe technology.
10.
Aspect ratio for characters is very similar to aspect
ratio for pixels. The difference is that each characterposition is treated as a low resolution pixel. An 80x25
character screen using my 13 inch monitor (10x7.5) gives ahorizontal "pixel" size of 10"/30. The vertical "pixel"
size is 7 . 5"/25
. The aspect ratio is ( 10/80 )/( 7 . 5/25 )= 42
or 5:12.
11. Aspect ratios for printed characters is also very
similar to aspect ratio for pixels. Printed page formats
can be measured in terms of lines per inch and characters
per inch. The width of a character is simply the reciprocal
of these parameters. Ten characters per inch gives a hori-
zontal "pixel" size of 1/10 inches. Six lines per inch
gives a vertical "pixel" size of 1/6 inches. The aspect
ratio is (l/10)/(l/6) = .6 or 3:5.
12. For this demonstration we note that as the size of
each point gets smaller the number of points per inch gets
larger. We must transform the equation into an expression
using inches rather than points. For this purpose we may
let the number of points per inch be K. Then B and H will
be the sizes in inches of the sides, and KB and KH will be
the corresponding number of points. As the number of points
per inch, K, gets very large, the contribution of one point
to the length gets very small, and any error introduced by
dropping the "INT" portion of the formula will become negli-
gible. The formula itself,
Z INT( (1-1)
• ( ( H-l ) / ( B-l ) ) +1
)
1-1
reduces to:
( ( H-l ) / ( B-l ) ) • Z (1-1) + El.
1-1 1-1
Transforming the formula so that the result includes expres-
sions for length in inches requires substituting the corre-
sponding number of points expressed in inches times the
number of points per inch. To obtain an area result which
is in terms of square inches, the point area formula must be
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divided by the number of points
The new area formula becomes:
in a square inch, namely K2 .
[ ( (K H-1)/(K B-1) )
K
Z(I-1) +
K
S1]/K2
1=1 1=1
Performinq the summation and some alqebra yields:
[ ( K • H-l ) / ( K B-l ) ) -KB- (KB-l)/2 + K • B ] /K2 .
[ (KH-1) ) K-B/2 + KB]/K2 .
(H-l/K) )
• B/2 4- B/K.
Takinq the limit of this as K approaches °° yields: ^BH.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
Most of this chapter will be devoted to showing why the
Pythagorean Theorem cannot be used in the argument against
atomism. Without the Pythagorean Theorem many arguments
against atomism fail. The less mathematically inclined may
wish to skip ahead to the concluding remarks on page 208.
The Atomic Destruction of the Pythagorean Theorem
One alleged proof of infinite divisibility appeals
indirectly to the Pythagorean theorem. 1 In this section I
examine a classic proof of the Pythagorean Theorem and show
that that proof depends upon and presumes that extension is
infinitely divisible. I also show that, when atomism is
presumed, the corrected proof fails to yield the well known
formula; a different formula results. Since the original
Pythagorean formula itself depends upon infinite divisibili-
ty, using it to "prove" infinite divisibility, in effect,
begs the question.
A Classic Proof of the Pythagorean Theorem
One diagram used in demonstrating the proof of the Py-
thagorean theorem involves 6 overlapping figures in the
other dplane. 2 Figure 26 shows a square with sides of
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length C that is inscribed inside
another square. The sides of the
triangles so formed are of length A
and B respectively. The area of
each triangle is AB/2. The length
of a side of the outer square is A
+ B. To prove the Pythagorean the-
orem, the total area of the outer
square is set equal to the area of
the 4 triangles plus the area of
the inner square. The proof involves
Figure 26. A square
with sides of length C
inscribed inside an-
other square.
simple algebra.
Pythagorean Theorem Proof (with infinite divisibility'! 3
(A + B) 2 = 4
•
(AB/2) + C2
A2 + B 2 + 2AB = 2AB + C2
A2 + B2 = C 2
This proof of the Pythagorean theorem depends upon a
line having no area and a perspective ratio of 1:1. in the
proof the area of contiguous triangles and a square is added
and set equal to the area of the overall figure. In order
for the area of contiguous figures to add to the area of the
overall figure, there must be no overlapping. That means
that the common border, a shared line, must have no area.
But a line is made up of at least two points. And if points
have a minimum extension, as would be the case under atom-
ism, then the line they make up must also have a minimum
area. Area, after all, is the square of extension. The
194
area of a line cannot be less than the sum of the areas of
its points
. For the area of a line to actually be zero, the
width of the line must be zero. But the width of a line is
just its extension in another direction. For the width to
be zero, extension must be zero, and that violates the pre-
sumption that there is a minimum extension.
Another way to look at this is by making an analogy be-
tween extended figures with area and extended figures with
length. When a line segment is divided into shorter and
shorter segments, the limiting case is a single point. If
Infinite divisibility is presumed, then the limiting case
has no extension; but if atomism is presumed, then the lim-
iting case is reached after a finite number of divisions and
has a minimum extension. Analogously, when an extended
figure with area is divided into narrower and narrower
widths, the limiting case is a single line. And this line
cannot be "narrower" than the minimum atomic extension. In
order for the limiting width to be zero, the division pro-
cess must continue infinitely. Since a line is the limiting
case of a plane figure which is being divided, a zero width
is obtained only by presuming that this figure can be divid-
ed to infinity -- by presuming infinite divisibility. In
other words, a line whose width (and area) is zero is ob-
tained only by presuming infinite divisibility. As a conse-
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quence, proofs of the Pythagorean theorem that do not take
into consideration the area of shared points and lines can-
not be valid under atomism.
In the atomic case, a line has a small but finite
width, and hence a determinate area. This means that adja-
cent plane figures, figures which share a common boundary
line, have overlapping areas, and the above proof of the
Pythagorean theorem is therefore invalid in the atomic case;
it does not account for these overlapping areas. The Py-
thagorean theorem is used to prove the incommensurability of
the diagonal with the sides of a triangle. Without the
Pythagorean theorem, this incommensurability cannot be
shown
.
In atomic metrics, points have a minimum extension, and
consequently, have a minimum length, area, and volume. If a
point is extended in one direction, it must also be extended
in all other directions. If it weren't, the proposition
that there is a minimum extension would be contradicted.
Lines, which are made up of points, must also have a minimum
length, area, and volume.
As noted in the last chapter, the length of two line
segments, say of length A and B, which touch at a point is
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the sum of the individual lengths less the extension of the
common point: A + B - 1. The same principle holds for area
and adjacent plane figures with a line of intersection as
holds for length and lines with a point of intersection.
Two plane figures which share a common boundary line have
overlapping areas. The sum of the areas of two plane fig-
ures is more than the area they jointly cover by exactly the
area of the line they share. The true (atomic) area of the
combined figure is obtained by adding the areas of the con-
tiguous figures and subtracting the area of their common
border line.
Lines drawn in the atomic plane have a minimum area of
two atomic units, since it takes two points to determine a
line, but may have an area from two up to the "length" of
the line; skew lines which pass "between" points are less
"dense" than lines which hit the points exactly.
In general, the calculation of the area of a plane
figure is not a simple matter. Moreover, determining how
many points are shared by adjacent figures is no simple
matter. Standard (continuous metric) mensuration formulas
are based on lines having no area. Blithely using these
standard continuous metric mensuration formulas when "refut-
ing" "atomic" distances presumes infinite divisibility —
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begs the question — or worse yet, introduces an implicit
contradiction
.
The length of two lines which meet at a point is:
A + B - 1
The area of two figures which share line C is:
D + E - C
For a square with a side whose length is divided into A and
B the area is:
(A + B-1) 2 = A2 + B 2 + 2AB - 2A - 2B + 1
Computing the Area of Atomic Triangles
The area of a right triangle with sides B and H is
computed by the formula:
B
A = S INT ( ( 1-1 ) ( H-l )/(B-l)+l)
1=1
This formula does not readily render itself into a
simple relation using B and H. We can transform this formu-
la into one which can be compared with the familiar formula
in continuous metrics for the area of a triangle. For the
purpose of this demonstration we will not need to make the
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transformation into a general formula that works for all
atomic triangles. We will be showing that one particular
special case of atomic triangles disproves the Pythagorean
theorem, so we will only need an area formula for that spe-
cial case. If the Pythagorean formula is to hold, it must
hold in the special case we will be considering; if it does
not hold in that special case, then it cannot hold in gener-
al. By limiting our examination to this special case, our
task is greatly simplified.
The length of the sides of an atomic triangle is an
integer. As such, the length is either even or odd; there
are just 4 possible combinations. Let the base of the tri-
angle be B and the height of the triangle be H. We will
look at the special case when B is even. This will allow us
to divide it by 2 and still have an integer. The advantage
to doing this will become apparent.
Since B is even, there are an even number of terms in
the sum, and half an even number is also an integer. We can
divide the series into two halves and then add the first and
last term, the second and the next to the last, etc., ending
with adding the two middle terms. To convert these terms
for a sequence of integers we would substitute an expression
which evaluates to the number of terms when an indexing
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variable is set to 1 . Such a conversion is accomplished by
substituting B+l-l for I. This allows us to sum to B/2.
B
£ INT( ( I-l )
(
h- 1 ) / ( B-l ) +l ) becomes:1=1
B/2
2 !ENT ( (I-l) (H-1)/(B-1)+1)+INT( ( B+l-I-1 ) ( H-1 ) / ( B-l ) +1
)
We want to get both INT terms of the expression into a form
with as much similarity as possible; we want to combine like
terms and remove quantities from under the INT function. As
I perform a little algebra, I bold items of interest to make
following the steps easier.
INT( (I-l) (H-1)/(B-1)+1)+INT( (B+l-I-1) ( H-1 ) / ( B-l ) +1
)
By rearranging we get a '(B-l)' which we can divide out.
= INT ( (I-l) (H-1)/(B-1)+1)+INT( (Bz^-I+1) ( H-1 ) / ( B-l ) +1
Multiply through by '1/(B-1)'.
= INT ( (I-l) (H-1)/(B-1)+1)+
INT ( ( B-l ) (H-1 ) /( B— 1 ) + ( -1 + 1 ) ( H-1 ) / ( B-l ) +1
)
Cancel out (B-l) /(B-l).
= INT ( (I-l) ( H-1 ) / ( B-l ) +1 ) +INT ( H—1+ (-1 + 1) ( H-1 ) / ( B-l ) +1
)
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Factor out a '-1'.
INT ( ( I 1 ) ( H 1 ) / ( B-l ) +1 ) +INT ( H-l— ( I— 1 ) ( H-l ) / ( B-l ) +1
)
Integer values may be removed from the INT function, so we
do so.
= INT( (1-1) (H-1)/(B-1) )+l+H-l+INT(-(I-l)(H-l)/(B-l))+l
Rearrange terms.
= INT ( U" 1 ) (H-l) /(B-l) )+INT(-(I-l) (H-1)/(B-1))+1+H-1+1
Simplify
.
= INT( (1-1) (H-l) /(B-l) )+INT(-(I-l) (H-l) /(B-l) )+H+l
We have reduced the expression to one which is the sum of
the integer part of a number plus the integer part of its
negation plus an integer — INT(Z)+INT(-Z)+N.
Note that INT(X.O) = X, INT(-X.0)=-X
and INT(X.Y) = X; INT(-X. Y)=-X-l
;
so, INT ( X . 0 ) +INT ( -X . 0 ) =0
and INT ( X . Y ) +INT ( —X . Y ) =— 1
.
The INT parts of the above expression is just 0 or -1, de-
pending upon whether the expression ( 1-1 ) (H-l ) / ( B-l ) eval-
uates to an integer or a number with a fractional part.
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We are summing
INT ( ( I-l ) ( H-l )/(B-l) ) +INT (
-
( I— 1 ) ( H-l ) / ( B-l ) ) +H+1
from 1=1 to B/2. So that we may compare our result with the
familiar continuous formula for the area of a triangle, let
us include the 1 with the INT expression and leave the H
separate
.
The INT parts of the expression evaluated to 0 or -1,
so adding the 1 yields an expression which evaluates to 1 or
0. This leaves the H. Summing from 1=1 to B/2 gives BH/2
plus the sum of the revised INT expression, which can be in-
terpreted as just the amount by which the area of an atomic
triangle is larger than a corresponding continuous triangle.
We get:
B/2
BH/2 + Z INT ( (I-l) ( H— 1 ) / ( B-l ) ) +INT (-(I-l) ( H-l ) / ( B-l ) ) +1
1=1
Without a loss of generality we can assume that H < B.
By this hypothesis, H/B is either 1 or something less than
1. Since the final formula must hold for all special cases,
it must also hold if H=B. To simplify our demonstration we
let H=B
.
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If H-B then (H-1 )/(b- 1) is l. 4 with this special case
we will be able to completely eliminate the INT function
from the expression.
INT( (1-1) ( H-l ) / ( B-l ) ) +INT (
-
( 1-1
)
= INT(I-1)+INT(-(I-1) )+H+l
= I-1-(I-1)+H+1
= H+l
(H-1)/(B-1))+H+1
Pictorially we can show what we are doing; we are
"chopping off" part of a triangle, rotating it, and fitting
Figure 27. Pictorial representation of area computation for
an atomic triangle with an even base.
B/2
£ H+l = ( H+l ) B/2
1=1
The area is BH/2 + B/2 (or BH/2 + H/2, since B=H)
.
Having worked out a formula for the area of certain
atomic triangles, let us consider the proof of the Pythago-
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rean theorem for the special case when B=H and both are even
The Pythagorean Formula in Atomic Metrics
Let us now examine the same diagram which purports to
demonstrate the proof of the Pythagorean theorem, by using 6
overlapping plane figures, using an atomic metric. The area
of the outer square is (A+B-l) 2 = A2 + B2 + 2AB
-2A
-2B +1.
The area of a triangle is AB/2 + B/2.
We will assume the area of the inner square is C 2 .
This assumption is not gener-
ally valid because atomic
squares not aliqned with the
axes do not generally have
square areas, as Figure 28
demonstrates
.
Figure 28. Squares in the
atomic plane without square
There are some diagonal areas.
squares with square areas though. The illustration in Fig-
ure 33 below has an offset square with an area of 16, and
the inner square in Figure 31 below has an area of 25.
The number of points on the diagonal of a triangle
which are in common with a side of the inner square is B.
This is true even of triangles with odd lengths. Figure 29
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The triangles overlap at the end points, so four points
would be counted twice
and must be subtracted.
Figure 30 illustrates
this. Adding the four
triangle areas and sub-
tracting the area of
the overlapping points
gives 4*(A*B/2 + B/2) - 4
The perimeter of the inner square consists of 4 lines,
each of which overlaps with a triangle and has B points.
But these lines intersect with each other at the vertices of
the square, so the combined area of these 4 lines themselves
is 4B - 4. We already have 4(AB/2 +B/2) - 4 as the area of
the four outer triangles, so we can add the area of the
Figure 30. Intersection points of
4 triangles.
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inner square, C2
,
and subtract the area of the common bound-
ary (4B - 4), to get the combined total area. This gives
us
:
4 ( AB/2+B/ 2 ) - 4 + C 2 - (4B - 4)
Setting these two areas equal and performing algebra,
Outer square area
(A + B -l) 2
A2 + B 2 + 2AB -2A -2B +1
A2 + B 2
-2A -2B +1
A2 + B 2
-2A
A2 + B 2
A2 + B 2 = C2 +2A -1
Four triangles +
4 ( AB/2+B/2 )
- 4 +
2AB + 2B - 4 +
- 2B +
- 1 +
+ 2A - 1 +
Inner square
- ( 4B - 4)
4B + 4C2 -
C 2
C2
Since A=B this reduces to
2A 2 = C 2 +2A -1
2A 2 -2A +1 = C 2
The infinitely divisible Pythagorean equivalent would be
2A 2 = C 2 . Figure 31 is an illustration with A = B = 4.
Since 2A 2 -2A +1 = C 2 is satisfied for A=4 and C=5
,
we
can interpret the fact that the diagonal line has only 4
points while C = 5 as meaning that the 4 points are "sparse-
ly" distributed along the line that, were it aligned with
the axis, would be "densely" populated with 5 points. Fig-
ure 32 shows a 5X5 square rotated 45° and superimposed upon
a diagonal square with an area of 25 points. As you can
see, they take up the same space as well as have the same
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Figure 31. Illustrating the equivalent of the Pythagorean
proof figure with atomic figures.
area
.
Let us look at atomic Py-
thagorean theorem demonstration
for the simple case of A=3
,
B=4
,
and C=4 5 — as shown in figure
33. The length of the outer
square side is A + B - 1
,
which
is 3 + 4 - 1 = 6. The area of
the outer square is 36. The area
of a triangle with sides 3 and 4
Figure 32. A 5x5 square
rotated 45° and superim-
posed on a diagonal
square with an area of 25
atomic units.
is 7. The four triangles touch another at four vertices, so
the combined area of the four triangles is 4 times 7 less 4
or 24. The area of the inner square is 16 s . But the outer
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triangles and the inner square
share a common border which is
only 4 points. Adding these
areas and subtracting the area of
the common border gives 24 + 16 -
4 = 36.
The Pythagorean formula
fails for even this special case.
It is unnecessary to go through
the even more complicated exam-
ples for the other cases, since
the damage could not be undone.
The necessary condition for the
Pythagorean theorem to hold is
Figure 33. Atomic Py-
thagorean theorem demon-
stration for the case of
A=3
,
B=4
,
and C=4
.
that the intersection between two lines be of zero area.
But, for that to be true, points must have zero extension;
for points to have zero extension, infinite divisibility
must hold.
Loomis collects and presents 370 "proofs" for the Py-
thagorean theorem. 7 These proofs all involve either the
addition of lengths, or ratios of lengths. None of the
proofs which involve the addition of lengths takes into
consideration the area of the shared points. And none of
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the proofs which depend upon ratios makes any provision for
integer results. Both conditions fail to yield the Pythago-
rean formula when atomic extension is considered.
Since the Pythagorean theorem does not hold in the
atomic plane, it cannot be appealed to in any argument pur-
porting to disprove atomism. Doing so begs the guestion.
Some Final Remarks
Is there a limit to dividing? If the object is matter,
the answer is a qualified yes (according to the standard
model of physics). If the object is numbers, the answer is
no. But when the object is space, the answer is less clear.
Epistemological concerns point out that the structure of our
perceptual processes bias the answer toward yes. If we
generalize away from the bias of our own perceptual process
and attempt to reason toward some general way of conceptual-
izing space, we come to the uncertainty of what we mean by
"how much" or "quantity". Typically we have determined
quantity by counting or measuring. And therein lies the
difficulty. We count things that are one. We measure
things that are divisible. We can't answer the question of
the quantity of space without choosing one of the ways we
use to determine quantity. But so choosing begs the ques-
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ti°n
• Tt now seems that thing are atoms because we count
them and that things are divisible because we measure them.
Is there some a priori way to rule one way out as some-
how not primary? That is, can one of the general views,
atomism or divisionism, be ruled out by showing it to be
flawed in some way? Over the millennia most philosophers
have thought so. The pendulum has swung back and forth many
times. And each swing usually followed some development in
our way of viewing the world.
Prior to its expression atomism held sway in the form
of Melanesian Monism. Everything was one. But monism im-
plied that motion was impossible. So monism gave way to
pluralism. But pluralism suffered from infinite regress.
In a resurgence of monism, extension was claimed to be infi-
nite. But the problem of motion remained, so space was
invented. Now the problem of infinite divisibility can be
applied to pure extension (without body) . But each side
continues to find flaws and question-begging in the other
side's arguments. At the same time we find a proliferation
of mathematical tools on both sides. Measuring develops
right along side counting.
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Infinite sets correspond to many; singleton sets cor-
respond to one. Either thesis (one or many) generates its
antithesis (many or one), but both are required to synthe-
size a solution. In physics relativity theory shows the
identity of matter and energy, and De Broglie developed an
equation relating the wavelength of a particle to its momen
turn.
Modern developments in the philosophy of science show
that any description we make of reality is at best a not-
yet-disconf irmed model, and while we can continually improve
the model by testing and revising it, there is no a priori
way to know when the final model is achieved. Moreover, we
know that our present model of physics is not the final
model because it does not include an account of gravity.
We also now have ample evidence that both points of
view (atomism and divisionism) can reliably be used in vari-
ous circumstances. Although there is as yet very little
general familiarity with discrete metrics, modern computer
display screens are becoming more and more common, and users
who deal with computer graphics are becoming much more ac-
customed to the discrete metrics involved.
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For some things, we use the perspective of infinite
divisibility; for others, we use the perspective of atomism.
Although incompatible with each other, these perspectives
appear to be internally self-consistent. I make an analogy
using model theory. Each point of view is a language capa-
ble of describing "stuff" in a certain way. And either
point of view may be taken. But as modern philosophy of
science has shown, we have no access to the "stuff" except
through the language we choose.
It has been said by that great philosopher Anonymous:
There are two kinds of people in the world —
those who divide the world up into two kinds of
people and those who do not.
That jest illustrates the tension that pervades our think-
ing. The two kinds illustrates counting and atomism while
the opposition illustrates measuring and divisionism. We
count and we measure, and the distinction between these
pervades even our basic physical theory. Wave mechanics is
contrasted with Quantum mechanics. Interference patterns in
light are explained by choosing the divisionist perspective.
The photo-electric effect is explained by choosing the atom-
ist perspective. In our physical theory there is an egua-
tion to relate the two views. In mathematics we can use
either to generate the other.
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We may, in fact, reject the need to choose between
these views, choosing each in its turn according to our
needs and its efficacy in the use to which we intend to put
it. Heraclitus may have said it first.
From out of all the many particulars comes one-
ness, and out of oneness comes all the many par-
ticulars
.
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Notes and References
1.
Antonie Arnauld, The Art of Thinking; Port-Rm,a i Locf icTranslated by James Dickoff and Patricia James (New York-
'
Bobbs-Merrill
, 1964), p. 299.
2.
Loomis, Elisha Scott, The Pythagorean Proposition(Washington D. C.: National Council of Teachers of Mathe-
matics, 1968), p. 224.
3. Loomis, p. 197. The proof given using figure 269 most
closely conforms to the present demonstration.
4. Since B is the base of a triangle and H is its height,
neither can be 1, and we needn't worry about division by
zero
.
5. Although C would be equal to 5 for continuous metric
spaces, it is not 5 in the atomic case; C is 4 for the atom-
ic case. Because the length of the side of the outer square
formed by "adding" the lengths of the sides of the triangles
is "shorter" (by 1) than it would be in continuous metrics,
the size of the atomic inscribed square is smaller than its
corresponding continuous analogue.
6. See Note 5.
7. Loomis
8. Philip Wheelwright, Heraclitus
.
(Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1959; reprint, New York: Atheneum, March
1971), p. 90.
213
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ackrill, J. L. Aristotle ' s Categories and De lntarpre>i-a -
tione. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963.
Aristotle. "Metaphysics". Translated by w. D. Ross, in TheBasic Works of Aristotle
,
Edited by Richard McKeon. NewYork: Random House, 1941.
Arnauld, Antonie. The Art of Thinking: Port-Roval Login .
Translated by James Dickoff and Patricia James. New
York: Bobbs-Merrill
,
1964.
Arnauld, Antonie. The Port-Royal Logic . Translated by Thomas
Spencer Baynes. Edinburgh, Scotland: Sutherland and
Know, 1851.
Bailey, Cyril. The Greek Atomists and Epicurus . New York:
Russell & Russell, Inc., 1964. (First published in
1928) .
Baxter, Donald L. M. "Hume on Infinite Divisibility". His-
tory of Philosophical Quarterly 5 (April 1988): 133.
Bayle, Pierre. Historical and Critical Dictionary . Translat-
ed by Richard Popkin. Indianapolis: Bobs-Merrill
,
1965.
Bergson, Henri. "The Cinematographic View of Becoming". In
Zeno ' s Paradoxes , ed. Wesley Salmon, 59-66. Indianapo-
lis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970.
Beyer, William H.
,
ed. CRC Standard Mathematical Tables .
25 th ed. West Palm Beach, Florida: CRC Press, 1978.
Black, Max. "Achilles and the Tortoise". In Zeno's Paradox-
es
,
ed. Wesley Salmon, 67-81. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Mer-
rill, 1970.
Bostock, David. "Aristotle, Zeno and the Potentially Infi-
nite", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73,
(1972-3): 37-51.
Burnet, John. Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato . New York:
St Martin's Press, 1968.
Cantor, Georg. Contribution to the founding of the Theory of
Transfinite Numbers . Translated by Philip E. B. Jour-
dain, n.p. England: Open Court Publishing Company,
1915; reprint, New York: Dover Publications, 1955.
214
215
Chappell, Vere. "Time and Zeno's Arrow".
Phy 59 (April 12, 1962).
Journal of Philosn-
Clark, Gordon H. Thales to Dewev: A Histnrv Q f
Boston: The Riverside Press, 1957 .
Philosophy .
Devlin, Keith J. Fundamentals of Contemporary Set Theory .
New York: Springer-Verlag
,
1979 .
Edwards, Paul, and others, eds. The Encyclopedia of Philos-
ophy • vol. 8. New York: MacMillan, 1967. S.v. "Zeno of
Elea", by Gregory Vlastos. 369-379.
The Focal Encyclopedia of Film & Television Technique
,London, Boston: Focal press, 1969.
Fogelin, Robert. "Hume and Berkeley On the Proofs of Infi-
nite Divisibility". Philosophical Review 97 (January
1988): 47-69.
Furley, David. Two Studies in the Greek Atomists . Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1967.
Gallop, David. Parmenides of Elea . Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1984.
Grtinbaum, Adolf. "Modern Science and Refutation of the Para-
doxes of Zeno". In Zeno's Paradoxes
,
ed. Wesley Salmon,
164-175. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill
,
1970.
Joachim, Harold H. Aristotle on Coming-to-be & Passinq-away .
Oxford, England: The Clarendon Press, 1922.
King-Farlow, John. "The Actual Infinite in Aristotle". Thom-
ist 52 (July 1988): 427-444. (This paper seems bent on
restoring authority to the third form of knowledge,
knowledge by authority, and contributes nothing to
understanding infinite divisibility.)
Kretzmann, N.
,
ed. Infinity and Continuity in Ancient and
Medieval Thought . Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press,
1982 .
Lear, Jonathan. "Aristotelian Infinity", Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 80, (1979/80): 199-200.
Lee, H. D. P. Zeno of Elea . Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1936.
216
Loomis, Elisha Scott. The Pythagorean Proposition
. Washing-
ton D.C., National Council of Teachers of Mathematics
1968. '
Mendelson
,
Elliott, Introduction to Mathematical Login 2nd.
ed.
,
New York: D. Van Norstrand, 1979 .
Meyers, Robert A., ed. Encyclopedia of Physical Science
Technology Vol . 5. Orlando: Academic Press, 1987. S.v.
"Elementary Particle Physics", by Timothy Barklow and
Martin Perl.
Moore, A. W. "Aspects of the infinite in Kant". Mind 97
(April 1988): 205-223.
North, J. D. "Finite and otherwise: Aristotle And Some Sev-
enteenth Century Views". In Nature Mathematized vol.
1., pp. 113-148. Edited by William R. Shea. University
of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, no.
20. Dordrecht, Holland and Boston, U. S. A.: D. Reidel,
1983 .
Pagels, Heinz R. Perfect Symmetry: The Search for the Begin-
ning of Time . New York: Bantam Books, 1986.
Piaget, Jean. Genetic Epistemology
,
New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1970.
Pohl, Herbert A., Quantum Mechanics for Science and Engi-
neering . Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
1967
Priestly, William McGowen. Calculus: An Historical Approach .
New York: Springer-Verlag
,
1979.
Rohwer, William D.
,
Jr. Paul R. Ammon, and Phebe Cramer.
Understanding Intellectual Development: Three approach-
es to Theory and Practice . Hinsdale, Illinois, The
Dryden Press, a division of Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
Inc., 1974
Ross, W. D. Aristotle's Physics . Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1960.
Russell, Bertrand. The Principles of Mathematics . New York:
W. W. Norton & Company, inc., 1938.
Russell, Bertrand. Our Knowledge of the External World. New
York: W. W. Norton & Company, inc., 1926.
217
Russell, Bertrand. "The Problem of Infinity Considered His-torically". in Zeno 7 s Paradoxes
,
ed. Wesley Salmon45-58. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill
,
1970.
Salmon, Wesley. Zeno 7 s Paradoxes
. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Mer-
rill, 1970.
Shea, William R. ed. Nature Mathemati ?ed vol. 1. University
of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, no.
20. Dordrecht, Holland and Boston, U. S. A.: D. Reidel*
1983. '
Struik, Dirk J. A Concise History of Mathemati ns
. New York:
Dover Publications, 1967.
Taylor, Edwin F. and John Archibald Wheeler, Spacetime Phy-
sics . San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1963
Thomsen, Dietrick E. "Experimenting With 40 Trillion Elec-
tron-Volts". Science News Magazine Vol. 132, No. 20,
November 14, 1987, 315.
Thomsen, D. E.. "Atomic nuclei: Quarks in leaky bags". Sci-
ence News Magazine Vol. 125, No. 18, May 5, 1984, 297.
Thomson, James. "Tasks and Super-Tasks". In Zeno 7 s Paradox-
es
,
ed. Wesley Salmon, 89-102. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Mer-
rill, 1970.
Wheelwright, Philip. Heraclitus . Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1959; reprint, New York: Atheneum, 1971.
White, David A. "Part and Whole in Aristotle's concept of
Infinity". Thomist 49 (April 1985): 168-182.
Williams, C. J. F. Aristotle's De Generations Et Corrup-
tione . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982.
Wysotsky, Michael Z. Wide Screen Cinema and Stereophonic
Sound, translated by Wing Commander A. E. C. York, New
York: Hastings House, 1971.

